In recent years, it has been a relatively common practice for the Polish antitrust authority – the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the OCCP) – to issue conditional decisions in merger control proceedings. Actually, this is not a practice known only to the Polish antitrust authority, as such decisions are also issued by the European Commission. Consents granted following this procedure allow participants to a planned concentration (also referred to as merger) to proceed, but under certain conditions – behavioural or structural. Several important issues arise especially with regard to the latter type of conditions, particularly in terms of the permissible degree of interference in the sphere of private legal rights and obligations of one or both participants in the concentration, and the consequences of failure to comply with the condition under which the concentration has been approved. These issues are the subject of this paper, which ends with conclusions and implications regarding the judicial practice of the Polish antitrust authority in the area in question.

The public administration reform in Kosovo can be defined as a challenge to make significant changes in the government, decentralization of public administration, simplification of procedures, computerization of services and electronic governance at all levels of administration and improvement of developments in the field of human resources. The government of Kosovo has drawn up the strategic develop­ment plan and the strategic framework for the public administration reform, where the strategies for the public administration reform are foreseen. The reform envi­sioned with the strategic framework is directly related to the obligations of the Republic of Kosovo in the process of European integration and in addition to governmental monitoring and supervision structures, they are also monitored by the European Commission. The government of Kosovo, through the strategic framework, determines the strategic goals and policies which it intends to achieve within the nearest period, with the aim of improving the operation and moderni­zation of the public administration.

Margin squeezing is an abuse of dominant position, which is not directly mentioned in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Euro­pean General Court that have recognised this practice as anti­competitive, initially treating it as anti­competitive refusal to supply. Given the many similarities between these practices, there are questions as to whether margin squeeze should be consi­dered an separate manifestation of an abuse of dominant position. The aim of the article is to analyse the position of the European Commission in this regard and juxtapose it with the views contained in relevant judicial decisions, judgements, and rulings, as well as to compare it with the regulations adopted in the United States.

In our presentation, we review the procedure and method of meeting the electoral bodies of different (mainly European) countries – in particular the issue of ensuring the publicity and extent to which they can operate online. In addition, we examine in more detail the practice and procedural method of the Hungarian electoral bodies, in particular the National Election Commission. Based on the above, we also outline the possibilities for the further development of Hungarian practice. Our main findings: it is clear that although online meetings of election commissions are still used only in several countries, but the COVID-19 epidemic has highlighted the need to open up to the online space not only in the election process but also in the practice of individual election bodies. The regulations of the Hungarian National Election Commission define the rules of online meetings in great detail. This makes Hungary one of the few EU countries where it is possible to meet by videoconference. In our opinion, this direction will become decisive in the EU countries in the coming years. Moreover, we do not consider it inconceivable that the entire electoral process (including remote voting) should be digitised, as is the case in Estonia. However, this still requires many steps to be taken by individual countries to increase voter confidence in digitisation. For now, however, we have to be satisfied with one of the positive benefits of the COVID-19 epidemic: the ability to online meetings of election commissions.

The author is searching for an answer to the question of whether the European Union needs own solutions in the area of taxation of digital economy and whether the solution offered by the European Commission, which is taxation of significant digital presence, can be effective in taxing the digital economy of the European Union. To this end, a number of references to selected standpoints of international doctrine, OECD regulations, and the draft of the Directive has been made in this paper.

The article aims to analyse the national parliaments’ capability of exerting influence on the European Commission in the framework of the yellow card procedure. The analysis is based on the actions undertaken by national parliaments of selected Member States from Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe within the period between the announcement of the European Commission proposal for a targeted revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers and its decision to maintain the proposal. The analysis covers three variables concerning the states selected for analysis, namely the economic interest of those states, the coherence of their parliaments’ respective positions and the actions undertaken by the national parliaments, including those of their members, on the international level.

