The article has two basic goals. The first one is to create a conceptual framework
for the discussion of judicial impartiality. In order to achieve this aim, in this text I reflect on three aspects of the principle of impartiality, which have generally been studied independently from one another in the literature. I make an attempt to show that the three distinguished aspects of impartiality can be analysed, using a uniform conceptual scale. The second goal of the paper is to justify a claim that one of these aspects (namely the aspect of impartiality towards worldview doctrines) differs from the other two in terms of structure. In the text, I attempt to consider that difference and then propose a formula for judicial worldview neutrality that takes into account the special nature of that aspect of judicial impartiality. The conclusion of these reflections is the introduction of two versions of the worldview neutrality principle, which should – in my view – be applied in activities under taken by judges.
The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.
The main purpose of the presented research project is to prepare an initiating answer to the present state of judicial integrity recognised as the top of legal professions and the legal system as such. The method comes mainly from the Oxford analytical jurisprudence, nevertheless, the historical and interdisciplinary approaches, as well as a legal practice, were taken seriously into consideration. The main theses and their scientific standpoints are: (i) at present, we are facing the disintegration of integrity; (ii) one of the sources of it lies in the very grounds of major jurisprudential terms, understood as parts of the Hartian internal point of view and that there are fundamental analytical paradoxes of integrity, generating practical dysfunctionalities; (iii) it is possible to solve main problems through a completely new approach: an ontological turn in the philosophy of law causing the idea of law as a concept and a new concept of integrity, namely ‘negative integrity’. It could be easily and effectively treated as practical support for firstly improving judicial integrity and secondly legal practice in general.
The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge’s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.
The paper analyzes the concept of integrity of a judge from the perspective of the virtue jurisprudence. There are the judicial virtues specified and described, including integrity as one of the elements of the virtue of justice. Subjective and objective integrity are distinguished, as well as personal, professional and institutional integrity. Integrity of a judge is understood as personal integrity combined with professional integrity and also institutional integrity in which values and aims of the profession are taken into account. Virtue jurisprudence does not provide clear directives for solving legal disputes but it emphasizes the necessity of referring to the dispositions of a judge in order to understand fully the process of judgment. On the grounds of virtue jurisprudence, the integrity of a moral subject if assumed which provides the foundation for trust in the profession of judge and does not allow for the separation of social roles, assuming the possibility of reconciling them with the use of prudence. The problem of conflicting virtues, namely integrity and impartiality in the context of judicial review is discussed on the example of the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of October 22, 2020, K 1/20 which illustrates judicial activism. The considerations concerning this example bring about the conclusion that in the most controversial political and moral disputes, political prudence suggest the direction of the virtue of judicial restraint due to deference of democracy and the division of powers.
This paper dwells on the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity. It claims that for the emergence and proper functioning of judicial empathy as a kind of judicial virtue, a number of conditions needed to be fulfilled, including the development of judicial integrity. The paper aims to unpack this argument and to demonstrate judicial empathy and integrity in action as exemplified particularly by judicial behaviour observed during empirical research in Cracow lower courts. The overall perspective for examining the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity rests on the developmental vision of a judge. Although the presented research fits into the broader interest in judicial empathy and judicial virtues, the paper contains concrete examples of verbal and non-verbal behaviours of a judge that demonstrate how judicial empathy co-functions with other skills and virtues. In general, the paper opposes the marginalisation of judicial skills and virtues.
The purpose of the article is to analyse the relationship between judicial integrity and the institution of votum separatum. The first part concerns the relationship between the concepts of a definite approach to a professional role performed and the institution of votum separatum. The second part of the paper attempts to answer the question whether care about maintaining integrity can actually be attributed to dissents submitted to the Constitutional Tribunal. The article attempts to justify a conclusion that judicial integrity does not constitute the main function of dissents that are actually submitted to the Tribunal. The main obstacle is interpreting cases in which such dissents were submitted, as axiological opposites. Thus, what can be attributable to dissents is definite values, for the protection of which these dissents are submitted, such as e.g. individual rights or care about the public interest. However, the relation of these values to judicial integrity is not obvious. This results from the fact that axiological characteristics attributed to the same judge’s dissents are subject to change. That change results not from the inconsistency of beliefs, but from the characteristics of the case examined.
