This article argues that regulatory sandboxes have become a necessary legislative tool to foster new business models. In the past, some new ideas failed because of the lack of such a legislative tool, shown by the Uber case. AI may play a dual role as an object of regulation and a tool of supervision, including RIA, which poses an additional threat to society at a time when it is becoming apparent that it may escape human control. This requires a reversal of the goals of a sandbox where providing security becomes more important than nurturing novelty. While the EU Commission and scholars encourage trust in AI, distrust should be the guiding principle. In addition, the rule of law may be compromised due to the use of regu-latory sandboxes as a back door for the legislative and administrative authorities to go around the established principles.

In recent years, it has been a relatively common practice for the Polish antitrust authority – the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the OCCP) – to issue conditional decisions in merger control proceedings. Actually, this is not a practice known only to the Polish antitrust authority, as such decisions are also issued by the European Commission. Consents granted following this procedure allow participants to a planned concentration (also referred to as merger) to proceed, but under certain conditions – behavioural or structural. Several important issues arise especially with regard to the latter type of conditions, particularly in terms of the permissible degree of interference in the sphere of private legal rights and obligations of one or both participants in the concentration, and the consequences of failure to comply with the condition under which the concentration has been approved. These issues are the subject of this paper, which ends with conclusions and implications regarding the judicial practice of the Polish antitrust authority in the area in question.

The public administration reform in Kosovo can be defined as a challenge to make significant changes in the government, decentralization of public administration, simplification of procedures, computerization of services and electronic governance at all levels of administration and improvement of developments in the field of human resources. The government of Kosovo has drawn up the strategic develop­ment plan and the strategic framework for the public administration reform, where the strategies for the public administration reform are foreseen. The reform envi­sioned with the strategic framework is directly related to the obligations of the Republic of Kosovo in the process of European integration and in addition to governmental monitoring and supervision structures, they are also monitored by the European Commission. The government of Kosovo, through the strategic framework, determines the strategic goals and policies which it intends to achieve within the nearest period, with the aim of improving the operation and moderni­zation of the public administration.

The entry into force of the Act of 14 April 2023 on the State Commission for the Investigation of Russian Influence on the Internal Security of the Republic of Poland in the Years 2007–2022 was met with huge criticism not only from politicians from the camp opposing the ruling party but also from average individuals. It was emphasized that these regulations violate the universal right to information because the activities of the State Commission in the light of the regulations in question are not covered by full transparency. This is even though the legislator has explicitly classified it as a public authority. The main objective of the article is to compare the status, organization, and functioning of the authority with the subjective and objective premises for making public information available, and then to determine whether the legislator intended to shape a new restriction on access to information, or whether these regulations can be included in the group of separate provisions to which the Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information gives priority to application.

Margin squeezing is an abuse of dominant position, which is not directly mentioned in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Euro­pean General Court that have recognised this practice as anti­competitive, initially treating it as anti­competitive refusal to supply. Given the many similarities between these practices, there are questions as to whether margin squeeze should be consi­dered an separate manifestation of an abuse of dominant position. The aim of the article is to analyse the position of the European Commission in this regard and juxtapose it with the views contained in relevant judicial decisions, judgements, and rulings, as well as to compare it with the regulations adopted in the United States.

The issue of law-making is a key issue in a democratic state ruled by law. Particularly interesting seems to be the issue of enacting electoral law, which is exposed to the phenomenon of instrumentalisation. The aim of this article is to analyse the institution of legislative silence in Polish electoral law and to try to find an answer to the question whether the application of this solution may be an effective tool limiting the political influence on the shape of electoral law. In order to find the above questions, it was necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of this solution, primarily on the basis of the jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and international law standards specified in the documents of the Venice Commission. The work uses the formal and legal method and the literature and jurisprudence are reviewed.

