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Decyzje

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Year 12/2014 
Issue 24

Mancur Olson and the tragedy of the unbalanced commons

Richard Zeckhauser
Harvard Kennedy School

12/2014 (24) Decyzje

DOI 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.67

Abstract

Mancur Olson offered us big thoughts on big subjects. Today, he might well attack the problem of climate change and the current failure of nations to act effectively. Olson would note the incentives of nations to ride free or cheaply. He would observe that climate change is an alliance problem, one where some nations have much more at stake than others. With climate change, the alliance problem is redoubled, since the asymmetries among nations fall along multiple dimensions, including those of vulnerability to climate change, history of greenhouse emissions, emissions per dollar of GNP, level of economic development, and cultural environmental concerns. Each nation, valuing primarily its own concerns, advances principles favoring itself in the apportionment of painful cuts. Not surprisingly, the cuts that nations have agreed upon for the heralded 2015 Paris Accords will be woefully insuffi cient to avoid exacerbating climate change. Thus, despite much international discussion and many platitudinous agreements, concerns about the distribution of painful cuts will continue to prevent the nations of the world from even approaching an effi cient agreement. Our threatened planet needs a more sophisticated approach to this and other collective action problems, a fi eld pioneered by Mancur Olson.

References

  1. Kaminski, Marek M. Empirical Examples of Voting Paradoxes. In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, edited by Jac Heckelman and Nicholas Miller, forthcoming. [Google Scholar]
  2. Olson, Mancur. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. [Google Scholar]
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  4. Olson, Mancur. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Google Scholar]
  5. Olson, Mancur. (2000). Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York, NY: Basic Books. [Google Scholar]
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APA style

Mancur Olson and the tragedy of the unbalanced commons. (2015). Mancur Olson and the tragedy of the unbalanced commons. Decyzje, (24), 191-202. https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.67 (Original work published 12/2014AD)

MLA style

“Mancur Olson And The Tragedy Of The Unbalanced Commons”. 12/2014AD. Decyzje, no. 24, 2015, pp. 191-202.

Chicago style

“Mancur Olson And The Tragedy Of The Unbalanced Commons”. Decyzje, Decyzje, no. 24 (2015): 191-202. doi:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.67.