This article considers the meaning of trust for judicial communication. The central tenet of this analysis is that trust is best conceptualized as a judicial virtue and that it can be most fully explained with aretaic language. This claim is elaborated through, first, making distinctions between trust and reliance, as well as between trust and trustworthiness. Second, exploring the determinants of trustworthiness leads the author to argue for a virtue account of judicial trustworthiness. Third, the article discusses whether and how trust as a particular attitude or propensity may be perceived as a judicial virtue. The argument concludes by considering the relation between trust in judges and trust in justice institutions, such as courts of law.

Constitutional crisis confronts legal practice with philosophical problems that normally may seem abstract or even purely academic. Among those, there is a question of material (content-dependent) criteria of legal validity, namely whether legal norms may actually have any content and remain binding elements of the law. It becomes palpable due to the legislative initiatives to decriminalize some violations of law committed by governmental officials. Such regulation deserves discussion in the light of theoretical conceptions of the claim to correctness (justice, righteousness) as a necessary feature of each act of enacting or applying the law. Arguably, even weaker conception of such claim, relying on the correctness relative to the public morality reflected in the fundamental values and principles of the positive law, is sufficient to challenge the potential presumption of validity of such decriminalizing provisions entailed by their possible formally accurate enactment.

The author’s goal is to analyze the concept of distributive justice and the possibility of its normative formulation in the Polish constitutional order. The starting point of consideration is the principle of social justice expressed in Article 2 of the Constitution and the model of distributive justice developed on its basis. The author, using formal-dogmatic, theoretical-legal and comparative-legal methods, points out the features of contributive justice and examines the normative and practical possibility of changing the paradigm of the constitutional fair state through a novel approach to justice focusing on equitable contribution, instead of the hitherto dominant distributive pattern. The result of the research conducted is the conclusion that, for reasons justified by the constitutional system and the praxeology of the workplace, contributive justice expands the concept of constitutional social justice in a valuable and desirable way.

The paper analyzes the concept of integrity of a judge from the perspective of the virtue jurisprudence. There are the judicial virtues specified and described, including integrity as one of the elements of the virtue of justice. Subjective and objective integrity are distinguished, as well as personal, professional and institutional integrity. Integrity of a judge is understood as personal integrity combined with professional integrity and also institutional integrity in which values and aims of the profession are taken into account. Virtue jurisprudence does not provide clear directives for solving legal disputes but it emphasizes the necessity of referring to the dispositions of a judge in order to understand fully the process of judgment. On the grounds of virtue jurisprudence, the integrity of a moral subject if assumed which provides the foundation for trust in the profession of judge and does not allow for the separation of social roles, assuming the possibility of reconciling them with the use of prudence. The problem of conflicting virtues, namely integrity and impartiality in the context of judicial review is discussed on the example of the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of October 22, 2020, K 1/20 which illustrates judicial activism. The considerations concerning this example bring about the conclusion that in the most controversial political and moral disputes, political prudence suggest the direction of the virtue of judicial restraint due to deference of democracy and the division of powers.

The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.

This article concerns the problem associated with the nature of the institution of a petition for reconsideration of the case in view of regulation No 16 of the Administrative Procedur Code in the version before the amendment dated 3 December 2010, which entered into force on 11 April 2011. Despite the amendment, to this day the provision is the source of many disputes, which is reflected in a very non-uniform judicial practice. On the basis of this regulation can be observed, how defective constructed legal provisions affect the administration of justice and the application of the law by creating situations in which the courts take over the functions of law making. On the selected example is shown, how one decision of the Supreme Court, being the basis of decisions of courts of appeal, causes that victims defective administrative decision are charged with the responsibility for legislative errors. Knowledge of the matter, which is the subject of this publication, is extremely important for all practitioners as well as theorists of the law because of the importance of the issues, which accompany the main theme. The work is based on an analysis of the concept of finality and validity of administration decision and depth on theoretical consideration and extensive discussion of the judicial practice of administrative courts, civil courts and Constitutional Tribunal.

The article deals with legal education in the Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815), which was a transitory period between a feudal and modern state. The urgent need for institutional education of a state personnel resulted from existence of legal provisions stemming from several legal orders, divergence in qualifications of personnel in administration and judiciary, as well as a necessity for efficient implementation f Napoleonic law. Those circumstances were precisely diagnosed by the minister of justice. He initiated courses of law followed by the School of Law and School of Administration. As the Duchy’s territory was enlarged, legal teaching had place also at the university in Cracow. It seems that although the state existed for only a short period, a more or less cohesive governmental concept of legal education’s role existed. It was to serve mainly the development of the state and this utilitarian goal dominated. It is worth reminding that those first Polish endeavours in the field of modern legal education took place at the time of a public finance crisis. Although majority of income was devoted to military needs and many projects were put off until later, authorities noticed that for an efficient governing of a state a well-educated personnel is needed. At that time this belief was not common.

The aim of the present paper is to operationalise the concept of the political in
order to make it available as an analytical category for the critical study of judicial
decisions (case law). The concept of the political is understood here, following, in
particular, Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory, whereby it is a dimension of a social
antagonism. Such an antagonism can be played out not only in the process of
legislation (creation of abstract and general legal norms), but also in the process of
adjudication (the so-called ‘application of law’, which, however, always has a creative
element to it). As an analytical category, the political can be operationalised
in order to subject judicial decisions to a critique which goes beyond the question
of the ‘correct’ interpretation and ‘application’ of law in a given case, but puts in the
spotlight real social, political and economic conflicts that are at stake. The analytical
framework is exemplified by judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice.

The main aim of this paper is to consider the acceptability of application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law in the regard to employment contract with pregnant women from the point of theory of justice. I argue that application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code resulting in exclusion of pregnant women from social security system not only might be doubtful from the constitutional law perspective, but it is also problematic from the point of view of the concept of justice realized by social security law. In the first part I recall in short basic typologies and definitions of justice. This leads to the observation, that although in philosophy there is no one understanding of justice, this notion has a long and established tradition. In following parts I ana- lyze which concepts of justice are being realized by constitutional law, civil law and social security law. I argue that as constitutional law and social security law deal mostly with distributive justice, civil law realizes mostly commutative justice, which also concerns Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code. In the last part I demonstrate consequences of applying Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law on the example of pregnant women being excluded from the social security system. This is followed by the final conclusion that although also for lawyers notion of justice has a long tradition, it is often im- posed in spite of "locally" realized types of justice, which leads to unwelcome and unforeseeable consequences.