The dynamic development of experimental economics, in particular of experimental work in game theory, has contributed to the questioning of the basic assumptions of classical game theory: the rationality and self-interest assumption. In response, those assumptions are being modified and more realistic models of human behavior in situations which can be described as games are being developed. The article provides a short overview of the models that abandon the self-interest assumption. An account is given mostly of the distributional models (i.a. inequity aversion models, model of quasi-maximin preferences). The results of the experiments designed to test the rival distributional models of social preferences are also presented in the article, as well as of the experiments that assess to the role played by intention-based reciprocity in motivating human behavior.

This paper presents the new, interdisciplinary field of science called neuroeconomics. The first part of the paper shows relations between neuroeconomics, classical economics and behavioral economics. Next, the most popular measurement methods used in neuroeconomic experiments are described. Finally, the paper reviews results from neuroconomic research in four areas: 1) choices under risk and uncertainty, 2) moral decision making, 3) intertemporal decision making, 4) economic behavior in the social context.

We are concerned with prerequisites for a wide acceptance in practice of computer based methods to support decision making within multiple criteria environment. An attempt is made to identify key obstacles, which hamper this process and, building on the published results of the Author, ways to overcome them, both in the methodological and the technical aspects, are outlined

In this paper we analyze the optimal stopping time problem known as Elfving problem. The problem can be formulated as follows: a decision maker observes offers which appear at jump times of a Poisson process. The decision concerning acceptance or rejection of a presented offer is made at the moment of its appearance. Once rejected, offer cannot be considered again. A reward for the decision maker is equal to the discounting value of the selected offer. The aim of the decision maker is to maximize his expected reward. In this paper we present applications of the described model in economy and sociology. We also present the optimal strategy and a differential equation which allows us to compute the optimal mean reward. Moreover, we analyze the influence of model’s parameters on the value of optimal mean reward and we compute the mean time of waiting for the optimal stopping time.