Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej sytuuje obowiązki spoczywające na organach władzy publicznej w granicach, w jakich mogą one przetwarzać dane osobowe, co jest niewątpliwym wzmocnieniem praw jednostki. Konstytucyjne ograniczenie zostało wyznaczone zarówno przez zasadę legalizmu, jak i zasadę demokratycz­nego państwa prawnego. Ustalenie administratora danych osobowych, a także inspektora ochrony danych osobowych w związku z postępowaniem trybunalskim, staje się istotne z punktu podmiotu, którego to dane są przetwarzane. Określenie Trybunału Stanu jako administratora danych osobowych nowelą ustawy o Trybuna­ le Stanu prowadzi do przypisania temu organowi licznych obowiązków wynikają­cych z rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) 2016/679 z 27.04.2016 r. w sprawie ochrony osób fizycznych w związku z przetwarzaniem danych osobo­wych i w sprawie swobodnego przepływu takich danych oraz uchylenia dyrektywy 95/46/WE.
Działając jako organ upoważniony do przetwarzania danych osobowych, Sąd odpowiada także za zgodność ich przetwarzania z prawem. Trybunał Stanu jest gwarantem realizacji praw i wolności jednostek, których to dane są przetwarzane w ramach prowadzonych przez niego działań.

Simplified proceedings, such as immediate coercion and direct coercion, are the subject of consideration in this study. The discussion focuses on the essence and aspects of proceedings referred to in Article 117 and 150 § 3 of the Act of 17 June 1966 on enforcement proceedings in administration. The aim of the research is to attempt to evaluate simplified proceedings as a tool in the system of protection of the most important human values.
The research mainly used the legal-dogmatic method of interpreting the content and ordering the legal structure. The analytical method was also applied, by means of which analyses were made of legal provisions concerning the basis for the appli-cation of the simplified procedures in administrative enforcement proceedings.
From the conducted research, it is clear that the primary goal of these proceed-ings is to counteract the indicated threats. The collected research material allowed confirming the thesis and presenting a de lege ferenda motion regarding the necessity to amend Article 117 of the Administrative Enforcement Act. The changes should consist in waiving the necessity to serve a reminder to the debtor before applying this procedure. The provision currently in force omits such a possibility, and the waiver itself may be the result of the need to save important values in an emergency.

Since 1 December 2021, the rule applicable in bankruptcy proceedings has been that all pleadings and documents are filed exclusively via the IT system supporting court proceedings using the forms available in this system. An exception to this rule is inter alia a natural person’s right to file a request to declare personal bankruptcy and all pleadings and documents without using the system. The publication analyses whether this entitlement is granted to a natural person only in bankruptcy proceedings or in bankruptcy proceedings conducted after the declaration of bankruptcy.

The issue of the rule of law as a criterion for the action of public administration bodies has not yet been the subject of wider doctrinal reflection. The reason for this state of affairs is probably the rather sparing reference by public administration bodies to the rule of law as a basis for their decisions. Meanwhile, the obligation imposed on the authorities in Article 7 of the Code of Administrative Procedure should be treated as one of their fundamental duties in ongoing administrative proceedings. The present study focuses on signalling only some of the problems related to the notion of the rule of law on the grounds of general administrative procedure, indicating the ambiguity of this phrase and the related various understandings of it. The conclusions should be regarded as an invitation to discuss this undoubtedly complex issue.

Under the provisions of Act I of 2017 on the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, a brand new institution has been introduced in Hungary: as of 1 January 2018, in administrative court proceedings, the judge may, with the agreement of the parties, allow for a court mediation procedure in the cases in which the law does not preclude it. The primary method to approach the topic is the review of the relevant primary legal sources [actual law in the form of the constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary), acts, governmental decrees, orders of the President of the National Office, court cases, etc.] and secondary legal sources (Hungarian and international scientific literature explaining the primary sources, the legal practice and also the specific circumstances determining the broader social environment) through which we may define relevant scientific problems, create our own definitions and prepare a catalogue of practical problems, specifically for Hungarian issues regarding the topic. Moreover, this article tries to build on the results of the interviews with judges, representatives of different defendants (administrative authorities) and others. Qualitative interviewing, including the interviewing of judges and other participants of such proceedings, is a relatively new method in the field of legal studies, at least in Hungary.

