The purpose of the article is to propose a concept of the collective right to food which may turn out to be essential in fighting hunger and malnutrition on a global scale. International agreements, including Pacts on Human Rights, overlook the rights of indigenous peoples by corresponding to the individualistic, state-centric, consumeristic and commercial vision of the right to food. An approach, which is based on the objectives of critical studies on law, to the official dogma of the right to food (developed within expert and intergovernmental bodies in the form of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) allows for claiming that the dogma is less legitimized than the collective right to food (defined in the Decla-ration of Atitlán) resulting from the indigenous peoples’ practice. This is why, remaining in the sphere of the official, Grotian international legal order, it should be acknowledged that the indigenous peoples’ right to food defined in the article is a part of third-generation rights (next to the second-generation individualistic right to food) while remaining strictly connected to the right to self-determination and the right to development. It is a result of the long-term practice of those peoples. The above-mentioned proposal of the third-generation right to food has not been applied to the legal doctrine so far. Its value is the opportunity to develop and study the concept of food sovereignty that allows one to more effectively combat hunger and malnutrition on a global scale as compared to the previous actions of international communities.

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.

Women’s rights are an inseparable part of the human rights, and human rights are an integrated part of women’s rights. The Swedish Government has adopted a concept of feminist foreign policy, aiming at strengthening these rights on a global level. Women’s rights are continued to be violated as much as ever, hindering democracy, peace, rule of law, sustainable development and economic growth – the overarching aims of international policy. Women’s rights to education, financial resources and access to the labour market are crucial in defending human rights and having a policy for 100 per cent of the world’s population. A priority task of the feminist foreign policy is supporting women’s inclusion in all decision-making structures, both on national and multilateral level. This in order to achieve wider foreign, development and security policy objectives through a new approach, different way of thinking and different solutions.

The aim of the article is to offer an insight into the problem of observance of human rights at sea in situations of fighting piracy and armed robbery against vessels. The analysis has been conducted using the example of the situation in the Gulf of Aden and piracy off the coast of Somalia. The authors have analysed international legal regulations in the field of the law of the sea and human rights, with a particular consideration of the observance and protection of human rights depending on the maritime zone (territorial sea, contiguous zone, and high sea) where these rights are violated. The subject matter of the observance of human rights in the context of maritime areas has not been so far a matter addressed in Polish-language scientific publications. Yet, given its special social and legal significance (e.g. in the light of the migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea basin), it seems necessary to bring it to attention. In the conclusions, the authors argue that the adopted regulations affecting piracy and acts of armed robbery against vessels provide only a framework and that it is crucial to establish specific procedures to deal with pirates at an international level (considering the international standards of protection of human rights).

Subjects of rights originating from inherent human rights are among the subjects of public subjective rights. A deliberation on the matter of natural persons and legal persons, perceived as subjects of these rights, makes it possible to determine a number of questionable issues, which are surely reflected in the materialisation of these public subjective rights in legal practice. The subject matter is very complex, if only on account of the necessity to make use of the results of the linguistic interpretation of the notion of citizen. This is vital even though a legal definition of citizen exists. The intricate nature of the problem in question is also a consequence of the need to make a distinction in the area of the possibility to grant public subjective rights originating from inherent human rights to citizens, non-citizens under the jurisdiction of the Polish state, and non-citizens outside the jurisdiction of the Polish state. Another highly problematic aspect is the possibility to apply an analogy in the field of assignment of subjective public rights originating from inherent human rights to legal persons. Since the very application of analogies in this domain is controversial, it seems reasonable to stress the lack of possibility to consider legal persons as subjects of public subjective rights originating from inherent human rights such as life or health.

One of the most effective systems of protection of human rights is the system defined in the European Convention of Human Rights. Until 2010, the European Court of Human Rights had rarely handled tax cases because, in principle, it excluded this category of cases from its jurisdiction in the field of the protection of taxpayer rights. Such cases had always been qualified – in accordance to the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – as criminal or civil (property-related) cases. A major change in the ECHR’s approach to cases featuring tax-related aspects occurred in 2011. Given the protection of the right to property as set out in Protocol No. 1, the ECHR ranted taxpayers protection related to the return of value added tax in situations in which the taxpayer fulfilled their record-keeping obligations. The adopted trend in the issued decisions is seen to be dominant, but to be considered grounded, a greater number of ECHR judicial decisions than at present is needed. There is no doubt that the new tendency in the judicial decisions issued by the ECHR may have a major impact on the decisions issued by administrative courts in Poland.