In our presentation, we review the procedure and method of meeting the electoral bodies of different (mainly European) countries – in particular the issue of ensuring the publicity and extent to which they can operate online. In addition, we examine in more detail the practice and procedural method of the Hungarian electoral bodies, in particular the National Election Commission. Based on the above, we also outline the possibilities for the further development of Hungarian practice. Our main findings: it is clear that although online meetings of election commissions are still used only in several countries, but the COVID-19 epidemic has highlighted the need to open up to the online space not only in the election process but also in the practice of individual election bodies. The regulations of the Hungarian National Election Commission define the rules of online meetings in great detail. This makes Hungary one of the few EU countries where it is possible to meet by videoconference. In our opinion, this direction will become decisive in the EU countries in the coming years. Moreover, we do not consider it inconceivable that the entire electoral process (including remote voting) should be digitised, as is the case in Estonia. However, this still requires many steps to be taken by individual countries to increase voter confidence in digitisation. For now, however, we have to be satisfied with one of the positive benefits of the COVID-19 epidemic: the ability to online meetings of election commissions.

Many of the principles of taxation that were developed in the first half of the 20th century, such as the arm’s length principle and the definition of the term “permanent establishment” (PE) in determining the tax position of international business operations, when applied to the business models of the 21st century, often result in the under-taxation of businesses that are otherwise fully compliant with the laws as presently written and implemented. Compounding the problem is the fact that these rules and principles of taxation are broadly recognized and are enshrined in a wide network of tax treaties. This makes the task of modifying or updating these rules and principals extremely difficult. Using legal-dogmatic and legal-theoretical methods, the author will show that present attempts to tax e-commerce transactions unilaterally are not effective and that, under present conditions, even organizations such as the EU are unable to address the problem at hand. The OECD project, commissioned by the G-20, which seeks to create a set of international e-commerce taxation rules, faces some very serious difficulties – largely because a well-established “set in stone” complement of internationally accepted laws, rules, and regulations is serving to block the development of new, more appropriate rules. This phenomenon has become known as the lock-in effect or legal impossibilism. In order to effectively address this phenomenon, lawmakers on a global basis must understand the mechanisms that are blocking the effective evolution of business taxation.

The purpose of the article is to characterise the main reasons and consequences of the division of sub-central government tasks between its own tasks and commissioned tasks and the indication of some controversy related to this issue. The author analyses in particular certain types of local government tasks (concerning the most important spheres of local activity, such as welfare, education, or health) and its qualification to the category of „its own tasks”. The essential conclusion of the paper is that in many cases the qualification of specific public affairs to one or the other category of self-government tasks is determined not so much by its specific „nature”, but primarily by its fiscal consequences, including the ability to pass the obligation of its financing to local authorities. The research methodology used in the article is based on a critical analysis of the legal acts as well as literature on public finance and financial and administrative law.

The author is searching for an answer to the question of whether the European Union needs own solutions in the area of taxation of digital economy and whether the solution offered by the European Commission, which is taxation of significant digital presence, can be effective in taxing the digital economy of the European Union. To this end, a number of references to selected standpoints of international doctrine, OECD regulations, and the draft of the Directive has been made in this paper.

The article aims to analyse the national parliaments’ capability of exerting influence on the European Commission in the framework of the yellow card procedure. The analysis is based on the actions undertaken by national parliaments of selected Member States from Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe within the period between the announcement of the European Commission proposal for a targeted revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers and its decision to maintain the proposal. The analysis covers three variables concerning the states selected for analysis, namely the economic interest of those states, the coherence of their parliaments’ respective positions and the actions undertaken by the national parliaments, including those of their members, on the international level.

