It is the intention of the author of this article to present the theoretical and legal views of Sigmund Freud and Emil Durkheim and to place them in the context of classical texts on political-legal theory. Both thinkers, rather associated with sociology or psychology than with law, treated law as one of the most important reference points in their social concepts. In both cases, we are dealing with the treatment of the social order as transcendent to the empirical individual, and at the same time created by society. At the same time, the law is supposed to impede the emancipation of the individual and to allow the individual to have a real influence on the creation of power structures. At the same time, despite numerous analyses of the theoretical-legal views of these thinkers in the European scientific literature, this is the first such analysis in Polish. In addition to presenting Freud’s and Durkheim’s views, it opens up the possibility of not only situating them among political-legal theories, but also points to perspectives on the operationalisation of these theories – as well as their possible social implications. To this end, the following article juxtaposes their theories with the traditions of legal positivism as represented by Hans Kelsen and Herbert L.A. Hart – two authors who were inspired by Freud and Durkheim respectively.

The paper aims at reconstruction and critical discussion with the main tenets of political theory of adjudication, as presented by Rafał Mańko in his book, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania. Polityczność, etyka, legitymizacja [Towards a Critical Philosophy of Adjudication. The Political, Ethics, Legitimacy]. In the paper, I demonstrate: that the interpretation of the concept crucial for the entire theory – which is the concept of political – has been chosen by Mańko in an ideological and a priori manner; that the choice above effectively prevents the realisation of the main objective of the book, which is to legitimise adjudication; that the adoption of the ethics of adjudication advocated in the book is – in the light of the basic assumptions of that very publication – both improbable and hardly acceptable. Finally, I claim that Mańko’s theory, due to its totality, can distinguish neither between legitimate law and violence, nor between justified and unjustified adjudication. As a result, it loses its critical force. All these problems are not peculiar to Mańko’s theory, but they are general weaknesses of various versions of critical jurisprudence.

The aim of the present paper is to operationalise the concept of the political in
order to make it available as an analytical category for the critical study of judicial
decisions (case law). The concept of the political is understood here, following, in
particular, Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory, whereby it is a dimension of a social
antagonism. Such an antagonism can be played out not only in the process of
legislation (creation of abstract and general legal norms), but also in the process of
adjudication (the so-called ‘application of law’, which, however, always has a creative
element to it). As an analytical category, the political can be operationalised
in order to subject judicial decisions to a critique which goes beyond the question
of the ‘correct’ interpretation and ‘application’ of law in a given case, but puts in the
spotlight real social, political and economic conflicts that are at stake. The analytical
framework is exemplified by judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice.

The article attempts to analyse the status of the theory of legal interpretation that
emerges from the contributions of one of the representatives of critical legal studies
(CLS). Legal interpretation is analysed by using concepts drawn from hermeneutic
universalism and the post-structural philosophy of politics. The concepts of Duncan
Kennedy, an American philosopher of law, are subjected to analysis, and his
concept of adjudication, the indeterminacy thesis and the hermeneutic of suspicion
is addressed. The paper puts forward the thesis that the political nature of law – alongside
factors closely related to social structure – is also determined by factors which
pertain to the cognitive subject. This fact has crucial importance for determining
the status of the theory of legal interpretation.

In the article, I contrast the contemporary legal dogma with the challenges underlying the political nature of law and judicial practice. Both the Continental jurisprudence and the judicial decisions issued by European courts are dominated by the dogmatic current – and treated as politically neutral acts. My intention is to carefully verify this quite common belief in this paper. Making use of H. Berman’s views, I assume that the present shape of jurisprudence and the judicial practice based thereon have been established as a result of political conflicts and that the legal dogma is capable of neutralising and solving modern-day political conflicts precisely because of the qualities of the said shape. It is therefore both a political and an apolitical activity. But this paradox is only apparent. In its strive to keep its paradigm alive, the dogma should be flexible in reacting to the challenges occurring in its political environment. It can – and should – modify the “buffer” of the theory upon which it is set in order to retain its core. In the article, I try to answer the question about the boundaries of the possible adaptation of jurisprudence and juridical practice with respect to claims raised by the domain of politics – claims currently articulated as the strongest by the so-called critical theories of adjudication. The final part of the paper is an attempt – based on the example of theses formulated in monograph
by R. Mańko, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania – to outline the said boundaries.

Theoretical foundations of the animal protection law remain in statu nascendi. The lack of an established dogmatic systematization of this domain makes studies focused primarily on a comprehensive discussion of its practical aspects, also contributing to the development of theoretical and dogmatic bases of reasoning aiming to solve the practical issues of animal law. For this reason, the Animal Rights. Practical Guide by Karolina Kuszlewicz is a particularly valuable book. The author addresses various problems of the legal protection of animals in a competent and interesting manner.
Many of her interventions inspire further inquiries or critical comments. At the same time, the book illustrates how the dialogue between theoretical concepts and challenges of legal practice can co-create animal law as an emerging branch of the legal system together with an accompanying realm of jurisprudential research.