The article is based on an assumption that constitutionalism has a Janus face. A constitution is both a legal and a political act. So far, the public domain has been dominated by legal constitutionalism (constitutional dogmatics), which excludes the constitution from the public sphere, subjecting it to the authority of lawyers-experts. The contemporary political phenomena such as: new populism, illiberal democracy or new constitutionalism should shift the interest of researchers to the political aspect of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is, therefore, a multidimensional social practice. A political game featuring many actors. And the constitutionalism of lawyers is only one of its possible interpretations. Citizens also have their own constitutionalisms, and different perspectives on constitutionalism, reflecting opposing interests, may lead to conflicts. The constitutional law dogmatics applied to resolve such conflicts would argue for the existence of a transcendental framework for their resolution. A more political approach denies the existence of such a framework. In other words, the dogmatics in question requires democracy to adapt to constitutionalism, while the political approach requires constitutionalism to adapt to democracy. The text is an introduction to a part of a volume featuring articles by authors affiliated with the Centre for Legal Education and Social
Theory of the University of Wrocław.

The article is based on an assumption that constitutionalism has a Janus face. A constitution is both a legal and a political act. So far, the public domain has been dominated by legal constitutionalism (constitutional dogmatics), which excludes the constitution from the public sphere, subjecting it to the authority of lawyers-experts. The contemporary political phenomena such as: new populism, illiberal democracy or new constitutionalism should shift the interest of researchers to the political aspect of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is, therefore, a multidimensional social practice. A political game featuring many actors. And the constitutionalism of lawyers is only one of its possible interpretations. Citizens also have their own constitutionalisms, and different perspectives on constitutionalism, reflecting opposing interests, may lead to conflicts. The constitutional law dogmatics applied to resolve such conflicts would argue for the existence of a transcendental framework for their resolution. A more political approach denies the existence of such a framework. In other words, the dogmatics in question requires democracy to adapt to constitutionalism, while the political approach requires constitutionalism to adapt to democracy. The text is an introduction to a part of a volume featuring articles by authors affiliated with the Centre for Legal Education and Social Theory of the University of Wrocław.

This text aims to prove the thesis that we are currently witnessing a birth of new constitutional solutions. The populist movements across the world, and especially in Central and Eastern Europe, are effectively redesigning liberal-democratic constitutionalism. There is a clear correlation between populism, constitutionalism, and democracy, and so the process of redesign of the Central and Eastern European constitutionalism has an underlying democratic potential. Perhaps it is a sort of necessary adjustment of the system implanted in this part of the world after 1989.

The article discusses the issue of the place and presence of women in the public sphere, and tries to answer the question of how these matters are impacted by the institution of the Constitutional Tribunal. Applying the method of discourse analysis, I have examined the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s decisions and looked into the media discussion, with both revealing dominant trends regarding women’s rights in Polish constitutionalism. Using the category of counterpublics, I also cover emancipation movements important on account of women’s rights and their presence in the public domain. I also address the common myths concerning the Constitutional Tribunal. There are also mentions of room for the materialisation of emancipation processes in Polish constitutionalism.

The article discusses the issue of the place and presence of women in the public sphere, and tries to answer the question of how these matters are impacted by the institution of the Constitutional Tribunal. Applying the method of discourse analysis, I have examined the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s decisions and looked into the media discussion, with both revealing dominant trends regarding women’s rights in Polish constitutionalism. Using the category of counterpublics, I also cover emancipation movements important on account of women’s rights and their presence in the public domain. I also address the common myths concerning the Constitutional Tribunal. There are also mentions of room for the materialisation of emancipation processes in Polish constitutionalism.

Modernity understood as a permanent crisis of legitimacy and authority is a constant challenge for constitutionalism. The article reconstructs the danger of substituting political nature with moral imperatives. In modern societies, political disputes turn into so-called culture wars, and the dividing lines are marked by two moralities fighting each other: a liberal morality and a conservative morality. Using selected examples from the constitutional judiciary, I put forward a proposal of rethinking the definition of political nature in constitutionalism to deal with the crisis of legitimacy and authority that plagues it.

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current ‘juridification’ of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political
nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current “juridification” of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

Research into liberal democracy’s self-preserving quality is usually confined to the notion ‘militant democracy’ and focuses mainly on the specific instruments the political system employs to challenge its adversaries and bolster its structure. This paper takes a different approach to understanding liberal democracy’s self-preservation. It challenges the boundaries of the dominant concept by exploring consolidative tendencies in a more general and comprehensive fashion, focusing on gradual political – and legal evolutionary developments that contribute to the solidification of the political system. On that basis, a critical follow-up question is posed: what are the implications of these consolidative endeavours? By highlighting ‘political impotence’ and its destabilizing effects as one of more socio-political implications, the paper suggests that the self-preserving vigour of liberal democracy might turn out to be counterproductive, and that the crisis which liberal democracy is now experiencing does not occur in spite of but rather because of its self-preserving characteristics.