Mediation in the administrative procedure is a new institution that provides a chance for an improved perception of public administration, yet it also gives rise to a range of doubts. The latter spring chiefly, though not solely, from the nature of administrative control. The principles of the rule of law, objective law, and voluntary mediation, which may be taken an improper advantage of, contrary to the legislator’s intentions, are also identified as barriers.
Analysis of the issue implies that administrative proceedings leave room for mediation. Whether it will fulfil expectations, however, largely depends on the attitudes of parties and administrative authorities, or their employees, to be precise, for whom mediation is undoubtedly both a processual and mental challenge.
The introduction of mediation to the Code of Administrative Procedure is to be applauded, mainly from the perspective of inducing citizens’ trust in public authorities. Mediation may also prove an effective instrument of eliminating conflicts in administration and thus contribute to reducing the caseload to be heard by administrative courts.
It is important, though, for this opportunity to be taken proper advantage of and for the transformation of administration from controlling to mediating and more friendly to subjects administered to continue. This is a trend that deserves to be followed not only in Polish but also other legislations.

The article attempts to confront the concepts relating to the force of res judicata and its subjective limits present in the doctrine and jurisdiction with the current wording of the provisions regulating this institution and the provisions concerning enforcement-warrant proceedings which ensure a possibility to pursue a claim indicated in a judgment having the force of res judicata through enforcement proceedings. In the following article, the author presents the existing assumptions of the doctrine regarding mutual relations between the validity of judgment and the authority of res judicata. The author also analyses the possibility of granting the enforcement order against as well as in favour of a third party intervener, but also a uniform participant not indicated in the operative part of the judgment from the standpoint of the doctrine and jurisdiction. Taking into account the above mentioned considerations, the author concludes that in the light of the existing regulations, the concept of the force of res judicata whose subjective scope is limited to the parties to the proceedings indicated in the operative part of the judgement seems to be the most adequate.

Pursuant to article 9 clause 2 of Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland on Administrative Procedure of 1928, persons which possessed so-called legal interest in the case, were entitled to participate in the administrative procedure as a party. Both in procedure initiated by the authority ex officio and initiated on their own demand. The essential and still unsettled question of this construction is: who is authorised by the law to establish the existence of that legal interest, and consequently who decides on the admission of the applicant to the proceeding. This issue has been transferred to the Tax Code of 1997 with the implementation of that scheme, without taking into consideration the legal specificity of the tax assessment, especially self-assessment, to the tax procedure. Furthemore, pursuant to the ontological system, presented by Roman Ingarden in his work Controversy over the Existence of the World, an object which is the initiation of the procedure is an event, not a thing, processes, purely intentional object or an idea. Tax procedural law does not distinguish and name various types of objects properly, which causes serious problems as to legal interpretation. The aim of this work is to give some basic legal and philosophical directions for the reconstruction of the institution of the tax procedure initiation.

In analysing the historical development of the Roman criminal procedure it should be observed that it followed the immediacy principle from the earliest times until the Justinian period. Adherence to this rule is best confirmed by the manner in which particular evidence was taken in the Roman criminal procedure, as well as by its judicial evaluation. The significance attached by Romans to the principle in question is corroborated primarily by an example of evidence obtained from a witness’s testimony. Already in the Republic period, testimony given personally by a witness before the court was preferred to testimony in the form of a document. Adherence to the immediacy principle in the Roman criminal procedure was manifested by the fact of preparing reports, initially comprising only certain decisions, e.g. judgements, and later all procedural actions. In the Empire period, the Roman criminal procedure was also ominated by the immediacy principle. The fact that the principle was adhered to is explicitly confirmed by the rescripts issued by Emperor Hadrian, expressing the demand that direct evidence be taken before the court, the reform of the irenarchae’s office implemented by Antoninus Pius, as well as a ban on legal assistance in criminal cases, confirmed by Justinian. Certain exceptions to the immediacy principle were allowed, such as submitting at a trial written laudationes prepared out of court and reports on interrogation of witnesses compiled during the proceedings, as well as admissibility of circumstantial evidence.

