It is the intention of the author of this article to present the theoretical and legal views of Sigmund Freud and Emil Durkheim and to place them in the context of classical texts on political-legal theory. Both thinkers, rather associated with sociology or psychology than with law, treated law as one of the most important reference points in their social concepts. In both cases, we are dealing with the treatment of the social order as transcendent to the empirical individual, and at the same time created by society. At the same time, the law is supposed to impede the emancipation of the individual and to allow the individual to have a real influence on the creation of power structures. At the same time, despite numerous analyses of the theoretical-legal views of these thinkers in the European scientific literature, this is the first such analysis in Polish. In addition to presenting Freud’s and Durkheim’s views, it opens up the possibility of not only situating them among political-legal theories, but also points to perspectives on the operationalisation of these theories – as well as their possible social implications. To this end, the following article juxtaposes their theories with the traditions of legal positivism as represented by Hans Kelsen and Herbert L.A. Hart – two authors who were inspired by Freud and Durkheim respectively.

The article deals with the problem of modal inference: if some addressees are
obliged to do something, they are also obliged to realize states of affairs which
constitute a necessary condition for the main obligation. Likewise, they are obliged
to refrain from realizing states of affairs which constitute a sufficient condition for
the action contradicting the main obligation. This type of inference is called in Polish legal theory “instrumental inference”. It is argued in the article that sometimes instrumental norms in law must be fulfilled (“preparatory actions” must be undertaken) before the main obligation is fulfilled. Lawgiver helps addressees of norms by applying vacatio legis. It can lead to new paradoxical consequences – to the creation of “virtual norms” – norms which never come into force, but addressees are obliged to undertake preparatory actions. The article presents theoretical
description of this phenomenon. In conclusion one dogmatic claim is proposed:
there is a potential way (art. 4171 § 1 k.c.) of getting from public officials compensation for preparatory actions which caused burden for addressees, when the main obligation turned out to be “virtual”. In Poland this procedure should be based on the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal.

The paper presents the literary vision of „the power of medicine” as sketched by Aldous Huxley in his book Brave New World. Huxley created a futuristic image of society which reaches a state of complete organization and control of human procreation. In Huxley’s world humans are born as a result of in vitro fertilization and cloning. Human bodies, due to genetic selection, are produced for desired features of appearance and character, and the means of achieving universal happiness are appropriate pharmaceuticals. Artificial procreation as well as reproductive genetics anticipated by Huxley have become reality in the 21st century, implying several moral and legal dilemmas. In bioethical discussions questions emerge about the consequences of using new genetic technologies and the legal boundries of medical experiments on human bodies.

The article discusses Polish social welfare within the context of the economic analysis of law. Specific issues addressed in the article are: cost, time, ways of setting matters, the number of issued decisions and the beneficiaries of social welfare in Poland. Following the presentation, the obvious question arises concerning the legitimacy of the use of certain solutions, particularly in the context of their financial performance. Reflections on the social care model used in Poland are presented in the article, as well as the crisis of law as part of the broader issue of the crisis of the modern Western democratic state.

Interpretation is one of key notions on the convergence axis of law and literature. Both lawyers and literary scholars during their practices focus on interpreting complex language texts, establishing the meaning of expressions, reconstructing the sender’s intention, penetrating the influence of the text on the recipient, i.e. questions which turn out to be fundamental in both legal as well as literary texts. Analysis of the legal and literary interpretations allows us to identify differences as well as certain analogies between these two spheres of activity. They may be analysed through referring to the specificity of the entities participating in the interpretative practice, which are the sender and the recipient. The essential difference between interpretation in law and interpretation in literature consists of the rule that a legal text should be interpreted in the way that produces an unequivocal result. On the other hand, in the case of literary interpretation, it is difficult to reach a precise or unequivocal effect of reading the sense. Moreover, in literary interpretation it is not required. In a legal text and in a literary text the author-sender’s intention plays an important role. However, in the case of literary interpretation it is possible to apply a more flexible approach to the reconstruction of the author’s intention than in legal interpretation, where it is necessary to take into consideration rules and objectives of law only. The separateness of legal interpretation is justified foremost by the fact that it is specific purpose-oriented, which is establishing the meaning of the substance of applicable law.

The article discusses the differences and similarities between discretionary, judicial power and administrative authority. It indicates a possible recognition of the administrative and discretionary power. The author also considers possible risks in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, associated with the abuse of discretionary by administrative authority.

The article contains seven justified arguments formulating a new programme of research in legal science. It is a programme of research on identity of the law. The author proposes i.a.: separation of the mental identity of the law as a distinct quality from the identity of law in its „physical” dimension. The new research trend requires a new independent methodology of knowledge, which may be a harbinger of a revision of many existing ways of conceiving the law.

The Author presents a legal analysis of self-determination in international law. It is presented both through a historical and a modern perspective, recalling i.a. such cases as Kosovo, Quebec, Palestinian state in statu nascendi.

In the article the Author analyses an interaction between critics of law and the critics of theory of law. He studies a problem of the style of law theory and the influence of culture on that style. The Author proposes research the types of legal polemics. He claims, that the role of specific and abstract polemics in critics of law is significant and until now not sufficiently investigated.

The article is an attempt to problematize legal education in order to show its unconscious structures. Methodologically it is based on a Lacanian psychoanalysis, in particular on a three level concept of language. Considerations lead to the conclusion that the unconscious structure of legal education is opposed to conscious declaration. While declarations are talking about the transfer of knowledge, the real practices are based on enforcing discipline and subordination.

