The subject of this paper focuses on issues concerning criminal liability for a crime committed while inebriated or intoxicated. These issues, whose social significance is indisputable, continue to be controversial from the perspective of criminal law. One reason for this is the shortcomings of Article 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, which serves as the basis to hold an offender who was in said state tempore criminis criminally liable. The purpose of this paper, however, is not so much to criticise the current legal solution as to offer a proposition de lege ferenda concerning a change in the wording of the said provision on the grounds of the reservations raised. The conclusions that lead to it are derived both from the dogmatic-legal analysis of the cited provision and from the empirical approach motivated by the psychopathological view of the state of intoxication, or the problem of (in)sanity of the perpetrator of a prohibited act. These issues are ingrained in the regulation contained in § 3 of Article 31 of the Criminal Code. It is the will of the criminal legislator for the scope of Article 31 of the Criminal Code to encompass a variety of states which may seem similar from a psychopathological point of view they, but actually require a different legal approach with regard to criminal-legal aspects and criminal policy, which this study aims to present.

The article is focused on critical infrastructure protection in the field of selected liability issues. Critical infrastructure is significant from the country’s integrity and continuity point of view at all levels: economic, social and political. The process of sectoral markets liberalisation and the spread of international connections of these markets (e.g. arising of transeuropean networks) have resulted in shared responsibility on critical infrastructure protection. Protection duties have been divided between private (infrastructure operators) and public authorities. It is seemingly clear which one: the former or the latter bears responsibility for the protection of critical infrastructure during and after its disruption. In fact clarificatio of this area poses a problem at the level of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The critical infrastructure protection becomes a jigsaw puzzle of imperium and dominium relations that results in sophisticated picture of responsibility.

The Act of 17 December 2009 on pursuing claims in class actions regulating court proceedings in cases which involve claims of at least 10 people, is a kind of novelty in Polish law. Undoubtedly, it is a legal act improving and modernizing Polish civil proceedings. However, one should pay attention to new developments and the lack of their clarification, and therefore to the importance of already issued judgments of the Supreme Court. For this reason, existing jurisdiction on this subject has been presented and analyzed, which allows to precise the subjective scope, the term and extent of the unification of claims, as well as the concept and requirement of a representative of the collective. Without any doubts, the practice, which starts to shape, as indicated on the example of jurisdiction, will allow to clarify the scope of the subject and object of the Act. The ability to limit the claims for liability of the defendant has, without any doubts, a very important role in functioning of the class action, because the unification of pecuniary claims is in practice very difficult. Past court decisions show that unification should be understood as occurrence of a members’ request for the generically same forms of protection. Many practical problems are also raised by the concept of the representative of the collective, and the way, in which the collective should choose one.

The paper deals with the issue of the legal consequences of a false statement given
by the accused in criminal proceedings. The author presents positions expressed in this matter in the literature and jurisprudence. He then presents and justifies his own view. He believes that a false statement by the accused is not criminally prohibited, because there is no such type of offence. However, such behaviour is unlawful. It is true that this is a kind of defence, but it is not the execution of the right to defence. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the false statement could result in an intensification of the penalty or in the use of a preventive measure in the proceedings (for example temporary custody). It is undoubted, however, that false statement resulting in defamation or false accusation may lead to criminal liability.

The purpose of the article is to discuss the new regulation provided in Art. 189d item 4 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, i.e. the impact of the circumstances of the offender’s contribution to the occurrence of administrative tort on the administrative penalty. First, after conducting an analysis, I come into a conclusion that the said contribution does not affect the very fact of being held liable, but is taken consideration only at the stage of determining the amount of penalty. This proves that its application is limited. Then, I proceed with a critical analysis of the existing limitation, referring to the fundamental principles that should be taken into account in the process of law enforcement, which involves also imposing sanctions and determining the role of administrative financial penalties.

The article discusses a vital problem of the legal restrictions imposed on single-member limited liability companies under the provisions in force. In the first part of the text, the author explores the binding regulations applicable to single-member companies and arranges them in a way that it is possible to classify them within the legal framework. In the second part, the author deals with the legitimacy of existence of the said restrictions on the functioning of single-member companies, analyses the superficiality of application of particular solutions, and defines the most significant directions of changes necessary to abolish the restrictions imposed on single-member limited liability companies.

The purpose of the article is to discuss unjust enrichment as a source of obligations, already known in Roman law, which dealt with the most important problems related to the matter in question and ways to solve those problems in practice. The author, aware of the complexity of the issues related to unjust enrichment and the problems that may arise from the application of this institution, will focus on the presentation of the definition and the characteristics of unjust enrichment as a source of obligations. These characteristics are covered only in Article 405 of the Civil Code, but the apparently obvious regulation includes some unnamed elements that need to be taken into account when deciding whether unjust enrichment has actually taken place. The author intends to show that the special nature of unjust enrichment is determined first and foremost by the fulfilment of the conditions for its occurrence. These conditions include: an individual’s gain, benefiting at the expense of another person, the relationship between enrichment and impoverishment and the lack of legal grounds for enrichment; it should be added, however, that the Civil Code does not speak of the last of the listed conditions. The knowledge or the will of the enriched person will not be considered such conditions, though. The liability of the enriched person in such circumstances will occur regardless of the cause of the person’s gain.