This paper presents the issue of a lawyer’s integrity from the perspective of the assumptions underlying the original concept of a holistic approach to law and legal practice. In the course of the discussion, the basic principles of legal holism, the assumed understanding of lawyer’s integrity and their personal qualities forming the lawyer personality, and the problem of integrity in the context of the formula (model) shaping the lawyer-client relationship will be introduced. Legal holism recognises a lawyer’s self-knowledge, their conscious choice of professional role(s), the ways in which they are performed and the formula for working with clients and parties to disputes as crucial issues for the practice of law. It emphasises their complexity and possible impact on the postulated observance by a lawyer of the integrity of attitudes and actions in professional and private life. The author represents a research approach related to the concept of ontological and methodological multidimensionality of legal phenomena and the postulate of the so-called external integration of jurisprudence with the achievements of other sciences, including branches other than social (e.g. psychology or sociology).
The COVID-19 pandemic, placing societies and governments in an exceptional situation in every respect, has had an impact on the legal order of individual countries. It pressed them, on the one hand, to take swift and decisive actions and, on the other hand – to a necessary thorough assessment and considering of the costs and consequences, both legal and economic, of the introduced measures, often related to the constraints of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. Although Sweden during the pandemic seemingly chose a path different from other European countries, keeping social life largely unaffected, in its essence this strategy did not differ much from those used in other countries. The aim of the article is to present the solutions adopted in Sweden and to analyse the Swedish strategy against the background of constitutional civil liberties.
The article analyses known facts concerning the corruption of deputies in Ukraine. The negative influence of various oligarchs on legislative activity is shown in it. It was established that the manifestations of corruption in legislative activity are significantly easier due to its imperfection and lack of proper regulations.
The principle of the inevitability of punishment as regards the deputies is formal. Several recommendations have been formulated based on the research in order to improve legislative measures.
Numerous corruption-related facts concerning the deputies indicate significant deformations of legislative activity for the purpose of illegal enrichment. It was shown in the paper that the improvement of the legislative process has not been implemented properly.
There is every reason to claim that the purpose of individual deputies’ legislative activity is to form unclear relations between business and the government on special conditions to which citizens do not have any access. Some of the deputies use those privileges not for the good of society, but for personal enrichment.
It is noted that the inevitability of the punishment of deputies for the crime of corruption is rather pretended. Activities which are meant to fight corruption in that category of higher national officials are being implemented quite slowly.
An adoption of a number of acts improving legislative actions the purpose of which is to fight corruption among deputies is proposed. The elimination of illegal relations between the government and business is a priority.
: According to Article 15(1) of the UDHR, ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’. Although the quoted provision looks deceptively straightforward, the determination of its content is not an easy task. Past research has been mainly focused on the problem of statelessness which was the historical reason for the introduction of the right in question. In this paper, I argue that holding the status of a formal national is not enough to have the right to a nationality secured. To show this, first, I analyse the difference between the concepts of ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ with special attention paid to the cultural component of national identity. Second, I investigate the understanding of a nationality as ‘the right to have rights’. On the basis of the research on the statelessness I ask what challenges are faced by people without the formal nationality of any state and I show that being a national of certain states is equivalent to being stateless with respect to certain fundamental rights of an individual. Thus, the right to a nationality is indeed ‘the right to have rights’, but only if it is a right to a right nationality. In consequence, I suggest that (1) any state which recognises the right guaranteed in Article 15 of the UDHR should embrace its full content by readiness to accept as nationals those whose original nationality does not guarantee the protection of their first-order rights or is based on values clearly contradictory to their own; (2) peoples from failed states should be able to acquire new citizenship in a country of maximal cultural affinity, with regard to the economic effectiveness of the latter; (3) the obtaining of new citizenship may legitimately be conditioned by demand on compliance with the system of values of the nationality granted.
The purpose of the article is to present selected aspects of the issue of legal (administrative and legal) impossibility and to propose structural solutions that can contribute to reducing the scale of that negative phenomenon. Firstly, the article refers to the causes of legal impossibility and its form. Next, a structural solution that has been used and verified in developed administrations, that is, the accountability of administration, was presented, and its application to Polish administrative law was proposed. The study includes the use of, among other things, the method of transferring management solutions to administrative law. In the paper, a thesis was formulated that a systemic and correct introduction of the institution of the accountability of administration into the Polish system of administrative law (in the form of proper structural norms) may significantly contribute to reducing the scope of legal impossibility. The reflections presented in the article are provided in two dimensions – one that is formal and dogmatic and another that concerns legal realism.
The purpose of this article is to answer a handful of research questions. Can the numerous reliefs and exemptions provided for in tax law be qualified as the public subjective rights of the taxpayer?
