The review process of texts submitted for publication in scientific journals is one of the main ways of evaluating the scientific output of their authors. Any disruptions in this process can have serious and far-reaching consequences, not only in terms of the credibility and integrity of the author themselves, but – most importantly – in terms of the confidence in their achievements. Attempts to distort the review process have so far occurred most often in medical and exact sciences. The case of “The Critique of Law” discussed herein shows that attempts at scientific fraud affect also legal sciences. The purpose of the article is to inform the scientific community worldwide about subsequent attempts of unethical scholarly activities, to describe instances of malpractice, and to point out some of the possible ways to prevent the fraud in question.

The review process of texts submitted for publication in scientific journals is one of the main ways of evaluating the scientific output of their authors. Any disruptions in this process can have serious and far-reaching consequences, not only in terms of the credibility and integrity of the author themselves, but – most importantly – in terms of the confidence in their achievements. Attempts to distort the review process have so far occurred most often in medical and exact sciences. The case of „The Critique of Law” discussed herein shows that attempts at scientific fraud affect also legal sciences. The purpose of the article is to inform the scientific community worldwide about subsequent attempts of unethical scholarly activities, to describe instances of malpractice, and to point out some of the possible ways to
prevent the fraud in question.

This paper presents the issue of a lawyer’s integrity from the perspective of the assumptions underlying the original concept of a holistic approach to law and legal practice. In the course of the discussion, the basic principles of legal holism, the assumed understanding of lawyer’s integrity and their personal qualities forming the lawyer personality, and the problem of integrity in the context of the formula (model) shaping the lawyer-client relationship will be introduced. Legal holism recognises a lawyer’s self-knowledge, their conscious choice of professional role(s), the ways in which they are performed and the formula for working with clients and parties to disputes as crucial issues for the practice of law. It emphasises their complexity and possible impact on the postulated observance by a lawyer of the integrity of attitudes and actions in professional and private life. The author represents a research approach related to the concept of ontological and methodological multidimensionality of legal phenomena and the postulate of the so-called external integration of jurisprudence with the achievements of other sciences, including branches other than social (e.g. psychology or sociology).

The purpose of the article is to analyse the relationship between judicial integrity and the institution of votum separatum. The first part concerns the relationship between the concepts of a definite approach to a professional role performed and the institution of votum separatum. The second part of the paper attempts to answer the question whether care about maintaining integrity can actually be attributed to dissents submitted to the Constitutional Tribunal. The article attempts to justify a conclusion that judicial integrity does not constitute the main function of dissents that are actually submitted to the Tribunal. The main obstacle is interpreting cases in which such dissents were submitted, as axiological opposites. Thus, what can be attributable to dissents is definite values, for the protection of which these dissents are submitted, such as e.g. individual rights or care about the public interest. However, the relation of these values to judicial integrity is not obvious. This results from the fact that axiological characteristics attributed to the same judge’s dissents are subject to change. That change results not from the inconsistency of beliefs, but from the characteristics of the case examined.

This paper dwells on the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity. It claims that for the emergence and proper functioning of judicial empathy as a kind of judicial virtue, a number of conditions needed to be fulfilled, including the development of judicial integrity. The paper aims to unpack this argument and to demonstrate judicial empathy and integrity in action as exemplified particularly by judicial behaviour observed during empirical research in Cracow lower courts. The overall perspective for examining the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity rests on the developmental vision of a judge. Although the presented research fits into the broader interest in judicial empathy and judicial virtues, the paper contains concrete examples of verbal and non-verbal behaviours of a judge that demonstrate how judicial empathy co-functions with other skills and virtues. In general, the paper opposes the marginalisation of judicial skills and virtues.

The paper analyzes the concept of integrity of a judge from the perspective of the virtue jurisprudence. There are the judicial virtues specified and described, including integrity as one of the elements of the virtue of justice. Subjective and objective integrity are distinguished, as well as personal, professional and institutional integrity. Integrity of a judge is understood as personal integrity combined with professional integrity and also institutional integrity in which values and aims of the profession are taken into account. Virtue jurisprudence does not provide clear directives for solving legal disputes but it emphasizes the necessity of referring to the dispositions of a judge in order to understand fully the process of judgment. On the grounds of virtue jurisprudence, the integrity of a moral subject if assumed which provides the foundation for trust in the profession of judge and does not allow for the separation of social roles, assuming the possibility of reconciling them with the use of prudence. The problem of conflicting virtues, namely integrity and impartiality in the context of judicial review is discussed on the example of the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of October 22, 2020, K 1/20 which illustrates judicial activism. The considerations concerning this example bring about the conclusion that in the most controversial political and moral disputes, political prudence suggest the direction of the virtue of judicial restraint due to deference of democracy and the division of powers.

