The article is focused on financing of Polish support to displaced persons arriving to Poland from Ukraine after 24 February 2022, so after the Russian invasion on Ukraine. Poland has introduced a new statute and has amended general rules applicable in mass influx situations. That area of law is regulated also by Directive 2001/55/EC which establishes a minimum standard of displaced persons’ rights, leaving their financing primarily to national budgets. The Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 is the first law which has activated the Directive. Under the amended Polish law, support to persons from Ukraine is subject to the avail-ability of national financial resources, which contradicts the principles of public finance law because Polish law does not establish predictable sources of financing, and spendings are not controlled by the Polish Parliament.

The issue of the rule of law as a criterion for the action of public administration bodies has not yet been the subject of wider doctrinal reflection. The reason for this state of affairs is probably the rather sparing reference by public administration bodies to the rule of law as a basis for their decisions. Meanwhile, the obligation imposed on the authorities in Article 7 of the Code of Administrative Procedure should be treated as one of their fundamental duties in ongoing administrative proceedings. The present study focuses on signalling only some of the problems related to the notion of the rule of law on the grounds of general administrative procedure, indicating the ambiguity of this phrase and the related various understandings of it. The conclusions should be regarded as an invitation to discuss this undoubtedly complex issue.

This paper focuses on the issue of whether the boundaries of the private lives of judges are shaped according to cultural conditions and gender. My main assumption is that gender inequality in a culture is reflected in how the boundaries of the private life of judges are interpreted. In this regard, women judges may face more restrictions than their male colleagues in what they wear, what they do and what they say in their lives generally. And ultimately, an interpretation of private life that reinforces gender roles also limits the freedom of expression. I concretise my discussion regarding gender stereotypes that influence what judges do or say in their private lives in different cultures.

The amendment of Article 209 of the Polish Criminal Code, which took place on 31 May 2017 with the entry into force of the Act of 23 March 2017 on Amendments to the Criminal Code Act and the Act on Assistance to Persons Entitled to Maintenance (Journal of Laws of 2017, item 952), resulted in significant changes not only in the wording of the said article itself, but also in the picture of the statistical effects of pre-trial and court proceedings for the crime in question. From the very beginning, the said amendment raised questions and reservations among a substantial number of supporters of the established line of judicial decisions issued in the domain of criminal law. They considered it unfit to keep to the principles of adequacy and proportionality, as well as posing a threat to a significant – and ultimately destructive – increase in the burden on law enforcement authorities and the judiciary in general. At the same time, taking into account the main objectives and ideas of the amendment, which was intended in particular to improve the enforcement of maintenance obligations, it needs to be said that it proved ineffective and was actually a manifestation of penal populism.

The purpose of the article is analyse how essential the issue of personal data protection is in the procedure of leading a collective dispute. In order to make some findings in this matter, the dogmatic and legal method was primarily used and the provisions of the Act on Resolving Collective Disputes and the GDPR were analysed in the first place. The findings made lead to the conclusion that despite the fact that the dispute itself is collective, both parties (both the trade union and the employer) process a range of personal data during the dispute. Due to the specifics of the procedure and the fact that the Act was essentially created before the GDPR came into force and it was not amended for the inclusion of broadly understood requirements for the correctness of the processing of personal data, it is necessary to rely on general principles resulting from the GDPR, and a certain indicator of it may be opinions issued by the PDPO.
The issue raised in this paper has so far been included in certain statements from the doctrine, but its practical significance and importance for social partners who execute their constitutional right to lead collective disputes fully justify further research in this direction as well as the fact of findings resulting from that research reaching various target groups (apart from the above-mentioned social partners, representatives of the judicature and science should also be reached).

The present article addresses the issue, whether in international law there exists pre-contractual responsibility (culpa in contrahendo). If such a responsibility indeed exists it will play a significant role not only in State-to-State relations, but also in the relations between States and private investors, given the fact that currently, on the virtue of investment treaties, private entities have rights to lodge claims against states before arbitration tribunals, which employ international law in their judgements. Hence, determination whether responsibility for culpa in contrahendo exists in international law, will allow to establish, whether private entities may base the claims on that ground, and if such course of action is advantageous. The proposed analysis will be based upon sources of international law, such as treaties, custom, general principles of law, as well as judicial and scientific authorities – and additionally also relevant practice in chosen States’ legal practice.

The article has two basic goals. The first one is to create a conceptual framework
for the discussion of judicial impartiality. In order to achieve this aim, in this text I reflect on three aspects of the principle of impartiality, which have generally been studied independently from one another in the literature. I make an attempt to show that the three distinguished aspects of impartiality can be analysed, using a uniform conceptual scale. The second goal of the paper is to justify a claim that one of these aspects (namely the aspect of impartiality towards worldview doctrines) differs from the other two in terms of structure. In the text, I attempt to consider that difference and then propose a formula for judicial worldview neutrality that takes into account the special nature of that aspect of judicial impartiality. The conclusion of these reflections is the introduction of two versions of the worldview neutrality principle, which should – in my view – be applied in activities under taken by judges.

Forestry Law does not constitute an autonomous branch of law – it is in fact most commonly percieved as part of the environmental law. However, this does not mean, that it is impossible to extract general principles of the Forest Law. The Forest Act contains a catalogue of explicitly formulated general principles of forest management, which at the same time are the principles of forest law. Furthermore, it is possible to reconstruct some additional general principles from specific provisions of the Forest Act, as well as to indicate those of the principles of the environmental law, which may be extended to forestry regulations. The aim of this paper is therefore to formulate and analyse the general principles: (1) expressly articulated by the legislature; (2) possible to reconstruct from the detailed provisions of the Forest Act; (3) of the environmental law, which can be applied to forestry regulations. The result of the survey is a more extensive catalogue of general principles of forest law in directive-descriptive terms, which may contribute to the extension of the autonomy of the forest law.

There are some typical relations that can be observed in public administration, including management, supervision, control, co-ordination and co-operation. The latter two are seldom subject to scrutiny by administration law academics. The purpose of this article is to initiate a discussion on filling this gap. In most cases, co-ordination is performed in connection with management, supervision or control. This type of co-ordination can be described as functional. However, independent co-ordination also exists. Due to the limited number of positive law regulations regarding this type of co-ordination, it is usually limited to the co-ordinating body applying non-executive measures. The co-ordination relationship in administration law is an unusual type. At least three entities are necessary for such a relationship to exist, namely a co-ordinator and two co-ordinated parties. The analysis of co-operation in public administration is possible upon considering the principle of general co-operation as a separate one. This principle could have the status of a general administration law principle, but the positive law does not currently formulate this principle directly. However, it can be derived from various applicable rules, including rules of constitutional importance. This principle dictates that all public administration entities must co-operate with each other. The article attempts to define forms of co-operation, indicating their diversity. Many issues related to co-ordination and co-operation in administration still require scientific explanation. A further stage should involve regulating these activities within the framework of the positive law. This could be implemented by future act – the “General Provisions of Administrative Law”.