Mancur Olson offered us big thoughts on big subjects. Today, he might well attack the problem of climate change and the current failure of nations to act effectively. Olson would note the incentives of nations to ride free or cheaply. He would observe that climate change is an alliance problem, one where some nations have much more at stake than others. With climate change, the alliance problem is redoubled, since the asymmetries among nations fall along multiple dimensions, including those of vulnerability to climate change, history of greenhouse emissions, emissions per dollar of GNP, level of economic development, and cultural environmental concerns. Each nation, valuing primarily its own concerns, advances principles favoring itself in the apportionment of painful cuts. Not surprisingly, the cuts that nations have agreed upon for the heralded 2015 Paris Accords will be woefully insuffi cient to avoid exacerbating climate change. Thus, despite much international discussion and many platitudinous agreements, concerns about the distribution of painful cuts will continue to prevent the nations of the world from even approaching an effi cient agreement. Our threatened planet needs a more sophisticated approach to this and other collective action problems, a fi eld pioneered by Mancur Olson.

This essay proposes that time preference is an essential component of analysis of collective behavior and provision of public goods. It addresses the validity of the assumption that time preference, as a parameter in individual utility functions, is exogenous and fi xed. While individual time discounting is used to predict many social phenomena, it is quite often applied in a fi xed form where the possibility of change is rarely discussed. The mechanism of change in individual time discounting is explored in different social contexts, using student, inmate and drug addict populations. This study establishes that certain parameters, such as the length of exposure to new environment and new social connections, are of extreme importance in determining the degree of change in time discounting.

This article presents a case study touching on the subject of the relationships occurring between events, which are not of economic nature, and the rates of return of the listed companies. The subject of the research concerns the relationship between sport and the stock exchange. The case study used sporting results and bookmakers’ expectations (betting odds) for the matches played by Borussia Dortmund, whose shares are quoted on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It was assumed that this relationship stems from the emotions of football fans who may be stock market investors. This assumption is justifi ed by the highest TV ratings of BVB matches both "live" and in front of the TV screens as well as the high attractiveness of securities issued by the BVB GmbH & Co. KGaA. The data used in the study came from the web service transfermarkt.de and Xetra market for the period of 2011–2014. Research methods employed for this study were the econometric models, including models of (G)ARCH type, and statistical tests of signifi cance.

The major purpose of the paper is considering the possibility of using conjoint analysis in postponed lotteries research. The role of conjoint measurement theory in mathematical psychology is reviewed. Next, the conjoint data analysis method is elaborated; this method is derived from conjoint measurement theory and it is very popular in market research. The focus is on two versions: traditional Conjoint Value Analysis (CVA) and Choice-Based Conjoint (CBC). The results of this research show that changes in the scope of the likelihood of payment, rather than changes in the dimension of deferral, more strongly determine the choices made.

People often face choices where outcomes are both delayed and uncertain. Numerous studies of delayed gains and losses show the hyperbolalike discounting process of delayed payoffs. We assumed that when evaluating a delayed lottery people act according to the prospect theory model, where payoffs are discounted according to a hyperbolic function. The problem that we addressed is whether the a parameter of the value function v( ) and the g parameter of the probability weighting function w( ) differ for evaluations of delayed and instant lotteries. We found that when people compare delayed certain payoffs with delayed risky payoffs they are more risk prone than in situations where both certain payoffs and risky payoffs are instant. However, when people compare
present certain payoffs with delayed risky payoffs they are less risk prone than in situations where both certain payoffs and risky payoffs are instant. Additionally, the probability weighting curves were more linear for delayed lotteries than for instant lotteries (people were more sensitive to changes of probability).

Winning a championship is the highest achievement in Formula 1, and multiple titles can earn one a place in the pantheon of the sport. In this article I explore whether the scoring method for selecting a champion can be considered defi nitive, and how unstable results might be when the method’s parameters are slightly changed. I have employed case studies of paradoxes and historical recreations of seasons using alternative scoring systems. Finally, I argue that the Borda count is desirable system for scoring in Formula 1,
and that building strategies by teams around particular scoring systems is a legitimate aspect of the sport.

