The purpose of the research conducted is to present the directions of changes in
the Polish legislation on accessing and reusing public information, showing perspectives for public information in administration. The pursue of it is accompanied by a diagnosis of the most important issues in the execution of the guaranteed information powers, and also by an analysis of the judicature’s work and postulates of the doctrine in this regard. The object of the study using the method of dogmatic-
legal analysis covers Polish and European normative acts, scientific publications,
the case law of administrative courts and the Constitutional Tribunal. The results
indicate that the issues and doubts raised concern the fundamental aspects of
access to public information, as well as detailed issues related to establishing a legal
framework for the principles of reusing that information. The current directions
of changes fit into building administration that is based on open public data, which
will not only ensure wide access to public information but will also create and gather
data in a way that will allow for the further economic use of those data by the private
sector. Resolving the existing problems in exercising information rights and implementing the projected changes will both pose a considerable challenge to the public administration. The conducted research allowed for formulating legislative postulates and remarks addressed to the legislator, as well as practical solutions concerning the organisation of the administration apparatus.

Mediation in the administrative procedure is a new institution that provides a chance for an improved perception of public administration, yet it also gives rise to a range of doubts. The latter spring chiefly, though not solely, from the nature of administrative control. The principles of the rule of law, objective law, and voluntary mediation, which may be taken an improper advantage of, contrary to the legislator’s intentions, are also identified as barriers.
Analysis of the issue implies that administrative proceedings leave room for mediation. Whether it will fulfil expectations, however, largely depends on the attitudes of parties and administrative authorities, or their employees, to be precise, for whom mediation is undoubtedly both a processual and mental challenge.
The introduction of mediation to the Code of Administrative Procedure is to be applauded, mainly from the perspective of inducing citizens’ trust in public authorities. Mediation may also prove an effective instrument of eliminating conflicts in administration and thus contribute to reducing the caseload to be heard by administrative courts.
It is important, though, for this opportunity to be taken proper advantage of and for the transformation of administration from controlling to mediating and more friendly to subjects administered to continue. This is a trend that deserves to be followed not only in Polish but also other legislations.

The aim of this article is to answer the question whether taxpayers are entitled to any subjective rights that are overtly, unambiguously and legibly laid down in tax law. The author presents the title issue by analysing a broad base of judicature by
Poland’s CT, the EUCJ and Poland’s administrative courts, also discussing the relevant literature concerning subjective rights as coded in the provisions of the Polish Constitution and tax law. Taxpayers’ subjective rights may constitute an effective protection measure not only vis-a-vis the administrative discretion of tax authorities, but also in the event of their abuse of administrative power in relations with entities obliged to pay levies.

This article explores the possibility of replacing the traditional administrative supervision over the gig industry in favour of regulatory instruments rooted in economy. While regulation in this sense is not uncommon in the Enlish-speaking countries, even outside infrastructural sectors, in continental Europe, administrative supervision of business still prevails. The current approach of states, including administration, legislative authorities and courts, towards the gig economy can be attributed to the misconception expressed in the EU and national court decisions presuming that companies such as Uber, offering an electronic platform, form one entity with thousands of businesses performing services such as Uber drivers. This paper asserts that regulatory authorities with their powers of correcting the anomalies of the market, are better suited for platform-based services. States should use their powers to liberalise doing business, rather than restrict new, inventive forms of business to the detriment of the customers.

This article concerns the problem associated with the nature of the institution of a petition for reconsideration of the case in view of regulation No 16 of the Administrative Procedur Code in the version before the amendment dated 3 December 2010, which entered into force on 11 April 2011. Despite the amendment, to this day the provision is the source of many disputes, which is reflected in a very non-uniform judicial practice. On the basis of this regulation can be observed, how defective constructed legal provisions affect the administration of justice and the application of the law by creating situations in which the courts take over the functions of law making. On the selected example is shown, how one decision of the Supreme Court, being the basis of decisions of courts of appeal, causes that victims defective administrative decision are charged with the responsibility for legislative errors. Knowledge of the matter, which is the subject of this publication, is extremely important for all practitioners as well as theorists of the law because of the importance of the issues, which accompany the main theme. The work is based on an analysis of the concept of finality and validity of administration decision and depth on theoretical consideration and extensive discussion of the judicial practice of administrative courts, civil courts and Constitutional Tribunal.

The theme of the article is suitable application of the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure in cases where a decision is issued by universities. The article discusses the case law of administrative courts and two ways of interpreting this problem. The article also the position of other authors and our own opinion of the author.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

In the judgement C-403/16 Soufiane El Hassani v. Polish Foreign Office European Court of Justice noticed that provisions of internal law cannot limit the right to judical-review established in art. 32 par. 3 of Visa Code. The regulation must be interpreted in context of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Meanwhile the sentence was answer to question of Polish Supreme Administrative Court and it arose under Administrative Courts Proceedings Act which prohibits performing judicial review over visa decisions. The aim of the paper is to explain that judicial review at those issues may be effectively performed by common courts, without damaging visa-applicants rights. The possibility comes from wide definition of civil case in code of civil procedure and attribution of common courts in some public administration cases.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

One of the most effective systems of protection of human rights is the system defined in the European Convention of Human Rights. Until 2010, the European Court of Human Rights had rarely handled tax cases because, in principle, it excluded this category of cases from its jurisdiction in the field of the protection of taxpayer rights. Such cases had always been qualified – in accordance to the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – as criminal or civil (property-related) cases. A major change in the ECHR’s approach to cases featuring tax-related aspects occurred in 2011. Given the protection of the right to property as set out in Protocol No. 1, the ECHR ranted taxpayers protection related to the return of value added tax in situations in which the taxpayer fulfilled their record-keeping obligations. The adopted trend in the issued decisions is seen to be dominant, but to be considered grounded, a greater number of ECHR judicial decisions than at present is needed. There is no doubt that the new tendency in the judicial decisions issued by the ECHR may have a major impact on the decisions issued by administrative courts in Poland.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

The subject of this paper is the taxation of a security transfer of title to a fixed property with the tax on goods and services. The author focuses on the interpretation of the term “paid supply of goods” in the context of a security transfer of title. The objective of the following considerations is to establish whether a security transfer of a title is a chargeable event, and to indicate the moment in which the tax becomes chargeable on the grounds of the goods and services tax and in the light of the absence of a consistent practice of the tax authorities as well as divergent judicial decisions of administrative courts on the matter.