The aim of the paper is to create an updated typology of soft law. It places soft law among mechanisms of a rather moral, sociological and political origin. This does not mean that it is completely irrelevant in legal terms, but the inclusion of the regulations of soft law in the framework of a “normative system” does not deserve to be taken into account i.a. due to the character of soft law (i.a. formulating the regulations in a general, imprecise manner, the uncertainty of introduced instruments, the lack of an obligatory force to implement them). This paper indicates the roles played by soft law in the international public law discourse. It also presents differences in their consideration on the grounds of the international law (including the Community law) as well as the internal law. Out of the whole catalogue of individual functions and tasks of soft law, special heed should be taken of the co-ordinating role of the mechanisms of soft law. Against this background, the paper makes a categorisation of the opinions of the Venice Commission in the framework of soft law. This is because they show the typical features of the mechanisms of that law: they play a binding role, relatively clarifying the international law, they are based on the undisputed authority of the creating entity. However, they are not subject to the forced implementation of them. In the conclusions of the paper, a chance, but also a fundamental threat related to the conduct of the international legal discourse on the basis of the mechanisms of soft law were indicated.

The 2018 amendment of the Polish Electoral Code established the institution of electoral officials, who replaced the institution of electoral plenipotentiaries, existing since 1998. One of the main differences between the two institutions is that electoral officials may not work at commune offices in charge of preparing and holding election in the area of their jurisdiction. The aim of the adopted solution was to isolate local government administration from the election process. The article offers a critical analysis of the institution of electoral officials. The subject matter of the discussion is both the legal regulation and the conclusions drawn from the examination of the institution in question, conducted by the Stefan Batory Foundation after the end of the 2018 local government elections, when the electoral officials fulfilled their statutory duty for the first time. The discussion leads to the conclusion that the establishment of the institution of electoral officials was not well thought out, and actually took place without appropriate consultation. The provisions of the Electoral Code are often vague. They have not been clarified to a sufficient extent in the resolutions adopted by the National Electoral Commission either. It is reasonable to have electoral officials appointed for a six-year term of office by the Head of the National Electoral Office. What is surprising, however, is that electoral officials may run for an office during elections taking place in a constituency outside of their area of activity as well as engage in election cam paigns – except for their own campaigns – while they should remain completely impartial during the election. The vague status of electoral officials and of the principles of their remuneration made it very difficult to attract individuals willing to perform this function. The headcount originally assumed had to be reduced by half; now it is 2,600. It is also necessary to reconsider the number of electoral officials assigned to individual communes. A major flaw of the adopted regulation is the lack of a clear division of duties and responsibilities between electoral official and communes. All this casts a bad light on the institution of electoral officials. It is argued that they were poorly prepared to perform the duties they were entrusted with. They also lacked the necessary theoretical knowledge and were not familiar with local conditions and constraints. Therefore, instead of helping, they made the work of commune officials only harder. But the call for dissolving the institution altogether is not legitimate. It is necessary to return to the previous solution, where the electoral officials in a commune were the officials working at commune offices, regular employees of these basic local government units. In communes with larger populations, there may be even more such officials. It is essential to reinforce the status of electoral officials, which is why it is important to clearly definthe nature of their relationships with the commune heads (town/city mayors) as well as to strengthen their position and grant them authority in the field of duties carried out as part of elections and referenda over other commune officials. It is also requisite to appoint them for terms of office of a particular number of years, and remunerate them in fixed monthly amounts – with the amounts increased in periods of preparing and holding elections or referenda. Only this way will it be possible to have a proper Electoral Official Service composed of professional commune officials specialising in organising and holding elections and referenda.

The research objective of this paper is to determine the impact that the repressive nature of the European Commission’s amendments to Directive 2008/115 will likely have on the two basic values of the return policy, that is, its fairness and effectiveness. The basic thesis of this study is that the direction of the directive’s recast, assuming – inter alia – an extension of the list of circumstances for applying the entry ban and detention, is contrary to the declared fairness of the migration policy towards third-country nationals. At the same time, the effectiveness of the planned changes is already questionable at the stage of draft legislation. These considerations are based on a juxtaposition of the proposed changes with currently binding legislation, the Commission’s soft law and the case law of the CJEU. The final effect of these analyses is the finding that the solutions proposed by the Commission will lead to an inevitable increase in the use of coercive measures against irregular immigrants in a way that stands in fundamental contradiction to the declared fairness and proportionality of EU actions. In this context, the effectiveness of the return policy should not be identified with a percentage of returns, but rather with the recognised necessity of overall and perfect control over irregular migrants. At the same time, the Recast Return Directive will contribute to the development of an already existing tendency to treat migration law as an instrument of security and public order, and to use administrative law measures so that they function in a manner equivalent to that of a criminal sanction.

