The main goal of this research was to investigate whether people exhibit algorithm aversion—a tendency to avoid using an imperfect algorithm even if it outperforms human judgments—in the case of estimating students’ percentile scores on a standardized math test. We also explored the relationships between numeracy and algorithm aversion and tested two interventions aimed at reducing algorithm aversion. In two studies, we asked participants to estimate the percentiles of 46 real 15-year-old Polish students on a standardized math test. Participants were offered the opportunity to compare their estimates with the forecasts of an algorithm—a statistical model that predicted real percentile scores based on fi ve explanatory variables (i.e., gender, repeating a class, the number of pages read before the exam, the frequency of playing online games, socioeconomic status). Across two studies, we demonstrated that even though the predictions of the statistical model were closer to students’ percentile scores,
participants were less likely to rely on the statistical model predictions in making forecasts. We also found that higher statistical numeracy was related to a higher reluctance to use the algorithm. In Study 2, we introduced two interventions to reduce algorithm aversion. Depending on the experimental condition, participants either received feedback on statistical model predictions or were provided with a detailed description of the statistical model. We found that people, especially those with higher statistical numeracy, avoided using the imperfect algorithm even though it outperformed human judgments.
Interestingly, a simple intervention that explained how the statistical model
works led to better performance in an estimation task.

Before the parliamentary elections in 2018, the ruling party in Turkey, AKP, introduced a new apparentement provision in the electoral law, which allowed parties to make electoral alliances in order to meet the electoral threshold. We claim that this was an ex post mistake. AKP’s electoral engineering was motivated by their fear that its coalition partner, MHP, would not exceed the 10% threshold. While MHP actually met the threshold in the election, the opposition party, İP, failed to do so. Thanks to the new law, the votes for İP were not wasted, as would have happened under the old law. AKP less than 50% of seats and it consequently lost the parliamentary majority. Under the old electoral law, AKP would have won the majority. We use four alternative scenarios in order to estimate the seats and evaluate the political consequences of the unsuccessful electoral manipulation

This paper proposes a correction to the Flis-Słomczyński-Stolicki (2019, 2020) formula for countries with large variation among their districts in terms of political divisions. The Flis-Słomczyński-Stolicki formula (FSS formula) estimates seat allocations under the Jefferson-D’Hondt method by using national vote shares, as well as other parameters that are often readily available. However, the FSS formula does not yield precise estimates in those countries where there are independent candidates, special rights assigned to minority parties, signifi cant variation in district sizes, or an unequal distribution of votes due to ethnic or other regional divisions. Hence, I propose dividing the national distribution of votes into regions that satisfy the assumptions of the FSS formula within their district borders. By applying the FSS formula to regions consisting of historically and politically homogenous districts, I demonstrate that the formula’s estimates become signifi cantly more precise. For instance, by applying the regional correction to the 2018 Turkish Parliamentary elections, as well as other Turkish elections between 2007 and 2015, I show that the formula with the correction in three separate regions improves the Loosemore-Hanby goodness of fi t estimates from 2.1 to 3.41 percentage points (95% CI). Thus, the correction might signifi cantly improve the estimates of the FSS formula in various countries, including Spain, Peru, and Belgium.

This paper analyzes the French and the Vietnamese versions of the TV game show “The Price is Right”, using data from 130 episodes. We focus on the bidding game, covering 434 rounds and 1,736 bids. We document that players deviate signifi cantly from what is predicted by the model of rational expectations, especially in the French population. Moreover, Vietnamese fourth bidders are found to win more frequently than their French counterparts in spite of using strategic bids less often. We attribute these results to cultural reasons. Contestants from the collectivistic, uncertainty-tolerant culture (i.e., Vietnam) are more reluctant to engage in strategic bidding than individuals from the individualistic, uncertainty-avoidant culture (i.e., France). However, Vietnamese contestants pay more attention to the estimates of the previous players and thus make a better use of the informational advantage inherent to the sequential nature of the game. Overall, our evidence suggests that culture is an important omitted variable in studies that examine cross-country differences in decision-making.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the relation between the structure of a school-group and the problem of bullying. Bullying is a specific type of school violence, that occurs when a perpetrator or a group of perpetrators repeatedly attack a relatively helpless victim. This type of violence involves not only bullies and their victims, but also bystanders - other students who witness the process of bullying. Bullies’ behavior is planned and aimed at building social status in the group, and the suffering of the victims is not their main goal. Bystanders play a major role in the process, as their approval or disapproval can either encourage or discourage the bully. Behaviour of bystanders is analysed, with the use of a modifi ed structurally embedded coordination game, in order to show how the structure of the group can infl uence the process of bullying.

The article presents an important application of spatial generalization of Shapley value for simple games. Proposition presented by Shapley and Owen enables very interesting empirical interpretations. It has also strong contribution in the research of spatial voting models’ properties when there is no stable solution. This theorem enables us to fi nd the least unstable solution and therefore this is the valuable answer to the problem presented in the McKelvey’s theorem. The article presents the main postulates of the spatial voting theory, a geometric insight on which the general proof of Shapley-Owen theorem is based and empirical illustration of the presented concepts.

Typically, three kinds of settings, under which decisions are made, are distinguished, certainty, uncertainty, and risk. In this view, uncertainty is defi ned narrowly, as a situation, in which the probability distribution is unknown. However, D. Ellsberg’s studies showed that ambiguity, defi ned as an intermediate condition between uncertainty and risk, could be considered as the fourth type of decision settings. Seen from this perspective, uncertainty is a more complex notion and it is commonly experienced with regard to important issues other than only total or partial lack of knowledge of probability. Following the review of concepts of uncertainty, we present examples of their impact on
everyday life economic decisions that are made in the domains of consumer behaviour, saving, investment, and entrepreneurship. Finally, we present some methods of coping with different kinds of uncertainty.