The article covers the issue of the functioning of one of the advisory bodies of central governmental administration, i.e. the Council for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Affairs, which is associated with the President of the National Atomism Agency (PAA), the chief nuclear supervision body in Poland, which is the competent authority in nuclear safety and radiation protection affairs, as defined in the Atomic Law (Prawo atomowe). The article presents the objectives of the functioning of the Council as an advisory body to the nuclear supervision authority on the basis of international and European law and the views of the nuclear energy law doctrine. In relation to the Council, an important role is played by soft law acts, especially the so-called IAEA safety standards. Despite the fact that they are not legally binding, they constitute a valuable and extensive collection of recommendations supporting regional and national legislative activity. The purpose of this study is also a critical analysis of the amendment to the Atomic Law from 2016 in the section relating to changes made to the way of shaping the Council’s make-up. They caused the loss of one of the Council’s most important attributes, i.e. independence in the decision-making process and they deprived the President of the PAA (decision-making body) of influence on shaping its make-up. The changes introduced should be interpreted as an unequivocal negation of the ratio legis of appointing the Council and a significant step backwards in relation to the existing practice and legislative trends in recent years. The author postulates restoring the previous legal solutions as the ones that will allow the Council, the advisory body, to fulfil its function in the right way, really supporting the decision-making authority for which it works.

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge’s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.

The following article provides an introduction to the issues of legal and political organization of the Roman provinces in the area of conquered territory in the time of the Roman Empire (I-III A.D). It outlines the administrative division of the empire, the relationship between them and Rome. An efficiency and well-organized management of the huge land using structured magistrate, allowed the Romans to create a world Empire which prevailed over a thousand square kilometers. The most important tasks of princeps was to ensure external and internal security of the Empire by structured and efficiency administration, as well as a guarantee of the proper/ correct jurisdiction. Not without significance was the tax collection which enriched the imperial treasury and testified to the power of the ruler. The Roman state was based on provinces, colonies and municipalities, where the last one were the primary form of local autonomy. The organization of official structure was largely modeled on the system of the Republican Rome, while respecting local traditions at the same time. Although their dependence, the residents still had full decision-making in their own affairs.

Women’s rights are an inseparable part of the human rights, and human rights are an integrated part of women’s rights. The Swedish Government has adopted a concept of feminist foreign policy, aiming at strengthening these rights on a global level. Women’s rights are continued to be violated as much as ever, hindering democracy, peace, rule of law, sustainable development and economic growth – the overarching aims of international policy. Women’s rights to education, financial resources and access to the labour market are crucial in defending human rights and having a policy for 100 per cent of the world’s population. A priority task of the feminist foreign policy is supporting women’s inclusion in all decision-making structures, both on national and multilateral level. This in order to achieve wider foreign, development and security policy objectives through a new approach, different way of thinking and different solutions.

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current “juridification” of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current ‘juridification’ of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political
nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

Reaching back to the sources and the meaning of essential European values is of great importance to creating the vision of democracy and freedom. This applies also to values such as fraternity. The root thereof is found in pre-ancient poetry, later in the reflection of early philosophers – especially of the Sophists and the Stoics. Fraternity stands for the common descent, background, and heritage of humans. Descriptions of social reality nowadays reveal various forms of discrimination, e.g. on account of passing over the imperative of fraternity. A guarantee of only majority decision-making without common kindness as defined by C. Znamierowski and without fraternity will not make a system democratic. In such circumstances, the righteousness of legal acts is also debatable.