Rape is often considered as a crime against a woman’s virtue. However, cases of male rape and sexual violence against members of the LGBTQ+ community can-not be overlooked. Though such cases are much underreported as compared to male-on-female rape, every victim of sexual violence should have legal recourse, regardless of gender, at the very least from a human rights perspective.
In India, however, rape is classified as a gender-specific offence. To provide deeper insights into the issue, this paper examines two key questions: (1) What factors contribute to the persistence of gender-specific laws in India; and (2) What can be learned from a critical analysis of gender-neutral rape laws in the UK, South Africa, and European Union, with a particular focus on Sweden? Additionally, the paper explores the potential for India to adopt relevant legal principles from these jurisdictions.

By way of safeguarding the rights of transgender individuals, the Indian government enacted the Transgender Persons’ (Protection of Rights) Act 2019. Studies show that the Act does not fully comply with many international treaties that aim to safeguard the rights of and provide safeguards for transgender individuals. To commence, to acquire a certificate of identity, transgender individuals are required to undergo a screening procedure administered by a medical officer and a District Magistrate to be certified. This requirement contradicts the idea of self-identification that is highlighted in international treaties such as the Yogyakarta Principles and the Inter-national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In this article, the author conducts a comparative study of the provisions that should be promptly added to the Act to give it the necessary prominence that has been overdue.

One of the fundamental dilemmas in judicial application of the law is to respect the principle of the rule of law and not only the principle of legalism. The principle of legalism as enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution insufficiently protects the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of the individual, and therefore judicial activism is required, i.e. a correction of the established law in the process of interpretation and application of the law in order to give the law such content that is consistent with the constitutionally defined values underlying the axiology of the Polish Constitution. The correction of the legislated law involves going beyond the content of the principle of legalism and referring to such values as – equity, justice, goodness, human rights and freedoms.
The judge, due to the fact that under the Constitution he is first and foremost subject to its provisions, and secondarily to the laws, may – if he is able to justify it – reject the content of the statutory provisions and base his decision exclusively on the provisions of the Constitution. This is justified when the Constitution protects individual rights and freedoms to a greater extent than the law. A judge may not invoke the rule dura lex sed lex in the process of interpretation, as it destroys the standards of legal culture. The correction of statute law in the process of its inter-pretation relates to judicial independence and responsibility for the issued decision.

Everyone’s personal dignity guarantees freedoms and rights regardless of age, which means these freedoms and rights are also granted to children. Children’s rights highlight children’s subjectivity and draw attention to their special status, which is, in fact, determined by the child’s dependence on adults, but is still not passive or submissive. This emphasis on the child’s rights sort of equalises the child’s legal situation which is results from their physical and mental immaturity and dependence. However, every human being – including a child – has duties in addition to rights, which remain in relative balance. Thus, they contribute to the formation of the child’s personality in a balanced manner. Focusing solely on the enjoyment of rights and simultaneously neglecting duties distorts this balance and contributes to the development of attitude of taking everything for granted, laziness, and choosing to live at the expense of others. It seems therefore necessary to restore the balance between the focus on children’s rights and the marginalisation of their responsibilities.

This article examines the jurisdictional status of the internet. Because of the underly-ing nature of technology, nations cannot effectively monitor online transactions that originate or conclude within their borders. Governments can seek to enforce their laws within the constraints of their physical, geographical, and political domains as defined by an atlas, but a borderless cyberworld regulated by fast--expanding technology has a variety of challenges. This study sheds light on those challenges, the jurisdiction for parties to suit, the remedies accessible to them, and the territorial concerns discussed in various domestic courts. It also focuses on the pressures on stakeholders to act, as well as the economic, human rights, and techno-logical infrastructure implications of jurisdictional concerns. In general, jurisdictional issues on the internet have resulted in haphazard and unrestricted jurisdictional implementations, and this article emphasizes the territorial difficulties of internet administration and its direct influence on many nations and elements.

