This paper discusses judicial duty of improving the law on epistemic grounds and claims in that regarding this obligation, it is possible to give a place to free speech from an epistemic point of view. As a requirement of having epistemic agency, judges like other human beings have epistemological responsibility. Different from the others’ responsibility, judges’ responsibility is connected to their duty of improving the law, which is required by their job as well as the idea of the rule of law and judicial professional principles. Judges should improve the law’s capacity to guide the conduct of its citizens, who are obligated to obey the law. Improving the law also improves the delivery of justice. The ways of legal interpretation and justification are important to improve it. While applying the law, judges can find the law unclear or they may encounter some norm conflicts. In these cases, they
should resolve them to keep the law ‘legally in good shape’, which should meet epistemological requirements. When fulfilling this obligation, judicial free speech on epistemic grounds should not be limited.

The author offers an analysis of the controversial Israeli Nation-State Law of 2018 and B. Netanyahu’s involvement in its adoption. He claims that its ideas manifest Netanyahu’s desire to depart from the state-centred, social democratic, and liberal views advocated by Ben Gurion. This desire stems from his strong disagreement with Israel’s founder’s claim and belief that secularism is a guarantee that Israel does not fall into the same trap as the leaders of the bicentennial Crusades – which ultimately failed. The author of the paper makes an insightful comparison of this law with the contents of Point 13 of Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 plan – a docu-ment from exactly 100 years before, designed to shape Europe after victory in the war against Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary, on whose lands an independent Polish state was to be established.

The author offers an analysis of the controversial Israeli Nation-State Law of 2018 and B. Netanyahu’s involvement in its adoption. He claims that its ideas manifest Netanyahu’s desire to depart from the state-centred, social democratic, and liberal views advocated by Ben Gurion. This desire stems from his strong disagreement with Israel’s founder’s claim and belief that secularism is a guarantee that Israel does not fall into the same trap as the leaders of the bicentennial Crusades – which ultimately failed. The author of the paper makes an insightful comparison of this law with the contents of Point 13 of Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 plan – a docu-ment from exactly 100 years before, designed to shape Europe after victory in the war against Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary, on whose lands an independent Polish state was to be established.

The present article addresses the issue, whether in international law there exists pre-contractual responsibility (culpa in contrahendo). If such a responsibility indeed exists it will play a significant role not only in State-to-State relations, but also in the relations between States and private investors, given the fact that currently, on the virtue of investment treaties, private entities have rights to lodge claims against states before arbitration tribunals, which employ international law in their judgements. Hence, determination whether responsibility for culpa in contrahendo exists in international law, will allow to establish, whether private entities may base the claims on that ground, and if such course of action is advantageous. The proposed analysis will be based upon sources of international law, such as treaties, custom, general principles of law, as well as judicial and scientific authorities – and additionally also relevant practice in chosen States’ legal practice.

This paper dwells on the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity. It claims that for the emergence and proper functioning of judicial empathy as a kind of judicial virtue, a number of conditions needed to be fulfilled, including the development of judicial integrity. The paper aims to unpack this argument and to demonstrate judicial empathy and integrity in action as exemplified particularly by judicial behaviour observed during empirical research in Cracow lower courts. The overall perspective for examining the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity rests on the developmental vision of a judge. Although the presented research fits into the broader interest in judicial empathy and judicial virtues, the paper contains concrete examples of verbal and non-verbal behaviours of a judge that demonstrate how judicial empathy co-functions with other skills and virtues. In general, the paper opposes the marginalisation of judicial skills and virtues.

Abstract The question of compensation of Polish citizens for their property left beyond the Bug river after the population exchanges is among the most complex social, economical and legal issues resulting from the World War II to be solved by the Polish State. Although more than 70 years have passed since this issue has arisen, it remains the subject of numerous national and European court rulings and legislative actions; the significance of the legal solution of the described issue is bolstered by the fact that it is being treated as a “proving ground” for the broader question of reprivatisation. This article focuses on the current Act of 8 July 2005 which was aimed at providing a final solution for settling the claims. However, during the last few years of this act in operation numerous questions and disputes have arisen leading to more than 600 administrative court and Constitutional Tribunal rulings. The subject of this article will be focused on current controversies regarding the subject including the requirements of residence on the former territory of Poland on 1 September 1939, exclusion of non- Polish nationals who are heirs to property owners from entitlement to compensation and legal consequences of nationalization by Soviet authorities during World War II and its aftermath.

Evidencing in medical trials for damages is difficult, and it requires not only knowledge in the field of law, but also in the field of medicine. The main impediment to fluent proceeding in medical matters which requires to be strongly emphasised is a vast difficulty for courts in taking evidence by an expert within reasonable time. Such evidence is generally necessary in every case because there is a necessity to learn medical facts from the perspective of specialist knowledge (Article 278 § 1 of CPC). The problematic nature of damages for so called medical errors has gained more and ore significance, both because of the growing number of claims and the damages paid in relation thereto and the rising costs of insurance against those events incurred by healthcare centers. In such legal circumstances, it is worth indicating the extent to which the evidence by an expert doctor is taken in medical proceedings and the significance thereof for a proper course of the proceedings. Nevertheless, frequently opinions by experts are rather far from being objective. Often, as a result of falsely interpreted solidarity of representatives of the profession, experts disregard the lack of knowledge and diligence of a doctor and the organisational omissions in health care centers. Their opinions are very often unclear ambiguous, posing different hypotheses and the possibilities of damage which do not assist the court in properly assessing the events in matters for compensation. Because of that, a higher standard of conduct for expert doctors should be considered, the manner in which they are appointed and an improvement of the effectiveness of their work

This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

In the article the Author analyses an interaction between critics of law and the critics of theory of law. He studies a problem of the style of law theory and the influence of culture on that style. The Author proposes research the types of legal polemics. He claims, that the role of specific and abstract polemics in critics of law is significant and until now not sufficiently investigated.

The Act of 17 December 2009 on pursuing claims in class actions regulating court proceedings in cases which involve claims of at least 10 people, is a kind of novelty in Polish law. Undoubtedly, it is a legal act improving and modernizing Polish civil proceedings. However, one should pay attention to new developments and the lack of their clarification, and therefore to the importance of already issued judgments of the Supreme Court. For this reason, existing jurisdiction on this subject has been presented and analyzed, which allows to precise the subjective scope, the term and extent of the unification of claims, as well as the concept and requirement of a representative of the collective. Without any doubts, the practice, which starts to shape, as indicated on the example of jurisdiction, will allow to clarify the scope of the subject and object of the Act. The ability to limit the claims for liability of the defendant has, without any doubts, a very important role in functioning of the class action, because the unification of pecuniary claims is in practice very difficult. Past court decisions show that unification should be understood as occurrence of a members’ request for the generically same forms of protection. Many practical problems are also raised by the concept of the representative of the collective, and the way, in which the collective should choose one.

Hans-Georg Gadamer claims that there are two keys to a proper understanding of the humanities. The first is the concept of Bildung, and the other – legal hermeneutics. This article is an attempt to apply Gadamer’s claim in the field of legal education. This application leads to three conclusions: a) the need to involve practice to legal education, b) the need for humanization of legal education, c) the need for an individualized approach to law studies.

In the article, I contrast the contemporary legal dogma with the challenges underlying the political nature of law and judicial practice. Both the Continental jurisprudence and the judicial decisions issued by European courts are dominated by the dogmatic current – and treated as politically neutral acts. My intention is to carefully verify this quite common belief in this paper. Making use of H. Berman’s views, I assume that the present shape of jurisprudence and the judicial practice based thereon have been established as a result of political conflicts and that the legal dogma is capable of neutralising and solving modern-day political conflicts precisely because of the qualities of the said shape. It is therefore both a political and an apolitical activity. But this paradox is only apparent. In its strive to keep its paradigm alive, the dogma should be flexible in reacting to the challenges occurring in its political environment. It can – and should – modify the “buffer” of the theory upon which it is set in order to retain its core. In the article, I try to answer the question about the boundaries of the possible adaptation of jurisprudence and juridical practice with respect to claims raised by the domain of politics – claims currently articulated as the strongest by the so-called critical theories of adjudication. The final part of the paper is an attempt – based on the example of theses formulated in monograph
by R. Mańko, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania – to outline the said boundaries.

In 1942 the American military authorities interned over 120 thousand persons of Japanese ancestry in fear of sabotage on behalf of Japan. In a landmark 1944 case the Supreme Court rehabilitated Fred Korematsu but upheld constitutionality of the wartime laws leading to the internment. As transpired later, there was no evidence of the Japanese-Americans’ forming a fifth-column. The court decision was criticized as unconstitutional and driven by racism. In view of the dissenting judges and commentators it was condemned by the court of history. This article claims that the original decision was justified by the circumstances of the war, including the uncertainties it brought with it. Unless we equip the government with the power of clairvoyance, it has to be able to act, and even err, in emergency. The debate around Korematsu ignored the previous experience of both World Wars in which German fifth columns were active and effective. One such eyewitness account, not known in Western literature, is presented in the article. Modern his-tory confirms that the fifth column as such is a timeless phenomenon. The fear of hybrid wars techniques, justified or not, has led to the reemergence of the fifth column legislation in XXI century, although the range legal instruments intended to contain it is different. It is too early for judges and scholars to speak authorita-tively on behalf of the court of history, for history is still in the making.

A discussion on the law studies and the legal apprenticeship system in Poland has been offered in the article from the point of view of a question about the objectives of educating lawyers and about whether the current system of legal education is appropriate. By pointing to the system-determined role of lawyers pursuing their profession within institutionalised structures of the system of justice, the article concentrates, among others, on issues concerning the selection of the subjects to be taught. But especially on the dilemma whether legal education should produce skilled law technicians or elites co-shaping the ethical, intellectual, cultural, and economic profile of society. The views contained in the article are presented starting from an assessment of the significance of market knowledge through a determination of the utility of curricula for further professional development of lawyers both as actual lawyers and pursuing other professions and ending with a comparison of teaching broken down into traditional branches of law and newly-forming fields thereof. The article addresses also the claims for opening law to interdisciplinarity and the role of lawyer as a profession of trust in the context of a constant need to reinforce the trust in law itself.