The author is searching for an answer to the question of whether the European Union needs own solutions in the area of taxation of digital economy and whether the solution offered by the European Commission, which is taxation of significant digital presence, can be effective in taxing the digital economy of the European Union. To this end, a number of references to selected standpoints of international doctrine, OECD regulations, and the draft of the Directive has been made in this paper.

The article aims to analyse the national parliaments’ capability of exerting influence on the European Commission in the framework of the yellow card procedure. The analysis is based on the actions undertaken by national parliaments of selected Member States from Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe within the period between the announcement of the European Commission proposal for a targeted revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers and its decision to maintain the proposal. The analysis covers three variables concerning the states selected for analysis, namely the economic interest of those states, the coherence of their parliaments’ respective positions and the actions undertaken by the national parliaments, including those of their members, on the international level.

The research objective of this paper is to determine the impact that the repressive nature of the European Commission’s amendments to Directive 2008/115 will likely have on the two basic values of the return policy, that is, its fairness and effectiveness. The basic thesis of this study is that the direction of the directive’s recast, assuming – inter alia – an extension of the list of circumstances for applying the entry ban and detention, is contrary to the declared fairness of the migration policy towards third-country nationals. At the same time, the effectiveness of the planned changes is already questionable at the stage of draft legislation. These considerations are based on a juxtaposition of the proposed changes with currently binding legislation, the Commission’s soft law and the case law of the CJEU. The final effect of these analyses is the finding that the solutions proposed by the Commission will lead to an inevitable increase in the use of coercive measures against irregular immigrants in a way that stands in fundamental contradiction to the declared fairness and proportionality of EU actions. In this context, the effectiveness of the return policy should not be identified with a percentage of returns, but rather with the recognised necessity of overall and perfect control over irregular migrants. At the same time, the Recast Return Directive will contribute to the development of an already existing tendency to treat migration law as an instrument of security and public order, and to use administrative law measures so that they function in a manner equivalent to that of a criminal sanction.

A review of solutions which serve the taxation of the digital economy allows for the statement of a thesis that there are many methods which could tax business activity based on digital technologies. One should remember, however, that there also must be consensus and political will in order to introduce them. Due to the lack of consensus at the global level, on 21 March 2018, the European Commission presented two draft directives which were to ensure the taxation of enterprises conducting business in the European Union in the area of digital economy: the Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence and the Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services. The drafts of the Directives presented by the Commission are the beginning of the legislative work at the Union level. One should ask the question whether the European Union needs its own solutions regarding the taxation of the digital economy. In this paper,
the author attempts to evaluate whether the target solution proposed by the Commission, that is, the taxation of a significant digital presence, i.e. a digital establishment,
can be an effective tool for the taxation of the digital economy in the European
Union. For this purpose, subsequent references were made to selected opinions
of international doctrine, OECD regulations and the draft of the Directive.

The article aims to analyse the national parliaments’ capability of exerting influence on the European Commission in the framework of the yellow card procedure. The analysis is based on the actions undertaken by national parliaments of selected Member States from Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe within the period between the announcement of the European Commission proposal for a targeted revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers and its decision to maintain the proposal. The analysis covers three variables concerning the states selected for analysis, namely the economic interest of those states, the coherence of their parliaments’ respective positions and the actions undertaken by the national parliaments, including those of their members, on the international level.

The success of further development of Ukraine as sovereign and independent, democratic, social, constitutional state now, more than ever earlier, depends on determination of politicians, statesmen and public employees and adherence to principles of each citizen and civil society in general in fight against the external and internal enemy. Among internal enemies of Ukraine corruption which makes impossible effective economic, social and humanitarian development of Ukraine is high on the list, slows down the European integration of Ukraine, and at the end advantageous of external foes of our state. Therefore, eradication of corruption is one of the most important functions of the Ukrainian state now. The important place in system of subjects of forming and implementation of the state anti-corruption policy belongs to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ukraine. So, the parliament in Ukraine creates legal including the legal framework of the state anti-corruption policy, and also participates in forming of contest committees on election of special subjects of the prevention and counteraction. The head of state in Ukraine also defines essence and the maintenance of the state anti-corruption policy in the decrees, and also participates in forming of the commissions on selection and appointments of officials of specially authorized bodies according to the prevention and counteraction of corruption, and provides independence in activity of some of these bodies. The government of Ukraine provides complex implementation of the state anti-corruption policy, has own representation in contest committees which carry out forming of specially authorized bodies of prevention and counteraction of corruption (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, etc.), And also performs the common directorship and coordination of activity of National police of Ukraine and National Agency for Prevention of Corruption. At the same time, the success of prevention and counteraction of corruption in Ukraine depends on efficiency of interaction of the supreme bodies of the government in the field of forming and implementation of the state anti-corruption policy.