The purpose of the article is the legal and comparative analysis of how the principle of the proportional restriction of the rights and freedoms of an individual is understood by the Constitutional Tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights. The author made a comparative profile of selected statements of the indicated judicial bodies, which refer to the essence, theoretical basis, structure and the practical application of the concept of proportionality, which allowed for distinguishing the basic similarities and differences between how proportionality is perceived by the CT and how it is viewed by the ECHR. The main thesis of the paper assumes that the most important and the most far-reaching differences concern the proportionality test structure as presented by both judicial bodies, as well as some practical aspects of the application of the test in the circumstances of specific actual states, however, the essence itself and its axiological basis remain similar in both cases.

The purpose of the article is to propose a concept of the collective right to food which may turn out to be essential in fighting hunger and malnutrition on a global scale. International agreements, including Pacts on Human Rights, overlook the rights of indigenous peoples by corresponding to the individualistic, state-centric, consumeristic and commercial vision of the right to food. An approach, which is based on the objectives of critical studies on law, to the official dogma of the right to food (developed within expert and intergovernmental bodies in the form of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) allows for claiming that the dogma is less legitimized than the collective right to food (defined in the Decla-ration of Atitlán) resulting from the indigenous peoples’ practice. This is why, remaining in the sphere of the official, Grotian international legal order, it should be acknowledged that the indigenous peoples’ right to food defined in the article is a part of third-generation rights (next to the second-generation individualistic right to food) while remaining strictly connected to the right to self-determination and the right to development. It is a result of the long-term practice of those peoples. The above-mentioned proposal of the third-generation right to food has not been applied to the legal doctrine so far. Its value is the opportunity to develop and study the concept of food sovereignty that allows one to more effectively combat hunger and malnutrition on a global scale as compared to the previous actions of international communities.

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.

The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative concepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the application of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity’s own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evaluative norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR’s judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level.

The right to the city is a solution that can be considered in terms of third-generation human rights. The right to the city also serves as a tool for the effective fulfilment and respect of human rights agreed at the international level as well as the Sustainable Development Goals expressed in the 2030 Agenda. This is undoubtedly a new paradigm for urban development, which provides an alternative framework for rethinking cities and urbanisation. It aims to address the main challenges in cities and human settlements. The purpose of the article is to present an understanding of the right to the city by the analysis of its structure and the answer to the question of whether it is in fact a third-generation human right.

Abstract The question of compensation of Polish citizens for their property left beyond the Bug river after the population exchanges is among the most complex social, economical and legal issues resulting from the World War II to be solved by the Polish State. Although more than 70 years have passed since this issue has arisen, it remains the subject of numerous national and European court rulings and legislative actions; the significance of the legal solution of the described issue is bolstered by the fact that it is being treated as a “proving ground” for the broader question of reprivatisation. This article focuses on the current Act of 8 July 2005 which was aimed at providing a final solution for settling the claims. However, during the last few years of this act in operation numerous questions and disputes have arisen leading to more than 600 administrative court and Constitutional Tribunal rulings. The subject of this article will be focused on current controversies regarding the subject including the requirements of residence on the former territory of Poland on 1 September 1939, exclusion of non- Polish nationals who are heirs to property owners from entitlement to compensation and legal consequences of nationalization by Soviet authorities during World War II and its aftermath.

This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

The aim of the article is to offer an insight into the problem of observance of human rights at sea in situations of fighting piracy and armed robbery against vessels. The analysis has been conducted using the example of the situation in the Gulf of Aden and piracy off the coast of Somalia. The authors have analysed international legal regulations in the field of the law of the sea and human rights, with a particular consideration of the observance and protection of human rights depending on the maritime zone (territorial sea, contiguous zone, and high sea) where these rights are violated. The subject matter of the observance of human rights in the context of maritime areas has not been so far a matter addressed in Polish-language scientific publications. Yet, given its special social and legal significance (e.g. in the light of the migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea basin), it seems necessary to bring it to attention. In the conclusions, the authors argue that the adopted regulations affecting piracy and acts of armed robbery against vessels provide only a framework and that it is crucial to establish specific procedures to deal with pirates at an international level (considering the international standards of protection of human rights).