In the Polish public debate, one occasionally hears voices advocating the need for a significant change in the system of elections to Sejm, the Lower Chamber of Parliament – the objective of such changes would be to strengthen larger parties. As an example to follow, proponents of these changes cite Hungary, where the changes in electoral rules allowed the party in power to retain majority in the legislative despite reduction in popular support. Opponents of this solution see it as a manifest electoral manipulation. The aim of the present paper is to analyze how the “marginal only” changes to the structure of constituencies electing members of Sejm postulated in the political arena would affect electoral results of individual political groups and what would be the broader political consequences. The author pays particular attention to expected impact of such changes on the majority bonus for the winning party, possible government coalition variants, concentration of party system at parliamentary level and proportionality of elections. Simulation of allocation of seats in Sejm based on votes cast was prepared for three possible variants of the structure of Sejm constituencies, on the basis of historical data (for the 2011 and 2015 elections) and the predicted results of 2019 elections. Comparison of the simulated outcomes with the results obtained in the system currently in place allows to answer the main question posed.

This paper revisits one of the most debated tales from the Old Testament, Jacob’s deception of his father Isaac, and models it in the framework of a Bayesian game. Solving for the equilibrium that occurs in the Torah reveals what conditions must hold for biblical characters to be willing to make the decisions that they make. The paper also examines how the protagonists’ decisions would have changed if they had held different values. The analysis sheds light on which interpretations of the biblical story hold the most weight when its characters maintain consistent beliefs and act upon them in a sequentially rational manner.

In surveys, which are a commonly accepted research method in social sciences, we always observe a certain percentage of respondents giving no-opinion responses such as “no opinion” or “hard to say”. In this study, we treat no-opinion responses as a motivated decision to refuse to respond. The aim of the study was to determine what factors involved in the organisation of a study increase the percentage of respondents who opt for no-opinion responses. The factors on which we focused include in particular the significance of the difficulty of questions; the order of questionnaire questions; motivating respondents through rewards, and the research technique. In the first part of the study, 575 students were divided into 5 groups. Each group was surveyed about environmental consumer attitudes in different survey conditions. In addition, the respondents were asked to rank the difficulty of individual questions in the survey. Findings: The study showed that the percentage of no-opinion responses increases as the questions become more difficult. The respondents were more likely to avoid stating their opinion on those unecological behaviours that they exhibited more frequently. The change of the research technique from a questionnaire to a direct interview caused a decrease in the percentage of noopinion responses. The respondents opted for a “no opinion” response less frequently when the interview was conducted by a lecturer than when it was conducted by a student. Changing the order of questions also affected the percentage of no-opinion responses; however, that was only true for questions that the respondents recognised as easy. Conclusions: The study showed that the choice of a research technique intended to reduce the percentage of no-opinion responses depends on the quality of questions. If they are difficult and require the respondents to engage cognitive resources, a better solution is to employ the direct interview method. However, if the questions are sensitive and the respondent may feel pressure to give a response that conforms to social norms, a better solution is to ensure them anonymity, e.g. by employing the questionnaire technique.

Decision making in international organizations is a multistage and complex process. This paper is confi ned however only to one but the most important stage, either the voting on a one proposal, which may be accepted or rejected, or the choice between two alternative proposals. This seemingly simple, dichotomous decision can be made by many different methods of voting, i.e. simple majority; absolute majority; qualifi ed majority; voting with quorum; weighted voting; voting with a possibility of veto etc. These methods differ in their properties: equal vs. unequal treatment of the participants of decision-making assembly; the manner of respecting of minority rights; equal vs. unequal treatment of possible decisions; sensitiveness to changes of decisions of particular participants; effectiveness and other. These properties express postulates: anonymity; semi-duality; citizen sovereignty; monotonicity and strong monotonicity; unanimity, unrestricted domain etc. Some of these properties exclude the other. The choice of the particular method of voting means an acceptation of some postulates and a resignation from the other postulates.

The presented experiments are aimed at determining: (1) whether risk perception and risk acceptance are two distinct psychological processes and (2) how aspirations affect each process. It has been tested whether risk is independent of and preferences are depend on aspirations. In Experiment 1 72 employees of a high-tech company were presented with pairs of risky projects. The aspiration level was defi ned as the target return on the project and was set through an explicit instruction. In Experiment 2 93 bridge players were presented with pairs of contracts – one a sure thing and the other a risky one. The aspiration level was relatedto the team IMP points after the fi rst part of a knockout tournament and was set through an instruction. In both experiments with a between-subject design, two different aspiration levels were set for each group. All respondents were asked to judge riskiness of presented options and to select one. The results indicate that risk perception is insensitive to changes in aspirations, but preferences are. This supports distinctness of risk perception and risk acceptance.