Answering the question formulated in this way requires the verification of the research hypothesis, according to which tax reliefs and exemptions are, contrary to the judgments of the CT and the SAC, the subjective rights of the taxpayer.
Generally speaking, no publications in the tax law literature are devoted to the topic of interpreting tax reliefs and exemptions as the subjective rights of the taxpayer.
The main conclusion is that only systemic tax reliefs and only those systemic exemptions that jointly meet the two conditions can be considered the subjective rights of a taxpayer. First of all, they have a nature of disposable exemptions, i.e. the ones which involve the taxpayer’s right to make a choice. Secondly, the use of an exemption cannot be subject to administrative discretion. In the case of systemic tax reliefs, the verification of the first condition is always positive because there is no doubt that all systemic reliefs regulated in tax laws are the subjective rights of the taxpayer
Recently, interest in the method of administrative law regulations to tackle the problems of labour law has remained high in the Polish doctrine of labour law. New studies on this subject emerge every now and then. Leaving aside the perceived validity of the method to arrange labour law relations based on public law, I would like to point to the undoubted “appeal” of the axiological foundations of administrative law for the labour law system and, at the same time, to reflect on the consequences of the aforesaid axiology when looking at the potential choice between the method based on private law or public law in the realm of labour law relations. I assume that such a choice should be ultimately made for the sake of the science of labour law. However if labour is treated as a commodity, there can be no question of an extensive axiology that highlights the good of humans and the morality of the employer.
The article deals with the essence of the object of crime protection, as well as its genesis and conditions as exemplified by crimes against the honour of deceased people in selected countries. It has been hypothesised that factors such as religion, political system, historical and cultural conditions, geographical location, social system (social development) and the wealth of society influence the definition of the subject of the investigated crimes. The purpose of the work is also to indicate how the legislator creates a good legally protected in the event of a crime. On the one hand, these considerations have a purely linguistic and logical basis, i.e. an attempt is made to answer the question why we create names in relation to abstract objects, i.e. not having a real designation. The research hypothesis is that the object of protection remains only a linguistic entity created to justify the punishment of certain behaviours (and other needs), while it is possible to name the same value or phenomenon in different ways.
The article covers the issue of the functioning of one of the advisory bodies of central governmental administration, i.e. the Council for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Affairs, which is associated with the President of the National Atomism Agency (PAA), the chief nuclear supervision body in Poland, which is the competent authority in nuclear safety and radiation protection affairs, as defined in the Atomic Law (Prawo atomowe). The article presents the objectives of the functioning of the Council as an advisory body to the nuclear supervision authority on the basis of international and European law and the views of the nuclear energy law doctrine. In relation to the Council, an important role is played by soft law acts, especially the so-called IAEA safety standards. Despite the fact that they are not legally binding, they constitute a valuable and extensive collection of recommendations supporting regional and national legislative activity. The purpose of this study is also a critical analysis of the amendment to the Atomic Law from 2016 in the section relating to changes made to the way of shaping the Council’s make-up. They caused the loss of one of the Council’s most important attributes, i.e. independence in the decision-making process and they deprived the President of the PAA (decision-making body) of influence on shaping its make-up. The changes introduced should be interpreted as an unequivocal negation of the ratio legis of appointing the Council and a significant step backwards in relation to the existing practice and legislative trends in recent years. The author postulates restoring the previous legal solutions as the ones that will allow the Council, the advisory body, to fulfil its function in the right way, really supporting the decision-making authority for which it works.
Mediation in the administrative procedure is a new institution that provides a chance for an improved perception of public administration, yet it also gives rise to a range of doubts. The latter spring chiefly, though not solely, from the nature of administrative control. The principles of the rule of law, objective law, and voluntary mediation, which may be taken an improper advantage of, contrary to the legislator’s intentions, are also identified as barriers.
Analysis of the issue implies that administrative proceedings leave room for mediation. Whether it will fulfil expectations, however, largely depends on the attitudes of parties and administrative authorities, or their employees, to be precise, for whom mediation is undoubtedly both a processual and mental challenge.
The introduction of mediation to the Code of Administrative Procedure is to be applauded, mainly from the perspective of inducing citizens’ trust in public authorities. Mediation may also prove an effective instrument of eliminating conflicts in administration and thus contribute to reducing the caseload to be heard by administrative courts.
It is important, though, for this opportunity to be taken proper advantage of and for the transformation of administration from controlling to mediating and more friendly to subjects administered to continue. This is a trend that deserves to be followed not only in Polish but also other legislations.