In this article, the Polish institution of administrative entry to the area in order to carry out repair, maintenance or removal of failures of transmission equipment will be presented. It entitles to public-law interference in the constitutionally protected property right, under the condition that the determinants of its application have been met. The aim of the analysis is to indicate that the expropriation nature of this regulation, which is a specific form of expropriation, requires a strict interpretation of the premises leading to the restriction of the ownership for purposes related to transmission activity. An attempt will be made to demonstrate that the restriction of the ownership made on the basis of an administrative decision meets the expropriation standards applicable in the Polish legal system. The presented issues are not only of purely theoretical importance, but will also be used in the application of legal regulations by both public administration authorities and transmission companies applying for a permission.

The purpose of the research conducted is to present the directions of changes in
the Polish legislation on accessing and reusing public information, showing perspectives for public information in administration. The pursue of it is accompanied by a diagnosis of the most important issues in the execution of the guaranteed information powers, and also by an analysis of the judicature’s work and postulates of the doctrine in this regard. The object of the study using the method of dogmatic-
legal analysis covers Polish and European normative acts, scientific publications,
the case law of administrative courts and the Constitutional Tribunal. The results
indicate that the issues and doubts raised concern the fundamental aspects of
access to public information, as well as detailed issues related to establishing a legal
framework for the principles of reusing that information. The current directions
of changes fit into building administration that is based on open public data, which
will not only ensure wide access to public information but will also create and gather
data in a way that will allow for the further economic use of those data by the private
sector. Resolving the existing problems in exercising information rights and implementing the projected changes will both pose a considerable challenge to the public administration. The conducted research allowed for formulating legislative postulates and remarks addressed to the legislator, as well as practical solutions concerning the organisation of the administration apparatus.

The article deals with the problem of modal inference: if some addressees are
obliged to do something, they are also obliged to realize states of affairs which
constitute a necessary condition for the main obligation. Likewise, they are obliged
to refrain from realizing states of affairs which constitute a sufficient condition for
the action contradicting the main obligation. This type of inference is called in Polish legal theory “instrumental inference”. It is argued in the article that sometimes instrumental norms in law must be fulfilled (“preparatory actions” must be undertaken) before the main obligation is fulfilled. Lawgiver helps addressees of norms by applying vacatio legis. It can lead to new paradoxical consequences – to the creation of “virtual norms” – norms which never come into force, but addressees are obliged to undertake preparatory actions. The article presents theoretical
description of this phenomenon. In conclusion one dogmatic claim is proposed:
there is a potential way (art. 4171 § 1 k.c.) of getting from public officials compensation for preparatory actions which caused burden for addressees, when the main obligation turned out to be “virtual”. In Poland this procedure should be based on the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal.

The aim of this article is to answer the question whether taxpayers are entitled to any subjective rights that are overtly, unambiguously and legibly laid down in tax law. The author presents the title issue by analysing a broad base of judicature by
Poland’s CT, the EUCJ and Poland’s administrative courts, also discussing the relevant literature concerning subjective rights as coded in the provisions of the Polish Constitution and tax law. Taxpayers’ subjective rights may constitute an effective protection measure not only vis-a-vis the administrative discretion of tax authorities, but also in the event of their abuse of administrative power in relations with entities obliged to pay levies.

The aim of the publication is to establish the function of the legal regulation of the principle of resolving legal doubts in favour of the citizen (in dubio pro libertate), introduced by the amendment of 2017 to the Code of Administrative Procedure. The purpose of the article is also to compare the state of the regulation in force at the time of its entry into force with the legal state created after the introduction of the amendment. It has been argued that the introduced principle worsened the legal situation of citizens in relation to their situation before its entry into force. The paper briefly presents the functions of law, including procedural law. This principle has been discussed and it has been established that it has a protective function. First and foremost, to ensure the security and stability of the law when the legislator has failed to fulfil its duty to legislate correctly and fairly. This function is of particular importance in cases where an administrative body unilaterally determines constitutional rights and freedoms. Resolving legal doubts in favour of the citizens is of particular importance in administrative law, which is very dynamic area (inflation and atomisation of this law), specialised (e.g. technical conditions of development) and complex due to the existence of various hierarchies of sources of law (constitution, statutes and secondary legislation, including local laws). The principle also protects other values, such as an important public interest. As a result of the comparison of the state of regulation before 2017, it was established that as long as the principle of in dubio pro libertate was a postulate of the doctrine, court judgments, interpreted from other principles of administrative proceedings, it did not suffer such significant limitations and could serve more fully to protect an entity. It the current state of law, administrative bodies can make use of it in a limited way only to several proceedings. Nor does it apply if there is – as is common in administrative proceedings – an important social interest or conflicting legal or factual interests of the parties concerned. The originality of the work results from taking into account the case law developed since the entry into force of the principle and the comparison and analysis of the situation of citizens before and after its introduction into the Code. The research carried out for the purpose of this work will be based on the comparative legal method as well as legal-dogmatic analysis, including the analysis of Polish normative material and the resulting views of the judicature and doctrine of law.

