The purpose of the article is to provide a comparative analysis of two types of randomization – egalitarian and proportional – in distributive decisions, with a view to determining conditions in which they can be applied. It is argued in the article that justice reasons in favour of egalitarian randomization should be construed broadly (as embracing not only the situation of indifference – the equal satisfaction of a given criterion, but also the situations of the lack of criteria or their incommensurability), and that they are stronger than utilitarian reasons. It is also argued that the confl ict between justice ex ante and justice ex post may take an acute form only in the case of proportional randomization, which is why this type of randomization can be applied relatively rarely – only in two situations: if the distribution is repeatedly made and/or if the differences
between claims of the candidates (for a good/burden being distributed) are not substantial. Some other differences are also pointed out in the article, e.g., that while proportional randomization must always be statistical, egalitarian randomization may be at times epistemic. It is also argued that in some circumstances (e.g., in the context of the so called Number Problem) doubts may arise as to which type of randomization should be applied, and the applications of both types may prove to be equivalent.

This paper presents the results of two studies analysing the impact of procedural fairness and a sense of alienation on real tax payments in the public goods game. Study 1 showed that an unfair procedure of determining the rules of the game increases the frequency of tax evasion. In Study 2, tax evasion was associated with a sense of alienation induced in the subjects, understood as a conviction about the ineffectiveness of one’s own actions. The results of the studies presented in this paper indicate the importance of the treatment of taxpayers by the tax system as a factor infl uencing the propensity for tax fraud.

In the Polish public debate, one occasionally hears voices advocating the need for a significant change in the system of elections to Sejm, the Lower Chamber of Parliament – the objective of such changes would be to strengthen larger parties. As an example to follow, proponents of these changes cite Hungary, where the changes in electoral rules allowed the party in power to retain majority in the legislative despite reduction in popular support. Opponents of this solution see it as a manifest electoral manipulation. The aim of the present paper is to analyze how the “marginal only” changes to the structure of constituencies electing members of Sejm postulated in the political arena would affect electoral results of individual political groups and what would be the broader political consequences. The author pays particular attention to expected impact of such changes on the majority bonus for the winning party, possible government coalition variants, concentration of party system at parliamentary level and proportionality of elections. Simulation of allocation of seats in Sejm based on votes cast was prepared for three possible variants of the structure of Sejm constituencies, on the basis of historical data (for the 2011 and 2015 elections) and the predicted results of 2019 elections. Comparison of the simulated outcomes with the results obtained in the system currently in place allows to answer the main question posed.

In this article we attempt to summarize the fi ndings from a number of studies on the asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect, decoy effect). This is a phenomenon where popularity of one of the decision alternatives increases when accompanied by a similar but inferior (dominated) option. Scientifi c research and numerous observational studies show that the attraction effect occurs in various fi elds, incl. the economy, politics, law or medicine. In the literature there are many ambiguities and contradictory theories about, for example, its determinants in the light of the dual-systems theory. It is not ntirely clear whether the phenomenon of asymmetric domination is the result of a refl ective, deliberative way of information processing or of quick and intuitive thinking. There is also no unequivocal answer to the question whether this effect is a manifestation of human irrationality or whether it is an adaptive and effective decision-making strategy in conditions of uncertainty and information noise. The article contains a broad overview of research on the effect of asymmetric dominance among people and animals. The hanges in the susceptibility to this effect across the lifespan are analysed. Finally, the paper discusses using the asymmetric dominance effect to achieve socially desirable goals as described in the theory of libertarian paternalism.

Winning a championship is the highest achievement in Formula 1, and multiple titles can earn one a place in the pantheon of the sport. In this article I explore whether the scoring method for selecting a champion can be considered defi nitive, and how unstable results might be when the method’s parameters are slightly changed. I have employed case studies of paradoxes and historical recreations of seasons using alternative scoring systems. Finally, I argue that the Borda count is desirable system for scoring in Formula 1,
and that building strategies by teams around particular scoring systems is a legitimate aspect of the sport.