This paper presents the issue of a lawyer’s integrity from the perspective of the assumptions underlying the original concept of a holistic approach to law and legal practice. In the course of the discussion, the basic principles of legal holism, the assumed understanding of lawyer’s integrity and their personal qualities forming the lawyer personality, and the problem of integrity in the context of the formula (model) shaping the lawyer-client relationship will be introduced. Legal holism recognises a lawyer’s self-knowledge, their conscious choice of professional role(s), the ways in which they are performed and the formula for working with clients and parties to disputes as crucial issues for the practice of law. It emphasises their complexity and possible impact on the postulated observance by a lawyer of the integrity of attitudes and actions in professional and private life. The author represents a research approach related to the concept of ontological and methodological multidimensionality of legal phenomena and the postulate of the so-called external integration of jurisprudence with the achievements of other sciences, including branches other than social (e.g. psychology or sociology).

The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.

The research objective of the publication is expressed in its content devoted to the
general analysis of the solutions adopted in the draft regulation of the European
Union on the digital asset market. The entry of this legal act into force will fill the
so-called ‘regulatory gap’ as the digital asset sector is not regulated in the EU. The
research approach has been determined by the subject of the legal analysis, namely
the provisions of the proposed new EU regulation on the digital asset market. The
study describes the proposed legal regulation and its systemic importance, as well
as indicates the similarity of the proposed solutions to well-known legal institutions
in the area of the capital market. The main theses are as follows: the proposed legal
act will order the digital asset market in terms of law (firstly); the proposed legal act
in terms of content is based on solutions provided for in the capital market law
(secondly); the proposed legal act provides for legal institutions ensuring the
so-called safety of trading (thirdly). The results should be considered original
because the publication constitutes a pioneering study on the proposed legal act.
With its entry into force (the date is unknown), a discussion on specific topics will
begin in the science of law. Therefore, it is worth speaking up and evaluating the
proposed regulation before the new law is passed. The cognitive value of the publication results from its pioneering nature, and the impact on social relations is
significant. The digital asset market is developing extremely dynamically, and the
interest in this sector is very high.

The research objective of the publication is expressed in its content devoted to the general analysis of the solutions adopted in the draft regulation of the European Union on the digital asset market. The entry of this legal act into force will fill the so-called ‘regulatory gap’ as the digital asset sector is not regulated in the EU. The research approach has been determined by the subject of the legal analysis, namely the provisions of the proposed new EU regulation on the digital asset market. The study describes the proposed legal regulation and its systemic importance, as well as indicates the similarity of the proposed solutions to well-known legal institutions in the area of the capital market. The main theses are as follows: the proposed legal act will order the digital asset market in terms of law (firstly); the proposed legal act in terms of content is based on solutions provided for in the capital market law (secondly); the proposed legal act provides for legal institutions ensuring the so-called safety of trading (thirdly). The results should be considered original because the publication constitutes a pioneering study on the proposed legal act. With its entry into force (the date is unknown), a discussion on specific topics will begin in the science of law. Therefore, it is worth speaking up and evaluating the proposed regulation before the new law is passed. The cognitive value of the publication results from its pioneering nature, and the impact on social relations is significant. The digital asset market is developing extremely dynamically, and the interest in this sector is very high.

In my paper I would like to analyze the topic o academic legal education, using for that purpose tool granted by Rochard Rorty’s neopragmatism and Artur Kozak’s juriscentrism. In this article I consider the possibility of describing higher education and legal culture using both of those concepts, and to form some proposals for future shaping of this proces. In my text I aim to prove, tha contemporary legal education is basem mostly on the mechanisms of socialisation and professional training, which base rather on transfer of rules of legal reasoning and discussion within legal community, than on transfer of actual skills. Therefore I consider to which extent this process should be suplemented by methods which individualise students, and which allow the autocreation, which is, according to Rorty, should be the mian task of higher education. In the further parts of my paper I consuder, how those mechanisms will impact shaping of future lawyers, and by that, the legal community itself, and what benefits could we achieve this way.

