The paper aims to discuss the reasonable observer test as a tool for assessing judges’ expression. The argument begins by analyzing the relevant provisions of international soft law, as inscribed in the instruments developed and adopted by the CoE and the UN. Subsequently, an operationalization of the test is proposed by identifying the factors to be taken into account in the application of the test. In the following step, the expectations placed on the reasonable observer test are addressed, whereby the juriscentric (“strong”) and post-analytical (“weak”) positions are outlined. The former relies on Artur Kozak’s law-philosophical conception, and the latter is underpinned by the topography of juristic power developed by Paweł Jabłoński and Przemysław Kaczmarek. The paper makes the case for the post-analytical approach, which places rather modest expectations on the reasonable observer test and considers it instrumental in structuring the discussion, rather than yielding
indisputably reliable conclusions.

The aim of this paper is to present the issue of judicial freedom of expression in the perspective of obligations that are inherent in the judicial role. The fulfilment of such a task is dictated firstly by the presentation of an epistemic and egalitarian view of judicial humility. Based on this distinction I hypothesise two directions of thinking about judicial freedom of expression. The epistemic variant, focusing on the role aspect, presents the judge as a special category of citizen due to the obligations connected with his or her profession. The egalitarian variant presents an image of the judge as a citizen. The whole study is completed by the justification of the choice of a research topic. Among the reasons, technological changes and the related development of social media deserve special attention. The implementation of the tasks mentioned above allows several conclusions to be drawn. One of them concerns the mentioned hypothesis, which is given a correction. The other conclusion, in turn, concerns the variables in view of which the scope of judicial freedom of expression can be examined. The first of these is the sphere in which the judge’s expression occurs, the second is the object of that expression, and the third variable is the cultural aspect.

This paper discusses judicial duty of improving the law on epistemic grounds and claims in that regarding this obligation, it is possible to give a place to free speech from an epistemic point of view. As a requirement of having epistemic agency, judges like other human beings have epistemological responsibility. Different from the others’ responsibility, judges’ responsibility is connected to their duty of improving the law, which is required by their job as well as the idea of the rule of law and judicial professional principles. Judges should improve the law’s capacity to guide the conduct of its citizens, who are obligated to obey the law. Improving the law also improves the delivery of justice. The ways of legal interpretation and justification are important to improve it. While applying the law, judges can find the law unclear or they may encounter some norm conflicts. In these cases, they
should resolve them to keep the law ‘legally in good shape’, which should meet epistemological requirements. When fulfilling this obligation, judicial free speech on epistemic grounds should not be limited.

The purpose of the article is the legal and comparative analysis of how the principle of the proportional restriction of the rights and freedoms of an individual is understood by the Constitutional Tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights. The author made a comparative profile of selected statements of the indicated judicial bodies, which refer to the essence, theoretical basis, structure and the practical application of the concept of proportionality, which allowed for distinguishing the basic similarities and differences between how proportionality is perceived by the CT and how it is viewed by the ECHR. The main thesis of the paper assumes that the most important and the most far-reaching differences concern the proportionality test structure as presented by both judicial bodies, as well as some practical aspects of the application of the test in the circumstances of specific actual states, however, the essence itself and its axiological basis remain similar in both cases.

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.

The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative concepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the application of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity’s own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evaluative norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR’s judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level.

The article presents the problem related to the manner of defining a new psychoactive substance. The definition, partly contained in the provisions of the Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction of 2005, as regards the specification of the type of offense, refers to sub-statutory regulations – the ordinance of the Minister of Health. This way of defining the characteristics of a prohibited act raises constitutional doubts from the point of view of the principle of the exclusivity of the act and related rules:
1. Principles of the rule of law expressed in Article 2 of the Polish Constitution by not complying with the requirement of the principle of proper legislation.
2. The principles of nullum crimen sine lege certa arising from Article 42 paragraph 1 of the Polish Constitution, by violating the guarantee function of criminal law by violating the directive on statutory exclusivity and statutory specificity of an act.
3. Principles of the separation of powers resulting from Article 10 of the Polish Constitution by entrusting the executive authority with the powers of the legislative authority.
4. The principles of proportionality expressed in Article 31 paragraph 3 of the Polish Constitution regarding the grounds and scope of admissible limitation of constitutional rights and freedoms and the manner of limiting them.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis.
The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses a certain concept of secularism, where secularism is considered to be composite of three principles: separation of church and state, freedom of religion, and equality. Subsequently, the European Convention on Human Rights is reflected upon with that concept of secularism in mind. While it does not warrant separation of church and state, freedom of religion and equality are enshrined in it. Therefore, the Convention may be considered secularist to an extent. In the second part, three of the European Court of Human Rights landmark cases are analyzed with regard to secularism. While not much can be said about Kokkinakis v. Greece on its own, the comparison with Leyla Şahin v. Turkey and Lautsi v. Italy allows to point out that appearance of secu­larism (understood as one of its components – the principle of separation) provides the Court with a possibility to defer to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and draw the focus away from the actual violation of the principles enshrined in the Convention. Finally, it is noted that the only appearance of the concept of secu­larism as a personal conviction in the Court’s judgment is inconclusive.

