The article offers an analysis of the inscription of the 2nd century AD, engraved on a bronze board, founded in Souk el-Khmis in North Africa. It includes a complaint of colons from the area of saltus Burunitanus, addressed to Emperor Commodus, about the abuse of law by the procurator and the general land lessee. The text is a source of knowledge of the work conditions and the situation in the colons, working in the Imperial estates in North Africa (province of Africa proconsularis). It is at the same time one of the most comprehensive sources of information about the organisation and management of the Roman provinces during the time of the Empire. The colons were small land lessees, who on the basis of locatio-conductio contract cultivated land, collected harvested and paid tenancy. Initially they were free Roman citizens and enjoyed the confidence of the landowners. Over time, their situation deteriorated. The abuse in relation to them were
frequent and one such case of complaint is described. It is a testimony to the days, when the colons still had a strong and independent position, largely based on personal freedom.

The purpose of this paper is to answer how the issue of transparency has been dealt with in the Arms Trade Treaty. Analysed provisions will also be assesed. As a point of reference other instruments regarding arms trade will be used. Uncontrolled arms trade poses a significant threat to international peace and security. The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted the Arms Trade Treaty [hereinafter ATT]. The ATT entered into force on 24th of December 2014. For the first time in the history a global and legally binding instrument regulating ams trade has been adopted. Transparency is a key element of ATT. Firstly, observing inflows and outflows of arms allows to determine whether provisions of a treaty are used in practise. Furthermore it makes assesment of state’s intentions possible.
Extensive armament is correlated with war preparations. Secondly, transparency shows if a country has implemented the treaty into its law.

This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

The article presents the problem related to the manner of defining a new psychoactive substance. The definition, partly contained in the provisions of the Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction of 2005, as regards the specification of the type of offense, refers to sub-statutory regulations – the ordinance of the Minister of Health. This way of defining the characteristics of a prohibited act raises constitutional doubts from the point of view of the principle of the exclusivity of the act and related rules:
1. Principles of the rule of law expressed in Article 2 of the Polish Constitution by not complying with the requirement of the principle of proper legislation.
2. The principles of nullum crimen sine lege certa arising from Article 42 paragraph 1 of the Polish Constitution, by violating the guarantee function of criminal law by violating the directive on statutory exclusivity and statutory specificity of an act.
3. Principles of the separation of powers resulting from Article 10 of the Polish Constitution by entrusting the executive authority with the powers of the legislative authority.
4. The principles of proportionality expressed in Article 31 paragraph 3 of the Polish Constitution regarding the grounds and scope of admissible limitation of constitutional rights and freedoms and the manner of limiting them.

The paper deals with the issue of the legal consequences of a false statement given
by the accused in criminal proceedings. The author presents positions expressed in this matter in the literature and jurisprudence. He then presents and justifies his own view. He believes that a false statement by the accused is not criminally prohibited, because there is no such type of offence. However, such behaviour is unlawful. It is true that this is a kind of defence, but it is not the execution of the right to defence. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the false statement could result in an intensification of the penalty or in the use of a preventive measure in the proceedings (for example temporary custody). It is undoubted, however, that false statement resulting in defamation or false accusation may lead to criminal liability.

“You can get lost when standing still too.” These words of Edward Stachura are a metaphor of the main proposition of the paper. It aims to suggest a way to “set the ball rolling” by designing the paths of education for lawyers anew, with civil society in mind, and not just thinking of the requirements of legal training. Lawyers with knowledge in the field of information technology, interdisciplinary lawyers for business, lawyers-guardians of the rule of law and justice all need study programmes to take their predispositions, goals, skills, and abilities – all at different levels – into account. The purpose of the article is to shed light on the extra-legal barriers hindering the taking of a practical step ahead. The author shows three main ways of educating lawyers and explains why they are so important and why they call for changes in study programmes. Next, the author points to the obstacles faced by reformers and suggests exploring their actual impact on education in law and the level thereof.

Problem przemocy „honorowej" jest zjawiskiem przekraczającym granice państw, kultur i religii. Przemoc ta najczęściej bywa łączona z krajami i regionami Bliskiego Wschodu - Jordanią, Libanem, Palestyną, irackim Kurdystanem. W Europie oma- wiana kwestia pojawiła się w debacie publicznej dopiero na początku XXI w. i zo- stała ograniczona do kontekstu migracyjnego. Efektem takiej kategoryzacji przemocy „honorowej" jest polityzacja zjawiska, przejawiająca się w silnym uzależnieniu działań podejmowanych przez państwo od takich czynników, jak linia polityczna rządzącej partii czy nastroje społeczne. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, w jaki sposób uregulowano prawnie problem prze- mocy „honorowej" w wybranych krajach i regionach: Libanie, Jordanii, irackim Kurdystanie, Wielkiej Brytanii, Holandii i w Niemczech. Umożliwi to identyfikację sposobów walki z tym problemem i wskazanie, czy kontekst migracyjny wpływa na zróżnicowanie stosowanych rozwiązań. Przedmiotem analizy będzie regulacja prawna, a także orzecznictwo sądów oraz działalność różnych instytucji rządowych oraz pozarządowych nakierowanych na walkę z tym problemem. Wyniki badań prowadzą do refleksji nad tym, czy prawo karne rzeczywiście jest najefektywniejszym instrumentem rozwiązania omawianego problemu. Badana problematyka wpisuje się w szerszy kontekst zagadnienia wykorzystywania narzędzi prawnych do osiągania określonych celów polityk publicznych.

Artykuł podejmuje problematykę wyjaśnień oskarżonego, ukazując ich dualistyczną rolę - środka dowodowego oraz środka służącego obronie oskarżonego. Autor rozważa, czy w zakresie przysługującego oskarżonemu prawa do obrony mieści się prawo do kłamstwa, a także zajmuje stanowisko w odniesieniu do granic skła- dania przez oskarżonego fałszywych wyjaśnień. Następnie przedstawia uwagi dotyczące posługiwania się kłamstwem przez obrońcę oskarżonego w ramach taktyki obrony. Refleksje te zostały oparte na badaniach własnych autora polegających na przeprowadzaniu pogłębionych wywiadów z adwokatami wykonującymi funkcję obrońców.