Dealing with the problem of aging society is nowadays a challenging area of interests for both practice and science. Cognitive decline influences the decision-making process in elderly people. Changes in effectiveness of decisions are however situation-dependent. Aging not only affects the quality of decisions, but also strategy selection and choice satisfaction. Contemporary research and theories are discussed in this paper.

The study discussed here is aimed at determining how reference points, such as status quo and targets, affect salience of different aspects of a situation in evaluation of its riskiness. Examples of such aspects are probabilities and amounts of loss and win. The upcoming election to the Polish Parliament was used to investigate this issue. In Experiment 1, 67 participants – students of psychology and young adults graduated in computer sciences – evaluated risk related to the upcoming parliamentary election for six political parties represented in the Parliament. Since these six parties had different status quos and political targets, one might expect that the relative input of negative (e.g. the probability to loose seats) and positive (e.g. the probability to win the absolute majority) aspects of the situation to risk judgment would differ between parties. Experiment 2 was a repetition of Experiment 1 in a different time and with respondents, who were young people politically involved. In both experiments, no relation was found between the expected change in seats' number and riskiness. In Experiment 2, there was a salient relation between perceived risk and the probability to lose a parliamentary representation. However, in Exp. 1 such relation was significant only for the parties, which were endangered by such possibility. For the other parties perceived risk was related to their political targets, i.e. the probability to win the absolute majority or to form a governmental coalition.

While making investment decisions, investors use different reference points that change their values dynamically. In this paper we investigate the impact of the deviation of the portfolio value from different reference points on the investment activity of participants of the investment game, as measured by the turnover volume during the day. We consider the following reference points: (1) the portfolio value before the previous transaction, (2) the initial portfolio value (3) the highest portfolio value and (4) the lowest portfolio value noticed during the time of the game, (5) the best result and (6) the worst result in the game during the transaction day, and (7) the value of the Warsaw Stock Exchange Index (WIG20). The strongest effects on the investment decisions appear to be the highest and the lowest portfolio value noticed during the time of participation in the game.

Indirect reciprocity explains exchange within large groups where a favour is returned by someone other than the beneficiary. Evolutionary games used to analyze this phenomenon are of two types: some authors show that simple strategies based on information about the past deeds of a partner are sufficient for indirect reciprocity to emerge; others indicate that complex strategies based on motivations have better dynamic properties. These complex strategies require knowledge of a considerable number of past interactions of partners and their former partners and use complicated reasoning. I present another approach to improve the performance of simple strategies using the ecological rationality concept. According to this approach, information can be useful in solving a problem even if it is not logically related to it. A probabilistic connection between information and an environmental criterion is sufficient. I present two simple strategies based on such connections. They use reference and experience. Neither needs information extending beyond the most recent interactions of chosen individuals. Using computer simulation I show that they can support indirect reciprocity. The strategies are particularly useful when conditions are unfavourable e.g. when the cost of helping is high and/or when information is difficult to obtain.

The paper presented below tests the hypothesis that virtual investors (those investing virtual money to earn a virtual profit) succumb to the same pressures that have been found for investors who invest real money in an actual stock exchange. We focused on two issues: the disposition effect (i.e., the investors' propensity to sell stocks that are gaining value, while simultaneously holding stocks that are losing value) and the use of investing strategies that show the investor's belief in a continuation of the current trend. Our empirical research based on a data set of virtual investors' transaction records confirmed the presence of the disposition effect for virtual investment game samples, and provides support for the strong impact of this effect. With regard to investing strategies, we obtained results contrary to what we expected. Our subjects tended to employ contrarian strategies that showed belief in trend reversal, at least in the short term. This finding is not consistent with the common tendency of real money stock investors who tend to employ a momentum strategy that believes in continuation of the trend. These results suggest that the strategy used by investors depends on the specific situation and investing environment.

For more than half a century experimental results accumulate that disprove prognostic value of perfect equilibrium, a concept derived from the principle of rationalistic egoism. The article is a short survey of popular experimental games in which actors make decisions of monetary consequences, thus shaping the income distribution in a group (dyad, in particular). A brief account is given of experimental research on ultimatum and dictator game, dictator's dilemma, trust game, centipede, gift exchange and public good game. Special focus is on dictator's dilemma which tests for readiness to benefit one's partner at one's own expense. This elementary personal dilemma turns out to constitute an essential part of more complicated and better known two- and multi-personal games.