This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

The coronavirus pandemic and the economic consequences it has caused are unprecedented. For the first time ever, we are dealing with the phenomenon of a global pandemic which has undermined the foundations of market economy to such a considerable extent. The fight against it has made it necessary for the govern-ments of individual countries to make decisions radically restricting the freedom of conducting business activity – including decisions to suspend the functioning of particular economic sectors. The imposed lockdown meant that a great many of employers had to completely abandon their operations or radically limit the scope of the activities they were involved in virtually overnight, which obviously had an impact on their ability to make any profit and on their financial situation. At the same time, limiting or even cancelling the possibilities of doing business was a threat to the labour market, heralding its collapse and therefore an increase in the rate of unemployment. This is because a natural consequence of such a situa-tion is that employers decide to dismiss employees. A real threat of an economic crisis of an unparalleled scale prompted the governments of most countries to take far-reaching measures to save the economy. The Polish government imposed restrictions on the functioning of many econo-mic sectors as early as in March 2020. At the same time, there began legislative work on the so-called Anti-Crisis Shield.4 The resulting act, passed on 31 March 2020, was subsequently amended several times. The subsequent editions of the Anti-Crisis Shield featured regulations aimed at, among others, employers affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The purpose of this text is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the measures incorporated in the Anti-Crisis Shield in order to protect the interests of employers, i.e. the solutions related to the situation of employment of employees. The starting point will be an attempt to establish the rationale guiding the legislator when introducing these solutions. Then, the analysis will focus on the instruments used by the legislator to provide the protection of employers’ interests – and on the subject of protection. Finally, an attempt to evaluate the effects of these regulations will be made.

The article is the first in a series of papers to present and analyse the meaning that is ascribed to the notions of ‘gambling’ and ‘gambling games’ in the gambling law provisions of selected European countries, as well as to confront the normative meaning with gambling characteristics from the perspective of social sciences. The following parts of the paper analyse examples of those provisions which do not contain any term for a broad catalogue of gambling activities, as well as selected provisions containing legal definitions of ‘games of chance’ (‘games of luck’). The article mainly uses methods of comparative law. The presentation of the characteristics of gambling from the perspective of social sciences is based on the achievements of social scientists. The research is based on the following research theses. Firstly, regulatory models in which the gambling law provisions specify the characteristics of gambling without indicating a name covering a collective category of gambling games in the definiendum are rare. Such solutions are typical for countries which have so far pursued restrictive gambling policies. Secondly, both in the legal systems in which there is no legal definition of gambling under gambling law and also against the background of the definitions of legal games of chance, one may notice significant differences in the way in which individual features of gambling games are specified, i.e. the dependence of the outcome of a game on chance, player’s financial involvement and the winnings.

The purpose of the article is to discuss unjust enrichment as a source of obligations, already known in Roman law, which dealt with the most important problems related to the matter in question and ways to solve those problems in practice. The author, aware of the complexity of the issues related to unjust enrichment and the problems that may arise from the application of this institution, will focus on the presentation of the definition and the characteristics of unjust enrichment as a source of obligations. These characteristics are covered only in Article 405 of the Civil Code, but the apparently obvious regulation includes some unnamed elements that need to be taken into account when deciding whether unjust enrichment has actually taken place. The author intends to show that the special nature of unjust enrichment is determined first and foremost by the fulfilment of the conditions for its occurrence. These conditions include: an individual’s gain, benefiting at the expense of another person, the relationship between enrichment and impoverishment and the lack of legal grounds for enrichment; it should be added, however, that the Civil Code does not speak of the last of the listed conditions. The knowledge or the will of the enriched person will not be considered such conditions, though. The liability of the enriched person in such circumstances will occur regardless of the cause of the person’s gain.