The paper is a review of most interesting topics on the most renowned one element solution of cooperative games with side payments – the Shapley value. After an elementary introduction, we present the original definition of the Shapley value, basic formula and properties as well as main theorems characterizing the Shapley value by systems of axioms. The form and behaviour of the value of some specific games and types of games is demonstrated. Some applications are described, including those in cost sharing problems and as a power index in group decision making problems modelled as simple games. Also some particularly typical or interesting extensions and generalizations of the Shapley value are presented.

Anger is one of the most often experienced emotions, it is therefore important to understand how this emotion influences the process of judgment and decision making. The effect of anger can be analyzed on two levels. One is the question of how the anger an individual is experiencing influences her judgments and behaviours. Another thing is how anger being experienced by other people influences the behaviour of an individual. Research shows that a feeling of anger leads to more optimistic judgments, both of future and past events. When there is a conflict of interests, angry people take on a more competitive attitude and show little consideration for the interests of others. Anger also leads to worse understanding of one's self-interests and results in obtaining worse outcomes in negotiations, but paradoxically, it also brings about greater satisfaction from the outcome obtained. Additionally, a stronger sense of control over outcomes leads to holding the other party responsible for behaviours harmful to others and to being harsher when punishing such behaviours. Research on expressing anger in a situation of conflict shows that anger is interpreted as a sign of toughness and high aspirations. This allows for larger concessions in situations when the other party is in a weak position and/or is determined to reach an agreement. However, when the other party is in a strong position and/or can take severe retaliatory actions, expressing anger can be harmful to the angry person. In such situations the irate person tends to be cheated more often than a calm individual, if the other party can resort to such behaviours. Angry people are also less likely to join a coalition, but when they succeed, they can achieve considerable gains.

Indirect reciprocity explains exchange within large groups where a favour is returned by someone other than the beneficiary. Evolutionary games used to analyze this phenomenon are of two types: some authors show that simple strategies based on information about the past deeds of a partner are sufficient for indirect reciprocity to emerge; others indicate that complex strategies based on motivations have better dynamic properties. These complex strategies require knowledge of a considerable number of past interactions of partners and their former partners and use complicated reasoning. I present another approach to improve the performance of simple strategies using the ecological rationality concept. According to this approach, information can be useful in solving a problem even if it is not logically related to it. A probabilistic connection between information and an environmental criterion is sufficient. I present two simple strategies based on such connections. They use reference and experience. Neither needs information extending beyond the most recent interactions of chosen individuals. Using computer simulation I show that they can support indirect reciprocity. The strategies are particularly useful when conditions are unfavourable e.g. when the cost of helping is high and/or when information is difficult to obtain.