Marcus Tullius Cicero, who was an active politician, diplomat, philosopher, and statesman during the declining period of the Roman Republic, became an ideal inspiration for leading figures of the American Revolution because of his attitudes and scholarly activities. The influence of his views can be seen in the political system and the Federal Constitution of the United States. In addition, the natural law he advocated and the concept of private property became the foundation on which the American legal system is based.

The present paper is a reaction to Maciej Pichlak’s article "Law in the Snares of the Political: Addressing Rafał Mańko’s Critical Philosophy of Adjudication" which was published in this journal (“The Critique of Law” 2020, 12(3), pp. 109–125). The present response addresses selected issues raised in Pichlak’s critique, focusing on three aspects: law and the political, the importance of justice in the critical project, and finally the question of adjudication and ideology. On a more general note, the polemic reveals the importance of philosophical, political and ideological commitments and presuppositions of legal theorists and poses the question of the limits of the autonomy of jurisprudential debates vis-à-vis such commitments.

The following article provides an introduction to the issues of legal and political organization of the Roman provinces in the area of conquered territory in the time of the Roman Empire (I-III A.D). It outlines the administrative division of the empire, the relationship between them and Rome. An efficiency and well-organized management of the huge land using structured magistrate, allowed the Romans to create a world Empire which prevailed over a thousand square kilometers. The most important tasks of princeps was to ensure external and internal security of the Empire by structured and efficiency administration, as well as a guarantee of the proper/ correct jurisdiction. Not without significance was the tax collection which enriched the imperial treasury and testified to the power of the ruler. The Roman state was based on provinces, colonies and municipalities, where the last one were the primary form of local autonomy. The organization of official structure was largely modeled on the system of the Republican Rome, while respecting local traditions at the same time. Although their dependence, the residents still had full decision-making in their own affairs.

Forestry Law does not constitute an autonomous branch of law – it is in fact most commonly percieved as part of the environmental law. However, this does not mean, that it is impossible to extract general principles of the Forest Law. The Forest Act contains a catalogue of explicitly formulated general principles of forest management, which at the same time are the principles of forest law. Furthermore, it is possible to reconstruct some additional general principles from specific provisions of the Forest Act, as well as to indicate those of the principles of the environmental law, which may be extended to forestry regulations. The aim of this paper is therefore to formulate and analyse the general principles: (1) expressly articulated by the legislature; (2) possible to reconstruct from the detailed provisions of the Forest Act; (3) of the environmental law, which can be applied to forestry regulations. The result of the survey is a more extensive catalogue of general principles of forest law in directive-descriptive terms, which may contribute to the extension of the autonomy of the forest law.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis. The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

Academics and faculty members are entangled in many interests. Selfless science for cognitive purposes is a thing of the past. There is a constant game of the power over knowledge. Apart from scientists, many entities with various interests are participants of the game. They are: politicians, officials, academic administration, research sponsors, accreditation agencies, publishers, resort scientific institutes, industry, business. The scientists themselves sometimes work for the truth and sometimes they work for profit; they create knowledge which is public property, or when they are employed commercially, e.g. by the industry, they create private knowledge. This paper presents five factors which may contribute to restricting the cognitive autonomy of the scientists.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis.
The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

Academics and faculty members are entangled in many interests. Selfless science for cognitive purposes is a thing of the past. There is a constant game of the power over knowledge. Apart from scientists, many entities with various interests are participants of the game. They are: politicians, officials, academic administration, research sponsors, accreditation agencies, publishers, resort scientific institutes, industry, business. The scientists themselves sometimes work for the truth and sometimes they work for profit; they create knowledge which is public property, or when they are employed commercially, e.g. by the industry, they create private knowledge. This paper presents five factors which may contribute to restricting the cognitive autonomy of the scientists.

The article discusses the issue of the possibility of regulating matters concerning higher education and its institutions in executive and internal acts. It presents the acceptable limits of delegating matters relating to higher education to regulations, as well as internal acts of higher education institutions. These limits are described taking into account the principle of autonomy of higher education institutions, as well as the rules on the creation of law, in particular the rules for issuing regulations. It was also pointed out that the incorrect division of matter between act of parliament (statute) and a regulation violates constitutional rules of law creation. It is also contrary to the protection of entities’ trust in the state and law and the principle of division and balance of power. Faulty formation of the higher education system is not good to the quality of education and conducting scientific research. It hinders the implementation of the freedom of science.

The subject of the work is an attempt to analyse the notion of dignity in legal sciences, especially in legal theory and philosophy of law. The author distinguishes autonomous and heteronomous version of the notion in question. The first way of conceiving human dignity, assumes that dignity, i.e. the worth of human life, is fully independent of social conditions in which people live their lives. This way of conceiving dignity epitomises Kant’s philosophy of moral autonomy as immanent trait of every human being. The second way of conceiving human dignity assumes that the worth of human life is fully dependent of social conditions in which people live their lives. Consequently, it is taken for granted that there are social conditions in which people can lose dignity as contingent trait of human being. In this case, in order to get back lost dignity, people ought to change social conditions by way of social revolution. This way of conceiving dignity epitomises Marxist philosophy of alienation. The author tends to point out, that a different way of conceiving dignity is followed by serious legal consequences.