The research objective of this paper is to determine the impact that the repressive nature of the European Commission’s amendments to Directive 2008/115 will likely have on the two basic values of the return policy, that is, its fairness and effectiveness. The basic thesis of this study is that the direction of the directive’s recast, assuming – inter alia – an extension of the list of circumstances for applying the entry ban and detention, is contrary to the declared fairness of the migration policy towards third-country nationals. At the same time, the effectiveness of the planned changes is already questionable at the stage of draft legislation. These considerations are based on a juxtaposition of the proposed changes with currently binding legislation, the Commission’s soft law and the case law of the CJEU. The final effect of these analyses is the finding that the solutions proposed by the Commission will lead to an inevitable increase in the use of coercive measures against irregular immigrants in a way that stands in fundamental contradiction to the declared fairness and proportionality of EU actions. In this context, the effectiveness of the return policy should not be identified with a percentage of returns, but rather with the recognised necessity of overall and perfect control over irregular migrants. At the same time, the Recast Return Directive will contribute to the development of an already existing tendency to treat migration law as an instrument of security and public order, and to use administrative law measures so that they function in a manner equivalent to that of a criminal sanction.

A review of solutions which serve the taxation of the digital economy allows for the statement of a thesis that there are many methods which could tax business activity based on digital technologies. One should remember, however, that there also must be consensus and political will in order to introduce them. Due to the lack of consensus at the global level, on 21 March 2018, the European Commission presented two draft directives which were to ensure the taxation of enterprises conducting business in the European Union in the area of digital economy: the Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence and the Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services. The drafts of the Directives presented by the Commission are the beginning of the legislative work at the Union level. One should ask the question whether the European Union needs its own solutions regarding the taxation of the digital economy. In this paper,
the author attempts to evaluate whether the target solution proposed by the Commission, that is, the taxation of a significant digital presence, i.e. a digital establishment,
can be an effective tool for the taxation of the digital economy in the European
Union. For this purpose, subsequent references were made to selected opinions
of international doctrine, OECD regulations and the draft of the Directive.

The article aims to analyse the national parliaments’ capability of exerting influence on the European Commission in the framework of the yellow card procedure. The analysis is based on the actions undertaken by national parliaments of selected Member States from Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe within the period between the announcement of the European Commission proposal for a targeted revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers and its decision to maintain the proposal. The analysis covers three variables concerning the states selected for analysis, namely the economic interest of those states, the coherence of their parliaments’ respective positions and the actions undertaken by the national parliaments, including those of their members, on the international level.

The success of further development of Ukraine as sovereign and independent, democratic, social, constitutional state now, more than ever earlier, depends on determination of politicians, statesmen and public employees and adherence to principles of each citizen and civil society in general in fight against the external and internal enemy. Among internal enemies of Ukraine corruption which makes impossible effective economic, social and humanitarian development of Ukraine is high on the list, slows down the European integration of Ukraine, and at the end advantageous of external foes of our state. Therefore, eradication of corruption is one of the most important functions of the Ukrainian state now. The important place in system of subjects of forming and implementation of the state anti-corruption policy belongs to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ukraine. So, the parliament in Ukraine creates legal including the legal framework of the state anti-corruption policy, and also participates in forming of contest committees on election of special subjects of the prevention and counteraction. The head of state in Ukraine also defines essence and the maintenance of the state anti-corruption policy in the decrees, and also participates in forming of the commissions on selection and appointments of officials of specially authorized bodies according to the prevention and counteraction of corruption, and provides independence in activity of some of these bodies. The government of Ukraine provides complex implementation of the state anti-corruption policy, has own representation in contest committees which carry out forming of specially authorized bodies of prevention and counteraction of corruption (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, etc.), And also performs the common directorship and coordination of activity of National police of Ukraine and National Agency for Prevention of Corruption. At the same time, the success of prevention and counteraction of corruption in Ukraine depends on efficiency of interaction of the supreme bodies of the government in the field of forming and implementation of the state anti-corruption policy.