The subject matter of the second part of the article (the first part was published in issue 1/2019 of the “Critique of Law”) is a continuation of the analysis of the impact of cultural patterns such as integrity, social dialogue, elimination of violence on the formation of the relationships between authorities and members of the state community.

The subject of the analysis presented in the text is an argument that tends to (and used to) be raised in the critical discourse on constitutionalism – the allegation of the so-called constitutional fetishism. The argument is to show why the constitutional discourse has lost its potential to explain and create social processes. The reason is that lawyers focus too much only on the content and interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, without considering a broader social context, which makes the constitutional discourse limited solely to legal issues with a simultaneous omission or underestimation of all other aspects of constitutionalism. This attitude of lawyers to the content of the constitution (or – in broader terms – to the provisions of law) is sometimes referred to even as idolatrous, hence the reference to the notion of fetishism in the religious sense. The aim of the text is to analyse the structure of this argument and to attempt to determine the impact it can have on
constitutionalism.

The subject matter of this paper is the analysis of the phenomenon of subordination
as a manifestation of the relationships between political authority and society and of the phenomenon of equality as an inherent right of individuals. The author has made an attempt to examine the mutual relationships between the two phenomena, especially from the perspective of the impact on the establishment of relationships between political authority and society.

The aim of the article is to evaluate the draft of a new Family Code developed by the Social Codification Commission for Family and Guardianship Law attached to the Children’s Rights Ombudsman with regard to the advisability and legitimacy of the changes proposed in it, as well as to analyse its selected detailed solutions in the context of their impact on the protection of the child’s welfare. The aforemen tioned detailed issues concern, among others, the issues of parental custody and material and legal grounds for divorce. The proposed changes, namely the replacement of the institution of parental custody with “parental responsibility” and the introduction of a new divorce premise are perceived by the authors of the article as clearly negative.
The authors of the article are also critical of the procedure of preparation of the discussed draft. In their opinion, the applicable Family and Guardianship Code is not an anachronistic legal act and can and should continue to play the role of a basic regulator of legal and family relations in our country. The proposal to replace it with a new code is not sufficiently justified, either legally or socially, and its adoption may prove to be dangerous for the stability of the legal and family regula tions, shaped by the latest amendments to family law and contrary to the principle of protection of the best interests of the child.

Academics and faculty members are entangled in many interests. Selfless science for cognitive purposes is a thing of the past. There is a constant game of the power over knowledge. Apart from scientists, many entities with various interests are participants of the game. They are: politicians, officials, academic administration, research sponsors, accreditation agencies, publishers, resort scientific institutes, industry, business. The scientists themselves sometimes work for the truth and sometimes they work for profit; they create knowledge which is public property, or when they are employed commercially, e.g. by the industry, they create private knowledge. This paper presents five factors which may contribute to restricting the cognitive autonomy of the scientists.

The subject of the analysis presented in the text is an argument that tends to (and used to) be raised in the critical discourse on constitutionalism – the allegation of the so-called constitutional fetishism. The argument is to show why the constitutional discourse has lost its potential to explain and create social processes. The reason is that lawyers focus too much only on the content and interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, without considering a broader social context, which makes the constitutional discourse limited solely to legal issues with a simultaneous omission or underestimation of all other aspects of constitutionalism. This attitude of lawyers to the content of the constitution (or – in broader terms – to the provisions of law) is sometimes referred to even as idolatrous, hence the reference to the notion of fetishism in the religious sense. The aim of the text is to analyse the structure of this argument and to attempt to determine the impact it can have on constitutionalism.

Academics and faculty members are entangled in many interests. Selfless science for cognitive purposes is a thing of the past. There is a constant game of the power over knowledge. Apart from scientists, many entities with various interests are participants of the game. They are: politicians, officials, academic administration, research sponsors, accreditation agencies, publishers, resort scientific institutes, industry, business. The scientists themselves sometimes work for the truth and sometimes they work for profit; they create knowledge which is public property, or when they are employed commercially, e.g. by the industry, they create private knowledge. This paper presents five factors which may contribute to restricting the cognitive autonomy of the scientists.