The aim of the article is to evaluate the draft of a new Family Code developed by the Social Codification Commission for Family and Guardianship Law attached to the Children’s Rights Ombudsman with regard to the advisability and legitimacy of the changes proposed in it, as well as to analyse its selected detailed solutions in the context of their impact on the protection of the child’s welfare. The aforemen tioned detailed issues concern, among others, the issues of parental custody and material and legal grounds for divorce. The proposed changes, namely the replacement of the institution of parental custody with “parental responsibility” and the introduction of a new divorce premise are perceived by the authors of the article as clearly negative.
The authors of the article are also critical of the procedure of preparation of the discussed draft. In their opinion, the applicable Family and Guardianship Code is not an anachronistic legal act and can and should continue to play the role of a basic regulator of legal and family relations in our country. The proposal to replace it with a new code is not sufficiently justified, either legally or socially, and its adoption may prove to be dangerous for the stability of the legal and family regula tions, shaped by the latest amendments to family law and contrary to the principle of protection of the best interests of the child.

A review of solutions which serve the taxation of the digital economy allows for the statement of a thesis that there are many methods which could tax business activity based on digital technologies. One should remember, however, that there also must be consensus and political will in order to introduce them. Due to the lack of consensus at the global level, on 21 March 2018, the European Commission presented two draft directives which were to ensure the taxation of enterprises conducting business in the European Union in the area of digital economy: the Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence and the Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services. The drafts of the Directives presented by the Commission are the beginning of the legislative work at the Union level. One should ask the question whether the European Union needs its own solutions regarding the taxation of the digital economy. In this paper,
the author attempts to evaluate whether the target solution proposed by the Commission, that is, the taxation of a significant digital presence, i.e. a digital establishment,
can be an effective tool for the taxation of the digital economy in the European
Union. For this purpose, subsequent references were made to selected opinions
of international doctrine, OECD regulations and the draft of the Directive.

The aim of the paper is to create an updated typology of soft law. It places soft law among mechanisms of a rather moral, sociological and political origin. This does not mean that it is completely irrelevant in legal terms, but the inclusion of the regulations of soft law in the framework of a “normative system” does not deserve to be taken into account i.a. due to the character of soft law (i.a. formulating the regulations in a general, imprecise manner, the uncertainty of introduced instruments, the lack of an obligatory force to implement them). This paper indicates the roles played by soft law in the international public law discourse. It also presents differences in their consideration on the grounds of the international law (including the Community law) as well as the internal law. Out of the whole catalogue of individual functions and tasks of soft law, special heed should be taken of the co-ordinating role of the mechanisms of soft law. Against this background, the paper makes a categorisation of the opinions of the Venice Commission in the framework of soft law. This is because they show the typical features of the mechanisms of that law: they play a binding role, relatively clarifying the international law, they are based on the undisputed authority of the creating entity. However, they are not subject to the forced implementation of them. In the conclusions of the paper, a chance, but also a fundamental threat related to the conduct of the international legal discourse on the basis of the mechanisms of soft law were indicated.

The article aims to analyse the national parliaments’ capability of exerting influence on the European Commission in the framework of the yellow card procedure. The analysis is based on the actions undertaken by national parliaments of selected Member States from Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe within the period between the announcement of the European Commission proposal for a targeted revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers and its decision to maintain the proposal. The analysis covers three variables concerning the states selected for analysis, namely the economic interest of those states, the coherence of their parliaments’ respective positions and the actions undertaken by the national parliaments, including those of their members, on the international level.