The paper shows an American model of the participation of the society in the administration of justice. It is crucial for the Polish discussion about the involvement of public factor in that manner. The analysis is divided between the constitutional right to trial by jury and the institution of justices of the peace, which is unique for the Anglo-Saxon legal system. Research conducted here is the result of a detailed analysis of the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States and selected state courts that shaped the views of the American academia on this issue. Hopefully, this brief study will help to reform the Polish judicial process.

The paper aims to show that the Polish Environmental Law is an act that imposes
public imposts to protect Poland’s natural environment. This act features certain
specific qualities and legal solutions. The author has formulated a claim that some
of the provisions concerning the fees for the use of the natural environment and
the emissions surcharge breach the constitutional standards of exclusivity of an
impost act, of the right to predictable taxation, decent legislation, and a democratic
state of law.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The article presents the problem related to the manner of defining a new psychoactive substance. The definition, partly contained in the provisions of the Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction of 2005, as regards the specification of the type of offense, refers to sub-statutory regulations – the ordinance of the Minister of Health. This way of defining the characteristics of a prohibited act raises constitutional doubts from the point of view of the principle of the exclusivity of the act and related rules:
1. Principles of the rule of law expressed in Article 2 of the Polish Constitution by not complying with the requirement of the principle of proper legislation.
2. The principles of nullum crimen sine lege certa arising from Article 42 paragraph 1 of the Polish Constitution, by violating the guarantee function of criminal law by violating the directive on statutory exclusivity and statutory specificity of an act.
3. Principles of the separation of powers resulting from Article 10 of the Polish Constitution by entrusting the executive authority with the powers of the legislative authority.
4. The principles of proportionality expressed in Article 31 paragraph 3 of the Polish Constitution regarding the grounds and scope of admissible limitation of constitutional rights and freedoms and the manner of limiting them.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The main aim of this paper is to consider the acceptability of application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law in the regard to employment contract with pregnant women from the point of theory of justice. I argue that application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code resulting in exclusion of pregnant women from social security system not only might be doubtful from the constitutional law perspective, but it is also problematic from the point of view of the concept of justice realized by social security law. In the first part I recall in short basic typologies and definitions of justice. This leads to the observation, that although in philosophy there is no one understanding of justice, this notion has a long and established tradition. In following parts I ana- lyze which concepts of justice are being realized by constitutional law, civil law and social security law. I argue that as constitutional law and social security law deal mostly with distributive justice, civil law realizes mostly commutative justice, which also concerns Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code. In the last part I demonstrate consequences of applying Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law on the example of pregnant women being excluded from the social security system. This is followed by the final conclusion that although also for lawyers notion of justice has a long tradition, it is often im- posed in spite of "locally" realized types of justice, which leads to unwelcome and unforeseeable consequences.

This article has originated from observations of the current Polish political and legal disputes over the Constitution. In pursuing the reasons for the different lines of the argumentation presented, we have brought the issue of education in constitutional law to attention. We have covered the issue in two stages. The first stage involves a discussion of education models as expounded in social theory. Our starting point was the structural-functional model and its criticism along the lines of conflict, interpretative, and critical theories. This is followed by a presentation of the evolution of administrative-law institutions in the light of the conflict between the expected openness to ethical and political dimensions and the claims for integrity and coherence. To this end, we followed the proposals of Nonet and Selznick. The second stage includes a review of three conceptions of the constitution and constitutionalism. The views of Kelsen, Schmitt as well as the American judicial review doctrine served as model examples. These proposals can be presented as the cornerstones of three visions of constitutional-law education. We did not content ourselves with presenting a set of models of education and covering a reconstruction of the vision of constitutional education. We have also attempted to demonstrate, bearing in mind the nature of the Polish debate over the Constitution, that the judicial review doctrine opens up a promising sphere for a revaluation of both the theory and practice of constitutional law.

The article aims to help realize that to understand the changes which take place in space policy and space law, it is necessary to abandon the old course of thought and think the other way. The author exposes thesis that force to take a look at the law in a different way. He states that: all sources of international law (specified in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ) and EU law are in force in the Polish legal order, with the exception of international agreements, which only apply if they are ratified by the Republic of Poland and published in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland. The legal policy (conducted by the competent authorities in each forum based on the specific procedures) is the ius reflex, which inspires the development of lex and vice versa. The law applies beyond the borders of states’ jurisdictions (res communis) in the maritime and outer space and becomes a constitutional element of the new civilization (market and culture), which gradually affects the law within the jurisdiction of states (sovereignty and sovereign rights). The power of law ceases to guarantee the resolution of international conflicts, which forces the application of the law of force. The sine qua non condition to survive the new civilization is to protect humanity and to share resources fairly in the process of transformation.