Subjects of rights originating from inherent human rights are among the subjects of public subjective rights. A deliberation on the matter of natural persons and legal persons, perceived as subjects of these rights, makes it possible to determine a number of questionable issues, which are surely reflected in the materialisation of these public subjective rights in legal practice. The subject matter is very complex, if only on account of the necessity to make use of the results of the linguistic interpretation of the notion of citizen. This is vital even though a legal definition of citizen exists. The intricate nature of the problem in question is also a consequence of the need to make a distinction in the area of the possibility to grant public subjective rights originating from inherent human rights to citizens, non-citizens under the jurisdiction of the Polish state, and non-citizens outside the jurisdiction of the Polish state. Another highly problematic aspect is the possibility to apply an analogy in the field of assignment of subjective public rights originating from inherent human rights to legal persons. Since the very application of analogies in this domain is controversial, it seems reasonable to stress the lack of possibility to consider legal persons as subjects of public subjective rights originating from inherent human rights such as life or health.

The research objective of this paper is to determine the impact that the repressive nature of the European Commission’s amendments to Directive 2008/115 will likely have on the two basic values of the return policy, that is, its fairness and effectiveness. The basic thesis of this study is that the direction of the directive’s recast, assuming – inter alia – an extension of the list of circumstances for applying the entry ban and detention, is contrary to the declared fairness of the migration policy towards third-country nationals. At the same time, the effectiveness of the planned changes is already questionable at the stage of draft legislation. These considerations are based on a juxtaposition of the proposed changes with currently binding legislation, the Commission’s soft law and the case law of the CJEU. The final effect of these analyses is the finding that the solutions proposed by the Commission will lead to an inevitable increase in the use of coercive measures against irregular immigrants in a way that stands in fundamental contradiction to the declared fairness and proportionality of EU actions. In this context, the effectiveness of the return policy should not be identified with a percentage of returns, but rather with the recognised necessity of overall and perfect control over irregular migrants. At the same time, the Recast Return Directive will contribute to the development of an already existing tendency to treat migration law as an instrument of security and public order, and to use administrative law measures so that they function in a manner equivalent to that of a criminal sanction.

One of the most effective systems of protection of human rights is the system defined in the European Convention of Human Rights. Until 2010, the European Court of Human Rights had rarely handled tax cases because, in principle, it excluded this category of cases from its jurisdiction in the field of the protection of taxpayer rights. Such cases had always been qualified – in accordance to the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – as criminal or civil (property-related) cases. A major change in the ECHR’s approach to cases featuring tax-related aspects occurred in 2011. Given the protection of the right to property as set out in Protocol No. 1, the ECHR ranted taxpayers protection related to the return of value added tax in situations in which the taxpayer fulfilled their record-keeping obligations. The adopted trend in the issued decisions is seen to be dominant, but to be considered grounded, a greater number of ECHR judicial decisions than at present is needed. There is no doubt that the new tendency in the judicial decisions issued by the ECHR may have a major impact on the decisions issued by administrative courts in Poland.

The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses a certain concept of secularism, where secularism is considered to be composite of three principles: separation of church and state, freedom of religion, and equality. Subsequently, the European Convention on Human Rights is reflected upon with that concept of secularism in mind. While it does not warrant separation of church and state, freedom of religion and equality are enshrined in it. Therefore, the Convention may be considered secularist to an extent. In the second part, three of the European Court of Human Rights landmark cases are analyzed with regard to secularism. While not much can be said about Kokkinakis v. Greece on its own, the comparison with Leyla Şahin v. Turkey and Lautsi v. Italy allows to point out that appearance of secu­larism (understood as one of its components – the principle of separation) provides the Court with a possibility to defer to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and draw the focus away from the actual violation of the principles enshrined in the Convention. Finally, it is noted that the only appearance of the concept of secu­larism as a personal conviction in the Court’s judgment is inconclusive.