100 years of constitutionalism of two neighbouring European states – Czechoslovakia, later becoming the Czech Republic, and Poland – encourage a reflection on the paths of development of their respective constitutions, on the historical stages and successive political transformations, not just in the context of individual constitutionalisms of each of those states but with an emphasis on the similarities and differences in this domain. And this is what this study focuses on. Starting from the common fate of rebirth of both states after WWI through the inter-war efforts to establish democratic constitutional systems and the obstacles found on the way, followed by the post-WWII period of real socialism ending with the era of transformations and stabilisation as democratic states of law. The text explores all the similarities found in both general aspects – like the references to the European tradition of parliamentary governance – and in certain specific solutions – like the differences in the concept of the two-chamber parliament. But there are also situations occurring in only one of the states, e.g. the federalisation of Czechoslovakia, the emergence of two separate states of the Czechs and Slovaks, or the differences in the course and sequence of events of democratic transformations in each of the states in the 1980s (martial law in Poland and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia), which brings us to the conclusion that despite all the possible differences, the two constitutional systems have actually been very similar to each other.

100 years of constitutionalism of two neighbouring European states – Czechoslovakia, later becoming the Czech Republic, and Poland – encourage a reflection on the paths of development of their respective constitutions, on the historical stages and successive
olitical transformations, not just in the context of individual constitutionalisms of each of those states but with an emphasis on the similarities and differences in this domain. And this is what this study focuses on. Starting from the common fate of rebirth of both states after WWI through the inter-war efforts to establish democratic constitutional systems and the obstacles found on the way, followed by the post-WWII period of real socialism ending with the era of transformations and stabilisation as democratic states of law. The text explores all the similarities found in both general aspects – like the references to the European tradition of parliamentary governance – and in certain specific solutions – like the differences in the concept of the two-chamber parliament. But there are also situations occurring in only one of the states, e.g. the federalisation of Czechoslovakia, the emergence of two separate states of the Czechs and Slovaks, or the differences in the course and sequence of events of democratic transformations in each of the states in the 1980s, which brings us to the conclusion that despite all the possible differences, the two constitutional systems have actually been very similar to each other.

The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established in 1848, during the heated months of the revolutions of the time and “the Spring of Nations.” Starting 1869, the ministry was called the Imperial and Royal Ministry of the Empire and Foreign Affairs. In line with the conservative character of the monarchy, most of its workforce was still drawn from the environment of aristocracy and gentry, and the system was organised in a way to ensure that the staff was suitably trained. The main institution responsible for the education of professionals was the Oriental Academy established in 1754. In 1898 the Oriental Academy was transformed into the Imperial and Royal Consular Academy. Despite regular reorganisations, the Vienna Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained a relatively stable internal structure, whose individual components were later implemented by a number of successor states. The central administration was divided into four sections, or departments. At the ambassador level, the Habsburg Empire had representations in the German Empire, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Turkey, and at the Holy See that year (1883). The other diplomatic missions were headed by legates and appointed ministers. Two bodies had a significant impact on the monarchy’s foreign policy decision- -making: the Joint Council of Ministers and the Military-Political Conference.

This paper deals with the activity of the public administration of the Czech Republic. It analyses the structure and mechanisms of the functioning of the institutions of public administration and self-government of the Czech Republic. It appeared not so long ago that responsible persons were held accountable for wrong decisions – of both technical and political nature. In some cases, these decisions were also used against responsible persons at all levels. This research is based on the analysis of the present Czech legal norms and their application in the decisions made by local administration.

The subject of the analysis presented in the text is an argument that tends to (and used to) be raised in the critical discourse on constitutionalism – the allegation of the so-called constitutional fetishism. The argument is to show why the constitutional discourse has lost its potential to explain and create social processes. The reason is that lawyers focus too much only on the content and interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, without considering a broader social context, which makes the constitutional discourse limited solely to legal issues with a simultaneous omission or underestimation of all other aspects of constitutionalism. This attitude of lawyers to the content of the constitution (or – in broader terms – to the provisions of law) is sometimes referred to even as idolatrous, hence the reference to the notion of fetishism in the religious sense. The aim of the text is to analyse the structure of this argument and to attempt to determine the impact it can have on constitutionalism.

The subject of the analysis presented in the text is an argument that tends to (and used to) be raised in the critical discourse on constitutionalism – the allegation of the so-called constitutional fetishism. The argument is to show why the constitutional discourse has lost its potential to explain and create social processes. The reason is that lawyers focus too much only on the content and interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, without considering a broader social context, which makes the constitutional discourse limited solely to legal issues with a simultaneous omission or underestimation of all other aspects of constitutionalism. This attitude of lawyers to the content of the constitution (or – in broader terms – to the provisions of law) is sometimes referred to even as idolatrous, hence the reference to the notion of fetishism in the religious sense. The aim of the text is to analyse the structure of this argument and to attempt to determine the impact it can have on
constitutionalism.

Authority – even though the title of this paper may suggest so – is not a phenomenon opposing culture. It is actually a product of culture or, as sometimes said, of the achievements of civilisation. Since authority is a product of culture, it may not be treated as a phenomenon isolated from it, without any ties with cultural patterns, which may – as a result – act as determinants of the institutional and functional qualities of authority. Culture and its products (including knowledge, law, religion, morality, etc.), like other social phenomena, can become factors stimulating the exercise of authority, or act as factors to stabilise or curb this exercise within the framework of the patterns (norms) it has created. Societies make constant choices in terms of adopting, modifying, and rejecting various cultural patterns.