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge’s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.

The main purpose of the presented research project is to prepare an initiating answer to the present state of judicial integrity recognised as the top of legal professions and the legal system as such. The method comes mainly from the Oxford analytical jurisprudence, nevertheless, the historical and interdisciplinary approaches, as well as a legal practice, were taken seriously into consideration. The main theses and their scientific standpoints are: (i) at present, we are facing the disintegration of integrity; (ii) one of the sources of it lies in the very grounds of major jurisprudential terms, understood as parts of the Hartian internal point of view and that there are fundamental analytical paradoxes of integrity, generating practical dysfunctionalities; (iii) it is possible to solve main problems through a completely new approach: an ontological turn in the philosophy of law causing the idea of law as a concept and a new concept of integrity, namely ‘negative integrity’. It could be easily and effectively treated as practical support for firstly improving judicial integrity and secondly legal practice in general.

The article has two basic goals. The first one is to create a conceptual framework
for the discussion of judicial impartiality. In order to achieve this aim, in this text I reflect on three aspects of the principle of impartiality, which have generally been studied independently from one another in the literature. I make an attempt to show that the three distinguished aspects of impartiality can be analysed, using a uniform conceptual scale. The second goal of the paper is to justify a claim that one of these aspects (namely the aspect of impartiality towards worldview doctrines) differs from the other two in terms of structure. In the text, I attempt to consider that difference and then propose a formula for judicial worldview neutrality that takes into account the special nature of that aspect of judicial impartiality. The conclusion of these reflections is the introduction of two versions of the worldview neutrality principle, which should – in my view – be applied in activities under taken by judges.

The Author presents a legal analysis of self-determination in international law. It is presented both through a historical and a modern perspective, recalling i.a. such cases as Kosovo, Quebec, Palestinian state in statu nascendi.

The article is focused on critical infrastructure protection in the field of selected liability issues. Critical infrastructure is significant from the country’s integrity and continuity point of view at all levels: economic, social and political. The process of sectoral markets liberalisation and the spread of international connections of these markets (e.g. arising of transeuropean networks) have resulted in shared responsibility on critical infrastructure protection. Protection duties have been divided between private (infrastructure operators) and public authorities. It is seemingly clear which one: the former or the latter bears responsibility for the protection of critical infrastructure during and after its disruption. In fact clarificatio of this area poses a problem at the level of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The critical infrastructure protection becomes a jigsaw puzzle of imperium and dominium relations that results in sophisticated picture of responsibility.

These standards were introduced at four international organizations and supranational associations: 1) the European Union; 2) the Council of Europe; 3) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; 4) the Commonwealth of Independent States. The article states that the key reason for the introduction of standards for the regulation of lobbying at the international level was considerable corruption in the adoption of legal acts. It is concluded that latent and unregulated lobbying can seriously undermine public confidence in the institution of government, especially in the countries of the so-called “new democracy”. International regulation of lobbying takes the form of resolutions, procedural rules, guidelines, recommendations and model legislation. Notably, the first steps towards international regulation of lobbying were taken by the institutions of the European Union. Today EU standards for the regulation of lobbying is based on a series of articles set out in the EU-founding treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. EU standards for the regulation of lobbying influence not only the EU Member States, but it also extends to EU Partner Countries. Significant steps in the implementation of international standards for the regulation of lobbying are being constantly carried out by the Council of Europe. The establishment of CE standards for the regulation of lobbying is reflected in the activity of statutory bodies of the Council of Europe and its semi-autonomous bodies. In recent years a lot of work on the strengthening of international standards for lobbying regulation has been done by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. To help address the concerns with transparency and integrity in lobbying, the OECD Member Countries adopted in 2010 a Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying as guidance to decision-makers on how to promote good governance in lobbying. Another international organization, which began to regulate actively the practice of lobbying is the Commonwealth of Independent States. In order to intensify the work concerning legislative regulation of lobbying in the member countries of the CIS, at the XXII Plenary Session of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS member states the Resolution No. 22-16 of November 15, 2003 was adopted, which approved a model law “On regulation of lobbying activity in state authorities”.

The subject matter of the second part of the article (the first part was published in issue 1/2019 of the “Critique of Law”) is a continuation of the analysis of the impact of cultural patterns such as integrity, social dialogue, elimination of violence on the formation of the relationships between authorities and members of the state community.