The Act of 17 December 2009 on pursuing claims in class actions regulating court proceedings in cases which involve claims of at least 10 people, is a kind of novelty in Polish law. Undoubtedly, it is a legal act improving and modernizing Polish civil proceedings. However, one should pay attention to new developments and the lack of their clarification, and therefore to the importance of already issued judgments of the Supreme Court. For this reason, existing jurisdiction on this subject has been presented and analyzed, which allows to precise the subjective scope, the term and extent of the unification of claims, as well as the concept and requirement of a representative of the collective. Without any doubts, the practice, which starts to shape, as indicated on the example of jurisdiction, will allow to clarify the scope of the subject and object of the Act. The ability to limit the claims for liability of the defendant has, without any doubts, a very important role in functioning of the class action, because the unification of pecuniary claims is in practice very difficult. Past court decisions show that unification should be understood as occurrence of a members’ request for the generically same forms of protection. Many practical problems are also raised by the concept of the representative of the collective, and the way, in which the collective should choose one.

The theme of the article is suitable application of the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure in cases where a decision is issued by universities. The article discusses the case law of administrative courts and two ways of interpreting this problem. The article also the position of other authors and our own opinion of the author.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest omówienie wybranych kwestii problematyki związanej z przeprowadzeniem postępowania dowodowego w procedurze cywilnej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem istoty wniosku dowodowego oraz możliwości jego zgłoszenia. Analizie poddane zostały przepisy ustawowe i podustawowe dotyczące zarówno kwestii formalnych składania wniosku dowodowego, możliwości dopuszczenia dowodu, sposobu przeprowadzenia dowodu, a także roztrząsanie wyników postępowania dowodowego. Przepisy obowiązujące w obecnym kształcie nie dają możliwości zgłaszania dowodów według własnego uznania przez strony i uczestników postępowania, dlatego też niezwykle istotne jest stosowanie ich zgodnie z zaleceniem ustawodawcy, tak aby nie zostać pozbawionym wydania korzystnego rozstrzygnięcia tylko z tego powodu, że Sąd uzna wniosek dowodowy za spóźniony.

Artykuł obejmuje rozważania i uwagi dotyczące instytucji procesowej samokontroli organu administracji publicznej. W opracowaniu uwzględniono aktualne orzecznictwo sądów administracyjnych oraz poglądy przedstawicieli doktrynyprawa i postępowania administracyjnego. W szczególności analizie poddano przesłanki dopuszczalności zmiany lub uchylenia decyzji przez organ I instancji. Chodzi tutaj o przesłankę formalną, materialną oraz 7-dniowy termin na dokonanie autokontroli. Ponadto w opracowaniu sformułowano wnioski de lege ferenda w zakresie tej instytucji procesowej.

Artykuł jest próbą krytycznej oceny implementacji do polskiego kodeksu postępowania administracji instytucji mediacji. Autor rozważa zasadność wykorzystywania na gruncie prawa publicznego instytucji charakterystycznej dla prawa prywatnego. W tym celu analizie poddawane są dane dotyczące wprowadzonej ponad dekadę temu mediacji przed sądami administracyjnymi, której założenia są obecnie powielane. Prowadzą one do konkluzji, że mediacja administracyjna jest rozwiązaniem niepotrzebnym, zaś jej wprowadzenie do systemu prawa jest błędem. Autor proponuje także rozwiązania de lege ferenda, wskazując, że kluczem jest dejurydyzacja prawa administracyjnego.