Program łagodzenia kar Leniency jako instrument służący wykrywaniu karteli

Maziarz, Aleksander

Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyze the EU regulations regarding the leniency program in competition law and its impact on cartel detection. First of all the purpose and substance of the leniency program have been analysed, moreover the article analyses EU regulations on partial and full leniency as well as differences with American competition law. The article uses the formal-dogmatic and legal-comparative resarch methods – mainly American solutions were used for comparision with EU law. The thesis of the article is the statement that the leniency program should not be considered as the main legal instrument for detecting cartels but it should complement other instruments. The research results can be used for further research on legal regulations which are used for detecting cartels

Keywords

leniency program (1)cartel (1)l (1)agreement restricting competition (1)

References

Balasingham B., The EU Leniency Policy: Reconciling Effectiveness and Fairness, Hague 2016. Basedow J., Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Hague 2007 [Google Scholar]
Buhart J. (red.), Leniency Regimes: Jurisdictional Comparisons, London 2012. [Google Scholar]
Chavda A., Jegers M., The Effects of Leniency Programs and Fines on Cartel Stability, „Metroeconomica” 2007, 28 [Google Scholar]
Colino S. (red.), Cartels and Anti-Competitive Agreements, t. 1, Routledge 2012. [Google Scholar]
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Connor J., A Critique of Partial Leniency for Cartels by the U.S. Department of Justice, „SSRN Electronic Journal” 2007, 4. [Google Scholar]
Ewing K., Competition Rules for the 21st Century – Principles from America’s Experience, Hague 2006. [Google Scholar]
Furse M., Nash S., The Cartel Offence, London 2004. [Google Scholar]
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APA style

Maziarz, Aleksander (2021). Program łagodzenia kar Leniency jako instrument służący wykrywaniu karteli. (2021). Program łagodzenia kar Leniency jako instrument służący wykrywaniu karteli. Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia Nad Prawem, 13(2), 95-110. https://doi.org/10.7206/kp.2080-1084.451 (Original work published 6/2021AD)

MLA style

Maziarz, Aleksander. “Program Łagodzenia Kar Leniency Jako Instrument Służący Wykrywaniu Karteli”. 6/2021AD. Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia Nad Prawem, vol. 13, no. 2, 2021, pp. 95-110.

Chicago style

Maziarz, Aleksander. “Program Łagodzenia Kar Leniency Jako Instrument Służący Wykrywaniu Karteli”. Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia Nad Prawem, Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem, 13, no. 2 (2021): 95-110. doi:10.7206/kp.2080-1084.451.

Copyright info

CC-BY

[1] Balasingham B., The EU Leniency Policy: Reconciling Effectiveness and Fairness, Hague 2016. Basedow J., Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Hague 2007 [Google Scholar]

[2] Buhart J. (red.), Leniency Regimes: Jurisdictional Comparisons, London 2012. [Google Scholar]

[3] Chavda A., Jegers M., The Effects of Leniency Programs and Fines on Cartel Stability, „Metroeconomica” 2007, 28 [Google Scholar]

[4] Colino S. (red.), Cartels and Anti-Competitive Agreements, t. 1, Routledge 2012. [Google Scholar]

[5] Connor J., Cartel Detection and Duration Worldwide, „Antitrust Chronicle” 2011, 9. [Google Scholar]

[6] Connor J., A Critique of Partial Leniency for Cartels by the U.S. Department of Justice, „SSRN Electronic Journal” 2007, 4. [Google Scholar]

[7] Ewing K., Competition Rules for the 21st Century – Principles from America’s Experience, Hague 2006. [Google Scholar]

[8] Furse M., Nash S., The Cartel Offence, London 2004. [Google Scholar]

[9] Gauer C., Jaspers M., The European Competition Network. Achievements and challenges – a case in point: leniency, „Competition Policy Newsletter” 2006, 1 [Google Scholar]

[10] Harding C., Joshua J., Regulating Cartels in Europe, Oxford 2010. [Google Scholar]

[11] Harrington J., Jr., Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs, „The Journal of Industrial Economics” 2008, 56. [Google Scholar]

[12] Kayhko A., The European Commission’s 2006 Leniency Notice – for better or for worse?, „Competition Law International” 2008, 6. [Google Scholar]

[13] Lavoie C., South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five-Year Review, „World Competition” 2009, 1. [Google Scholar]

[14] LeClair M., Cartelization, Antitrust and Globalization in the US and Europe, Routledge 2011. [Google Scholar]

[15] Levenstein M., Suslow V., Cartels and Collusion – Empirical Evidence, „Ross School of Business Working Paper Working Paper” 2012, 1182. [Google Scholar]

[16] Marx L., Mezzetti C., Marshall R., Antitrust Leniency with MultiProduct Colluders, „American Economics Review” 2015, 7, s. 205–240. [Google Scholar]

[17] Myong-Hun C., Harrington J., The Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program on Antitrust Enforcement and Cartelization, http:/www.econ2.jhu.edu/People/Harrington/ leniency_4.10.pdf (dostęp: 3.04.2020) [Google Scholar]

[18] Roux C., Ungern-Sternberg T., von, Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1995/2007, SSRN: https:// ssrn.com/abstract=992686 (dostęp: 17.04.2020). [Google Scholar]

[19] Schroeder D., Squaring the circle in cartel cases: compliance, fines, leniency and settlement from a private practitioner’s perspective, „Competition Policy International” 2008, 6 [Google Scholar]

[20] Vestager M., Perspectives on Europe [przemowa], London School of Economics, 20 listopada 2015, https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129203224/https://ec.europa. eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/perspectives-europe_en (dostęp: 17.04.2020). [Google Scholar]

[21] Wils W., Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?, „World Competition” 2005, 28, s. 117–159. [Google Scholar]

[22] Zhou J., The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement, „Bruegel Working Paper” 2016, 2. [Google Scholar]

Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem