In 2021, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (unconstitutionally composed) dropped a judicial bomb on the primacy of the EU law, a judicial dialogue with the Court of Justice, and a mechanism for providing the rule of law conditions by the Member States. The Tribunal, for the first time in history, recognised Articles 1(1), 2, 4(3) and 19(1) TEU unconstitutional. The text critically unpacks the Tribunal’s reasoning. It provides doctrinal explanations and a broader interpretation of the judgement in the context of the Tribunal’s past case law and the existing Polish debate about the judgment. One of the main arguments is that the current Tribunal is intellec-tually dishonest and abusive regarding constitutional law. It took advantage of recycling the previous constitutional case law, which was not so enthusiastic about the primacy of the EU law. The Tribunal follows strategies of illiberals or abusive constitutional actors, who conceal their real intentions and actions behind the veil of noble values and respected aims.

Following a complaint to an administrative court by two judges, the Prime Minister used the self-revision procedure and revoked his countersignature of the Presi-dent’s official act. This is a true precedent in the history of Polish constitutionalism. Yet, the permissibility of judicial review of presidential acts performed in individual cases should not give rise to any doubts. This is because such acts are subject to the general control regime set forth in the Act of 30 August 2002 – Law on Proceed-ings before Administrative Courts. What we can learn from other judicial systems indicates that the acts of central executive authorities are not, with some exceptions, exempt from such supervision. An analysis of the judicial decisions of, for instance, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, which recognises its jurisdiction over appointments of judges serves as a convincing example.

This article is a contribution to the biography of Professor Andrzej Kabat – a prose­cutor, legal counsel, judge of the highest courts of the Republic of Poland, and a long­time academic teacher. The study discusses selected jurisprudential achieve­ments of Professor Andrzej Kabat from the period when he held the office of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative Court. Moreover, there are also references to his research on the institution of questions of law sub­mitted to the Constitutional Tribunal, which is regarded as pioneering in the science of law, despite the fundamental changes in the political system. What marks the discussed output of Professor Kabat is both the relevance of his ideas and the great significance for the practice of application of the law.

This article is a contribution to the biography of Professor Andrzej Kabat – a prose-cutor, legal counsel, judge of the highest courts of the Republic of Poland, and a long-time academic teacher. The study discusses selected jurisprudential achieve-ments of Professor Andrzej Kabat from the period when he held the office of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative Court. Moreover, there are also references to his research on the institution of questions of law sub-mitted to the Constitutional Tribunal, which is regarded as pioneering in the science of law, despite the fundamental changes in the political system. What marks the discussed output of Professor Kabat is both the relevance of his ideas and the great significance for the practice of application of the law.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

In 1942 the American military authorities interned over 120 thousand persons of Japanese ancestry in fear of sabotage on behalf of Japan. In a landmark 1944 case the Supreme Court rehabilitated Fred Korematsu but upheld constitutionality of the wartime laws leading to the internment. As transpired later, there was no evidence of the Japanese-Americans’ forming a fifth-column. The court decision was criticized as unconstitutional and driven by racism. In view of the dissenting judges and commentators it was condemned by the court of history. This article claims that the original decision was justified by the circumstances of the war, including the uncertainties it brought with it. Unless we equip the government with the power of clairvoyance, it has to be able to act, and even err, in emergency. The debate around Korematsu ignored the previous experience of both World Wars in which German fifth columns were active and effective. One such eyewitness account, not known in Western literature, is presented in the article. Modern his-tory confirms that the fifth column as such is a timeless phenomenon. The fear of hybrid wars techniques, justified or not, has led to the reemergence of the fifth column legislation in XXI century, although the range legal instruments intended to contain it is different. It is too early for judges and scholars to speak authorita-tively on behalf of the court of history, for history is still in the making.