This article provides an outline as to the functioning of “Amparo,” a Mexican mechanism of constitutional control. From the time of its introduction to Mexican constitutionalism in 1847, it has established itself as a robust constitutional control mechanism and has profoundly influenced Latin American constitutionalism and other countries in establishing similar mechanisms. This paper provides a summary of its evolution, functioning, and main procedural aspects.

Przedmiotem opracowania jest uchwalony przez parlament brytyjski w 1998 r. Human Rights Act (HRA) i jego wpływ na rozumienie pojęcia organu administracji publicznej w prawie angielskim. Uzasadnieniem podjęcia tematu jest ukazanie rozwoju doktryny brytyjskiego prawa administracyjnego pod wpływem prawa międzynarodowego na wskutek inkorporacji Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. W artykule ukazano drogę Wielkiej Brytanii do implementacji Konwencji i związanie się jej przepisami, a także zmianę w definiowaniu organu władzy publicznej (public authority). Wskazano również, że pojęcie organu administracji publicznej na gruncie HRA w Wielkiej Brytanii jest węższe od tej przyjętej na gruncie prawa polskiego i tym samym istnieje mniejsza ochrona obywateli brytyjskich przed działaniem administracji publicznej w tym państwie.

Przedmiotem pracy jest analiza pojęcia godności w naukach prawnych, w szczególności w teorii i filozofii prawa. Autor rozróżnia autonomiczną i heteronomiczną wersję pojęcia godności. Pierwszy sposób pojmowania godności zakłada, że godność, tzn. wartość ludzkiego życia, jest całkowicie niezależna od warunków społecznych, w których ludzie wiodą swoje życie. Taki sposób pojmowania godności występuje w Kantowskiej filozofii moralnej autonomii jako immanentnej cechy każdej osoby ludzkiej. Drugi sposób pojmowania godności zakłada, że wartość ludzkiego życia jest zależna od warunków społecznych, w których ludzie wiodą swoje życie. W konsekwencji przyjmuje się, że istnieją warunki społeczne w których ludzie tracą swoją godność jako przypadkową cechę istoty ludzkiej. W takim przypadku, w celu odzyskania utraconej godności ludzie powinni zmienić warunki społeczne w drodze rewolucji społecznej. Taki sposób pojmowania godności występuje w Marksowskiej filozofii alienacji. Autor zmierza do wykazania, że różny sposób pojmowania godności pociąga za sobą doniosłe konsekwencje prawne.

Ważny dla naukowego i filozoficznego sposobu myślenia jest problem okoliczności, które wpłynęły na wykształcenie takiego typu rozważań, różnego od objaśniania rzeczywistości za pomocą mitologicznych wierzeń. Sensem umysłowych poszukiwań człowieka filozofującego okazał się namysł nad regułą, nad kierującą wszystkim zasadą, tj. zarówno światem naturalnym (kosmosem), jak i relacjami między ludźmi. Doszło do tego sposobu myślenia po tym, gdy pojawiła się potrzeba i możliwość spisania (ustanowienia) abstrakcyjnych norm prawa (nomos) dla pewności i sprawdzalności orzecznictwa, dla obrotu gospodarczego, a zwłaszcza dla własności (prawo cywilne), wartość której wyrażono abstrakcyjnie w pieniądzu monetarnym. Były to znaczące okoliczności dla zainicjowania i rozwoju myślenia naukowo-filozoficznego (abstrakcyjnego). Innymi fundamentalnymi warunkami rozwoju nauki i filozofii była wolność, równość i uznanie dla inności, a także nieortodoksyjny charakter wierzeń (mitów). Te zapewniała zaś obywatelska, kosmopolityczna i rozwinięta gospodarczo polis, zwłaszcza demokratyczna. Owe warunki rozwoju nauki i okazały się uniwersalne i ponadczasowe.