The judicial review of administrative courts covers the legality of acts and actions of public administration bodies. The oversight over the activities of bodies of other authorities is, therefore, excluded from this review. However, there are cases in which administrative courts, invoking the so-called pro-constitutional interpre-tation, attempt to extend their jurisdiction also to be able to review the acts, actions or inactions of legislative and judicial authorities. Despite the fact that according to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the executive power (equated by legal scholars, commentators, and practitioners with the exercise of public administra-tion) is exercised by the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers, the dominant judicial practice is that the acts of the President, which constitute the exercise of his prerogatives, are not subject to the jurisdiction of administrative courts. The author argues against this practice.
The discussion addresses also the demands and proposals made in the litera-ture dealing with the subject for entrusting administrative courts with the review of decisions issued in social insurance cases, as well as the establishment of a separate judiciary in tax or – more broadly – financial cases. The author strongly opposes these demands and proposals as well.

Everyone’s personal dignity guarantees freedoms and rights regardless of age, which means these freedoms and rights are also granted to children. Children’s rights highlight children’s subjectivity and draw attention to their special status, which is, in fact, determined by the child’s dependence on adults, but is still not passive or submissive. This emphasis on the child’s rights sort of equalises the child’s legal situation which is results from their physical and mental immaturity and dependence. However, every human being – including a child – has duties in addition to rights, which remain in relative balance. Thus, they contribute to the formation of the child’s personality in a balanced manner. Focusing solely on the enjoyment of rights and simultaneously neglecting duties distorts this balance and contributes to the development of attitude of taking everything for granted, laziness, and choosing to live at the expense of others. It seems therefore necessary to restore the balance between the focus on children’s rights and the marginalisation of their responsibilities.

Everyone’s personal dignity guarantees freedoms and rights irrespective of age, which means that they also apply to the child. The rights of the child emphasise his or her subjectivity and draw attention to his or her special status determined, admittedly, by dependence on adults, but not without freedom. Emphasising the rights of the child is a kind of compensation for the child’s legal situation due to his/her physical and mental immaturity and dependence. However, every human being, including the child, has duties in addition to rights, which remain in relative balance. In this way, they contribute to the formation of the child’s personality in a balanced way. Limiting oneself exclusively to rights and at the same time margi-nalising duties leads to a disturbance of this balance, the formation of attitudes of entitlement towards others, teaches laziness and lives at the expense of others. As it seems, it is therefore necessary to restore the balance between highlighting children’s rights and depreciating their duties.

The aim of the article is to provide an overview of the international and EU law framework concerning the relation between the research and teaching. The analysis of internal regulations of selected European states is provided for a broader vision and comparative perspective. Such an overview constitutes the initial ground for further research and evaluation of the applicable law and its implementation. The article constitutes a summary of the initial phase of the research project dedicated to the impact of the legal research on legal education based on the projects funded by the Polish National Science Centre.

A review of the monograph entitled Realization of legal security in the institution of doctor’s liability for medical error by dr. hab. Wojciech Lis, prof. KUL was published in volume 14, issue 4/2022 of the journal “The Critique of Law”. This article is the answer of the monograph’s author to the above-mentioned review containing reflections on the reviewer’s comments and clarification of the review’s inaccuracies to the necessary extent.

The aim of the research was to identify conditions and forms of international and cross-border cooperation of Polish higher education institutions (HEIs). In order to achieve the goal, the formal-dogmatic method was applied, analyzing the literature on the subject, the law (mainly Polish law), as well as various statements and press releases. A request for public information was also used. The article was divided into three parts. The first one concerns the conditions of international and cross-border cooperation of Polish HEIs. The next part covers the forms of cooperation identified by the author, and the last one refers to the formula of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation as a form of international and cross-border cooperation of HEIs. The results of the research show that international and cross--border cooperation of Polish HEIs is based primarily on national law, which, however, is characterized by high variability, which does not favour building stable relations. The cooperation of HEIs takes various forms, from non-institutionalised to quasi institutionalised and institutionalised. Polish HEIs are trying to join the internationalization process, and the availability of external funding is conducive to gradual institutionalization of international and cross-border cooperation
of HEIs. There is a scarcity of studies on the subject, therefore the article may be
of great cognitive value to legal science, especially in Poland, but also abroad (for
scholars conducting comparative research).

The object of the study the findings of which are presented in this article is the written statements of reasons of selected resolutions issued by the Polish Supreme Court and the dissenting opinions submitted in opposition to them. The situation of this type constitutes a relationship of two or more standpoints regarding a problem presented to a bench, referred to in the text as an opposition. The aim of the article is to offer a typology of opposition that can be reconstructed as a result of a dissenting opinion being submitted. It encompasses axiological oppositions in the strong sense and interpretation oppositions (axiological in the weak sense). Axiological oppositions in the strong sense take the form of unipolar or bipolar opposites. The examined group of resolutions has given grounds to also isolate doctrinal disputes as well as disputes over the legal nature of a given institution. The article, however, focuses only on axiological opposites. The cognitive value of the conducted analyses lies: (1) in the identification of the limited role of interpretation guidelines on the level of written statements of reasons, and (2) in the identification of the dissimilarity of situations where a votum separatum becomes an expression of an equal standpoint on the grounds of ius interpretandi considered in broad terms and situations where a votum separatum is a dissenting opinion not so much against a decision that has been made but against the legal regulation that has required this decision to be as it is.

The main aim of this paper is to consider the acceptability of application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law in the regard to employment contract with pregnant women from the point of theory of justice. I argue that application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code resulting in exclusion of pregnant women from social security system not only might be doubtful from the constitutional law perspective, but it is also problematic from the point of view of the concept of justice realized by social security law. In the first part I recall in short basic typologies and definitions of justice. This leads to the observation, that although in philosophy there is no one understanding of justice, this notion has a long and established tradition. In following parts I ana- lyze which concepts of justice are being realized by constitutional law, civil law and social security law. I argue that as constitutional law and social security law deal mostly with distributive justice, civil law realizes mostly commutative justice, which also concerns Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code. In the last part I demonstrate consequences of applying Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law on the example of pregnant women being excluded from the social security system. This is followed by the final conclusion that although also for lawyers notion of justice has a long tradition, it is often im- posed in spite of "locally" realized types of justice, which leads to unwelcome and unforeseeable consequences.