Dla kreowania wizji demokracji i wolności duże znaczenie ma przypominanie źródeł i sensu ważnych europejskich wartości, także takiej wartości jak braterstwo. Korzenie odnajdywane są w poezji przedarchaicznej, a później w refleksji pierwszych filozofów, a jeszcze bardziej sofistów i stoików. Braterstwo wyraża wspólne pochodzenie i dziedzictwo ludzi. Opisy rzeczywistości społecznej ujawniają współcześnie różne formy dyskryminacji, m.in. właśnie ze względu na pomijanie nakazu braterstwa. Gwarancja wyłącznie większościowego decydowania bez utrzymywania życzliwości powszechnej w ujęciu C. Znamierowskiego czy braterstwa nie zapewni ustrojowi demokratyczności. W tej sytuacji także problematyczna jest prawość ustaw.

Artykuł analizuje postanowienie francuskiej Rady Stanu z 26 sierpnia 2016 r. zawieszające obowiązywanie decyzji mera jednej z miejscowości nadmorskich o zakazie noszenia „burkini” na miejscowych plażach. „Problem burkini” zaistniał także w Belgii, dlatego przedmiotowa analiza i towarzyszące jej rozważania stanowią także doskonałą okazję do krótkiego scharakteryzowania francuskiej i porównawczo belgijskiej specyfiki konstytucyjnego kształtu stosunków między państwem i Kościołami, a także szeregu adekwatnych odwołań do orzecznictwa ETPC dotyczącego problemu obecności – stanowiącej wyraz przekonań – symboliki, w przestrzeni publicznej państwa demokratycznego.

Tak zwana „ustawa o bestiach" stanowi regulację prawną dotyczącą postępowania ze sprawcami szczególnie niebezpiecznymi skazanymi prawomocnymi wyrokami na wiele lat przed jej wejściem w życie i dotyczy postępowania wobec nich po odbyciu przez nich kary pozbawienia wolności. Jej uchwaleniu oraz wejściu w życiu towarzyszyło wiele kontrowersji prawnych, co w efekcie doprowadziło do jej zaskarżenia do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Trybunał Konstytucyjny uznał, że umieszczenie osób uznanych za szczególnie niebezpieczne nie narusza konsty- tucyjnych gwarancji praw jednostki. TK stwierdził, że umieszczenie w Ośrodku nie ma charakteru karnego, a jedynie administracyjny, i nie stanowi orzekania drugi raz w tej samej sprawie. Artykuł krytycznie odnosi się do tezy TK i przed- stawionej przezeń argumentacji.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie możliwości regulacji spraw dotyczących szkolnictwa wyższego w aktach wykonawczych i wewnętrznych. Na tle zasady autonomii szkół wyższych i zasad dotyczących tworzenia prawa, w szczególności zasad wydawania rozporządzeń, zarysowano dopuszczalne granice delegowania materii odnoszącej się do szkolnictwa wyższego do rozporządzeń, a także aktów wewnętrznych szkół wyższych. Wskazano też, że nieprawidłowy podział materii między ustawę a rozporządzenie nie tylko narusza konstytucyjne reguły tworzenia prawa, ale też jest sprzeczny z ochroną zaufania podmiotów do państwa i stanowionego przez nie prawa oraz zasadą podziału i równowagi władzy. Wadliwe kształtowanie systemu szkolnictwa wyższego nie sprzyja jakości kształcenia oraz prowadzeniu badań naukowych. Utrudnia to również realizację wolności nauki.