The aim of the article is to analyze the EU regulations regarding the leniency program in competition law and its impact on cartel detection. First of all the purpose and substance of the leniency program have been analysed, moreover the article analyses EU regulations on partial and full leniency as well as differences with American competition law. The article uses the formal-dogmatic and legal-comparative resarch methods – mainly American solutions were used for comparision with EU law. The thesis of the article is the statement that the leniency program should not be considered as the main legal instrument for detecting cartels but it should complement other instruments. The research results can be used for further research on legal regulations which are used for detecting cartels

The paper focuses on the issue of public enforcement of consumer law in Poland. This analysis considers exclusively the stage of administrative proceedings and it does not concern judicial control over the decisions issued. The analysis aims at answering the question whether the phenomenon of legal impossibilism is to be observed in the domain administrative proceedings instituted by the President of the UOKiK with the purpose of implementing consumer policy. The hypotheses to be verified in the foregoing are as follows: (i) there are procedural mechanisms which enable an authority to effectuate protection of consumer rights, operating to the public benefit, and that (ii) it might be reasonable to expect that these mechanisms are exploited in practice by the President of the UOKiK. The first part considers the legal framework for enforcing consumer rights with the use of public law mechanisms in Poland. In the second part, the discussion revolves around the
practical application of the legal instruments by the President of the UOKiK. The
conclusions constitute a starting point to initiate further, in-depth empirical studies
related to the activities undertaken by the President of the UOKiK with the aim
to effectuate protection of consumer rights in Poland.

The principles of „Public Procurement” are important for the proper functioning of the public procurement system. There is no doubt that principles of public procurement system have a special significance for the above mentioned system, since they indicate the direction of interpretation of provisions of the public procurement law as well as they allow a proper interpretation of the meaning of legal norms. The purpose of this elaboration is to present two basic principles of the public procurement law, i.e. the principle of fair competition and equal treatment of economic operators as well as the principle of transparency. The Author indicates the institutional expression of these principles in the procedure of awarding public procurement and indicates the violations of the principles which occur in the practice of law.

The increased effectiveness of competition law enforcement has contributed to th appearance of an atypical type of cartel, which engages not only competitors, but also their common supplier (or retailer). The so called hub-and-spoke cartel consists in the exchange of strategic information between two or more horizontal competitors (spokes) via a common contractual partner active at a different level of the production/distribution chain (the hub), who often also contributes to stabilizing a cartel. Due to the existence of the vertical element of this indirect information exchange, the question arises whether it should be assessed in the same way as its direct equivalent, i.e. as a “by-object” restriction of competition, thus, not requiring an analysis of its actual effects. Although the EU institutions have not adjudicated a hub-and-spoke collusion case yet, the jurisprudence of the national courts may provide useful guidance on what the constituent elements of the hub-and-spoke collusion are and how to assess this practice under the EU competition law. The analysis of both national and EU case law allows to contend that the hub-and-spoke cartels should amount to de facto horizontal information exchange and be assessed in accordance with the “by-object” standard. However, the hub-and-spoke collusion may equally constitute a part of a normal negotiation process (e.g. bargaining) with trading partners, as well as give rise to several efficiency gains, which should be taken into account in examining the practice concerned under the EU competition law.

In addition to search engines, social networks represent an important digital service for many Internet users. Social network services such as Facebook, Xing, or Twitter provide vital platforms for communication and sharing of content as part of a modern, user-friendly Internet. Public criticism of social networks is expressed in particular with regard to processing of personal data. These play a central role in business models of many social networks, with regard to their use e.g. for advertising purposes. A question is, if it can be assumed that market-dominant providers, due to a lock-in effect, can demand a wide-ranging consent for the collection and use of personal data that would be expected in a functioning competition? In the following, social networks, potential competition issues and possible legislative measures due to concentration tendencies in connection with access to user data in the area of social networks will be discussed.