Trade secret constitutes one of the most common forms of intellectual property protection, comprising a special category of confidential information of vital impor-tance for achieving competitive advantage, including of economic nature, and the undisturbed operation of an enterprise.
It is the purpose of this paper is to specify the European and domestic legal conditions for the protection of trade secrets, the conditions and consequences of violating trade secrets (in the legal environment as of 28 February 2023), and to indi-cate the policy of protecting trade secrets.
For the purposes of achieving the presented goal, the thesis is assumed that the subject of protection, which is a trade secret, is consistent with the need to apply in practice the public law solutions adopted in this area, provided that the entrepreneur is able to use the tools available in this area. The implementation of the assumptions will also be possible by verifying the subject of protection in the analysis of selected judgments on various controversial issues and criminal acts in connection with the violation of trade secrets, as well as by verifying the legal tools provided for in the Act of April 16, 1993 on combating unfair competition.

Despite unfavourable weather conditions for the development of vines in Poland, the number of vineyards, especially small, so-called “boutique” vineyards, is growing exponentially. The aim of the article is to show how the changing Polish and EU law helps or creates barriers for running this type of vineyards. The evalua-tion of wine market regulation from the point of view of the criterion of economic freedom and competition law is the main research objective of the study, and the formulated theses are referred to in the conclusions in the conclusion. The article is based on the sources, which were the laws and regulations in force between 1948 and 2022. The regulations creating barriers to the operation of boutique wineries include, among others, the regulations contained in the “Wine Act” of 2004 imposing a requirement on winery owners to have their own laboratory facilities, appropriate technological lines or obtain permits from the Minister of Agriculture. The current regulations are less restrictive for small wineries, which does not change the fact that there are still a number of barriers to their operation

Digitisation is changing not only our society but also markets, strategies and business models, which has increased competition in many markets. At the same time, large companies with a digital business model, such as Amazon, in particular, are experiencing a rapid rise, which has triggered a debate about fair competitive conditions. However, it is not only the company’s significant market power that is a cause for concern. The increasing vertical integration of platform operators such as Amazon, which makes them direct competitors of their own platform users, also raises competition law issues. Against this backdrop, it is the aim of this article to analyse Amazon’s business model in more detail from a competition law perspective. The analysis aims to identify which parts of the company’s business model and the resulting strategies may be seen as problematic under competition law.

The rule of law does not govern all human interactions. There are times when the state bypasses legal constraints, as documented by the World Justice Project. Other times, jurisdictions may be mutually unfriendly and refuse to enforce foreign laws. Blockchains create trust between contracting parties at the individual level, enabling them to transact freely and increase consumer welfare. Blockchains can only supple-ment antitrust if the legal constraints do not impede their development. The law should thus support the decentralization of blockchains so that blockchain-based mechanisms may take over (even if imperfectly) where the law does not apply. With that in mind, we justify the attractiveness of that approach by showing that blockchain causes an increase in the number of transactions by creating trust (Part 1), and that it may overall increase the decentralization of economic transactions (Part 2). The law should take into account where it applies (Part 3). We conclude afterward (Part 4).

The aim of the article is to analyze the EU regulations regarding the leniency program in competition law and its impact on cartel detection. First of all the purpose and substance of the leniency program have been analysed, moreover the article analyses EU regulations on partial and full leniency as well as differences with American competition law. The article uses the formal-dogmatic and legal-comparative resarch methods – mainly American solutions were used for comparision with EU law. The thesis of the article is the statement that the leniency program should not be considered as the main legal instrument for detecting cartels but it should complement other instruments. The research results can be used for further research on legal regulations which are used for detecting cartels

The paper focuses on the issue of public enforcement of consumer law in Poland. This analysis considers exclusively the stage of administrative proceedings and it does not concern judicial control over the decisions issued. The analysis aims at answering the question whether the phenomenon of legal impossibilism is to be observed in the domain administrative proceedings instituted by the President of the UOKiK with the purpose of implementing consumer policy. The hypotheses to be verified in the foregoing are as follows: (i) there are procedural mechanisms which enable an authority to effectuate protection of consumer rights, operating to the public benefit, and that (ii) it might be reasonable to expect that these mechanisms are exploited in practice by the President of the UOKiK. The first part considers the legal framework for enforcing consumer rights with the use of public law mechanisms in Poland. In the second part, the discussion revolves around the
practical application of the legal instruments by the President of the UOKiK. The
conclusions constitute a starting point to initiate further, in-depth empirical studies
related to the activities undertaken by the President of the UOKiK with the aim
to effectuate protection of consumer rights in Poland.

The principles of „Public Procurement” are important for the proper functioning of the public procurement system. There is no doubt that principles of public procurement system have a special significance for the above mentioned system, since they indicate the direction of interpretation of provisions of the public procurement law as well as they allow a proper interpretation of the meaning of legal norms. The purpose of this elaboration is to present two basic principles of the public procurement law, i.e. the principle of fair competition and equal treatment of economic operators as well as the principle of transparency. The Author indicates the institutional expression of these principles in the procedure of awarding public procurement and indicates the violations of the principles which occur in the practice of law.

The increased effectiveness of competition law enforcement has contributed to th appearance of an atypical type of cartel, which engages not only competitors, but also their common supplier (or retailer). The so called hub-and-spoke cartel consists in the exchange of strategic information between two or more horizontal competitors (spokes) via a common contractual partner active at a different level of the production/distribution chain (the hub), who often also contributes to stabilizing a cartel. Due to the existence of the vertical element of this indirect information exchange, the question arises whether it should be assessed in the same way as its direct equivalent, i.e. as a “by-object” restriction of competition, thus, not requiring an analysis of its actual effects. Although the EU institutions have not adjudicated a hub-and-spoke collusion case yet, the jurisprudence of the national courts may provide useful guidance on what the constituent elements of the hub-and-spoke collusion are and how to assess this practice under the EU competition law. The analysis of both national and EU case law allows to contend that the hub-and-spoke cartels should amount to de facto horizontal information exchange and be assessed in accordance with the “by-object” standard. However, the hub-and-spoke collusion may equally constitute a part of a normal negotiation process (e.g. bargaining) with trading partners, as well as give rise to several efficiency gains, which should be taken into account in examining the practice concerned under the EU competition law.

In addition to search engines, social networks represent an important digital service for many Internet users. Social network services such as Facebook, Xing, or Twitter provide vital platforms for communication and sharing of content as part of a modern, user-friendly Internet. Public criticism of social networks is expressed in particular with regard to processing of personal data. These play a central role in business models of many social networks, with regard to their use e.g. for advertising purposes. A question is, if it can be assumed that market-dominant providers, due to a lock-in effect, can demand a wide-ranging consent for the collection and use of personal data that would be expected in a functioning competition? In the following, social networks, potential competition issues and possible legislative measures due to concentration tendencies in connection with access to user data in the area of social networks will be discussed.