The paper aims at reconstruction and critical discussion with the main tenets of political theory of adjudication, as presented by Rafał Mańko in his book, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania. Polityczność, etyka, legitymizacja [Towards a Critical Philosophy of Adjudication. The Political, Ethics, Legitimacy]. In the paper, I demonstrate: that the interpretation of the concept crucial for the entire theory – which is the concept of political – has been chosen by Mańko in an ideological and a priori manner; that the choice above effectively prevents the realisation of the main objective of the book, which is to legitimise adjudication; that the adoption of the ethics of adjudication advocated in the book is – in the light of the basic assumptions of that very publication – both improbable and hardly acceptable. Finally, I claim that Mańko’s theory, due to its totality, can distinguish neither between legitimate law and violence, nor between justified and unjustified adjudication. As a result, it loses its critical force. All these problems are not peculiar to Mańko’s theory, but they are general weaknesses of various versions of critical jurisprudence.

The article attempts to analyse the status of the theory of legal interpretation that
emerges from the contributions of one of the representatives of critical legal studies
(CLS). Legal interpretation is analysed by using concepts drawn from hermeneutic
universalism and the post-structural philosophy of politics. The concepts of Duncan
Kennedy, an American philosopher of law, are subjected to analysis, and his
concept of adjudication, the indeterminacy thesis and the hermeneutic of suspicion
is addressed. The paper puts forward the thesis that the political nature of law – alongside
factors closely related to social structure – is also determined by factors which
pertain to the cognitive subject. This fact has crucial importance for determining
the status of the theory of legal interpretation.

Theoretical foundations of the animal protection law remain in statu nascendi. The lack of an established dogmatic systematization of this domain makes studies focused primarily on a comprehensive discussion of its practical aspects, also contributing to the development of theoretical and dogmatic bases of reasoning aiming to solve the practical issues of animal law. For this reason, the Animal Rights. Practical Guide by Karolina Kuszlewicz is a particularly valuable book. The author addresses various problems of the legal protection of animals in a competent and interesting manner.
Many of her interventions inspire further inquiries or critical comments. At the same time, the book illustrates how the dialogue between theoretical concepts and challenges of legal practice can co-create animal law as an emerging branch of the legal system together with an accompanying realm of jurisprudential research.

As we are nearing the end of the first 25 years of the 21st century. What is increasingly noticeable is the growing dysfunction and pathology of big systems and of their elements, including – given the omnipresent interrelations and interdependencies – entire masses of smaller entities, together with micro- and family businesses. The author asks a question of whether it could be reasonable to consider returning to some of the assumptions, instruments, and methods adopted within the framework of the systems approach from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, which was originally
conceived and created to treat big systems. Do the achievements made in the field of research in recent decades make it possible to bridge the cognitive gaps that determined the failure of the systems approach in the past century? These gaps are mainly the social mechanisms of functioning of organised systems. There is absolutely no doubt that we have seen huge progress in this domain, mostly thanks to interdisciplinary research and research conducted in recently-emergent “hybrid” disciplines like economic or organisational sociology and psychology, sociology and psychology
of management, behavioural economics, behavioural finance, contemporary political
economics, but also hybrid legal sciences such as: economics, sociology, and politics of law, political sciences and strategic analyses. The author argues that we need an attempt of a certain reactivation of the systems approach in the context of diagnostics and treatment, meaning a redesign of entire organisational systems– or dynamic connections in a networked structure, actually. It is necessary to modify the classical procedure of systems analysis and adapt it to the specific nature
of the changeable networked structures of the 21st century.

Głównym celem artykułu jest rozważenie dopuszczalności stosowania art. 58 § 2 k.c. w prawie zabezpieczeń społecznych względem umów o pracę zawieranymi z kobietami ciężarnymi z punktu widzenia teorii sprawiedliwości. Chciałbym dowieść, iż stosowanie art. 58 § 2 k.c., skutkujące wyłączeniem kobiet ciężarnych z systemu ubezpieczeń społecznych, jest nie tylko wątpliwe z punktu widzenia Konstytucji RP, ale problematyczne z punktu widzenia rodzaju sprawiedliwości realizowanego przez prawo zabezpieczeń społecznych. W pierwszej części artykułu przypominam podstawowe typologie i definicje pojęcia sprawiedliwości. Choć w refleksji filozoficznej nie można mówić o 11jednej sprawiedliwości", to jest to pojęcie o ugruntowanej tradycji. Stawiam tezę, że o ile sprawiedliwość rozdzielcza jest urzeczywistniana przepisami prawa konstytucyjnego oraz zabezpieczeń społecznych, o tyle prawo cywilne realizuje przede wszystkim sprawiedliwość komutatywną, co dotyczy również art. 58 § 2 k.c. Następnie pokazuję konsekwencje stosowania art. 58 § 2 k.c. w prawie ubezpieczeń społecznych na przykładzie spraw kobiet ciężarnych wyłączanych z systemu ubezpieczeń społecznych. Artykuł zwieńcza konkluzja, iż choć sprawiedliwość dla prawników jest pojęciem o długiej tradycji, to niestety często jest wymierzana intuicyjnie, co prowadzi do niepożądanych i nieobliczalnych konsekwencji społecznych.

Artykuł porusza istotny problem edukacji prawniczej w Polsce. Po prezentacji zmian w edukacji prawniczej na świecie tekst koncertuje się na roli akademickiej i praktycznej edukacji prawniczej. Autorzy wskazują na specyficzną rolę ukrytego wymiaru edukacji prawniczej, który jest niedostrzegany, a spełnia kluczową rolę w formowaniu prawników w Polsce. Ostatnia część artykułu wskazuje na możliwości zmiany w systemie edukacji prawniczej.