Following a complaint to an administrative court by two judges, the Prime Minister used the self-revision procedure and revoked his countersignature of the Presi-dent’s official act. This is a true precedent in the history of Polish constitutionalism. Yet, the permissibility of judicial review of presidential acts performed in individual cases should not give rise to any doubts. This is because such acts are subject to the general control regime set forth in the Act of 30 August 2002 – Law on Proceed-ings before Administrative Courts. What we can learn from other judicial systems indicates that the acts of central executive authorities are not, with some exceptions, exempt from such supervision. An analysis of the judicial decisions of, for instance, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, which recognises its jurisdiction over appointments of judges serves as a convincing example.

This paper presents the main ideas behind a new type of resolution, which, accord­ing to the proposed amendments to the Law on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, would be passed by the Supreme Administrative Court. The purpose of so­called pilot resolutions would be to prevent inconsistency in rulings concerning cases that are identical in legal and factual terms. In the concluding remarks, we underline the positive aspects of the proposed changes and argue that their incorpo­ration into the existing system would enhance legal certainty and increase the predictability of judicial decisions.

This article is a contribution to the biography of Professor Andrzej Kabat – a prose­cutor, legal counsel, judge of the highest courts of the Republic of Poland, and a long­time academic teacher. The study discusses selected jurisprudential achieve­ments of Professor Andrzej Kabat from the period when he held the office of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative Court. Moreover, there are also references to his research on the institution of questions of law sub­mitted to the Constitutional Tribunal, which is regarded as pioneering in the science of law, despite the fundamental changes in the political system. What marks the discussed output of Professor Kabat is both the relevance of his ideas and the great significance for the practice of application of the law.

This article is a contribution to the biography of Professor Andrzej Kabat – a prose-cutor, legal counsel, judge of the highest courts of the Republic of Poland, and a long-time academic teacher. The study discusses selected jurisprudential achieve-ments of Professor Andrzej Kabat from the period when he held the office of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative Court. Moreover, there are also references to his research on the institution of questions of law sub-mitted to the Constitutional Tribunal, which is regarded as pioneering in the science of law, despite the fundamental changes in the political system. What marks the discussed output of Professor Kabat is both the relevance of his ideas and the great significance for the practice of application of the law.

This article concerns the problem associated with the nature of the institution of a petition for reconsideration of the case in view of regulation No 16 of the Administrative Procedur Code in the version before the amendment dated 3 December 2010, which entered into force on 11 April 2011. Despite the amendment, to this day the provision is the source of many disputes, which is reflected in a very non-uniform judicial practice. On the basis of this regulation can be observed, how defective constructed legal provisions affect the administration of justice and the application of the law by creating situations in which the courts take over the functions of law making. On the selected example is shown, how one decision of the Supreme Court, being the basis of decisions of courts of appeal, causes that victims defective administrative decision are charged with the responsibility for legislative errors. Knowledge of the matter, which is the subject of this publication, is extremely important for all practitioners as well as theorists of the law because of the importance of the issues, which accompany the main theme. The work is based on an analysis of the concept of finality and validity of administration decision and depth on theoretical consideration and extensive discussion of the judicial practice of administrative courts, civil courts and Constitutional Tribunal.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

In the judgement C-403/16 Soufiane El Hassani v. Polish Foreign Office European Court of Justice noticed that provisions of internal law cannot limit the right to judical-review established in art. 32 par. 3 of Visa Code. The regulation must be interpreted in context of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Meanwhile the sentence was answer to question of Polish Supreme Administrative Court and it arose under Administrative Courts Proceedings Act which prohibits performing judicial review over visa decisions. The aim of the paper is to explain that judicial review at those issues may be effectively performed by common courts, without damaging visa-applicants rights. The possibility comes from wide definition of civil case in code of civil procedure and attribution of common courts in some public administration cases.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.