This paper focuses on the issue of whether the boundaries of the private lives of judges are shaped according to cultural conditions and gender. My main assumption is that gender inequality in a culture is reflected in how the boundaries of the private life of judges are interpreted. In this regard, women judges may face more restrictions than their male colleagues in what they wear, what they do and what they say in their lives generally. And ultimately, an interpretation of private life that reinforces gender roles also limits the freedom of expression. I concretise my discussion regarding gender stereotypes that influence what judges do or say in their private lives in different cultures.

The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.

The recent changes in moral and the influence of other cultures caused that the traditional scope of the term “family” as people bound by the ties of marriage or blood is not so obvious. The Polish legislation does not provide for one legal definition of this term. The family status and its composition is determined by both the provisions of the Polish Constitution and other acts, but the scope of this notion fundamentally differs, depending on the area of legislation which is considered. The question then arises whether there is a need, and if so, whether it is possible to create a definition which would be common to different areas of law. The article contains a semantic analysis of the concept of “family” in Polish legislation on account of its structural scope.

In the article the Author analyses an interaction between critics of law and the critics of theory of law. He studies a problem of the style of law theory and the influence of culture on that style. The Author proposes research the types of legal polemics. He claims, that the role of specific and abstract polemics in critics of law is significant and until now not sufficiently investigated.

In my paper I would like to analyze the topic o academic legal education, using for that purpose tool granted by Rochard Rorty’s neopragmatism and Artur Kozak’s juriscentrism. In this article I consider the possibility of describing higher education and legal culture using both of those concepts, and to form some proposals for future shaping of this proces. In my text I aim to prove, tha contemporary legal education is basem mostly on the mechanisms of socialisation and professional training, which base rather on transfer of rules of legal reasoning and discussion within legal community, than on transfer of actual skills. Therefore I consider to which extent this process should be suplemented by methods which individualise students, and which allow the autocreation, which is, according to Rorty, should be the mian task of higher education. In the further parts of my paper I consuder, how those mechanisms will impact shaping of future lawyers, and by that, the legal community itself, and what benefits could we achieve this way.

The subject matter of the second part of the article (the first part was published in issue 1/2019 of the “Critique of Law”) is a continuation of the analysis of the impact of cultural patterns such as integrity, social dialogue, elimination of violence on the formation of the relationships between authorities and members of the state community.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis. The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

Authority – even though the title of this paper may suggest so – is not a phenomenon opposing culture. It is actually a product of culture or, as sometimes said, of the achievements of civilisation. Since authority is a product of culture, it may not be treated as a phenomenon isolated from it, without any ties with cultural patterns, which may – as a result – act as determinants of the institutional and functional qualities of authority. Culture and its products (including knowledge, law, religion, morality, etc.), like other social phenomena, can become factors stimulating the exercise of authority, or act as factors to stabilise or curb this exercise within the framework of the patterns (norms) it has created. Societies make constant choices in terms of adopting, modifying, and rejecting various cultural patterns.

Modernity understood as a permanent crisis of legitimacy and authority is a constant challenge for constitutionalism. The article reconstructs the danger of substituting political nature with moral imperatives. In modern societies, political disputes turn into so-called culture wars, and the dividing lines are marked by two moralities fighting each other: a liberal morality and a conservative morality. Using selected examples from the constitutional judiciary, I put forward a proposal of rethinking the definition of political nature in constitutionalism to deal with the crisis of legitimacy and authority that plagues it.

Rule of law is one of the most fundamental values of the European Union and the issues related thereto have become one of the top priorities not only in the EU agenda but also in the EU policies of most of the Member States, including Sweden. This is due to the increasing integration, the growing dependence of the functioning of the entire European Union on the way how the system of justice works in different Member States, and the concern over the condition of the rule of law in these Member States. In recent years, the European Union has been making use of some older instruments, whose aim is to control and improve the observance of the rule of law (including Art. 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), and has adopted some new solutions too – the European rule of law mechanism and the regulation regarding rule of law conditionality, related to the new EU budget. The need to work out effective procedures to determine the condition of the rule of law and to uphold the main standards of the system of justice in all EU Member States is becoming more and more urgent and remains one of the greatest challenges faced by the European Union to be dealt with by the Swedish government.

The article concerns real and potential reactions of jurisprudential discourses to the phenomenon of the crisis of liberal democracy. The author argues that liberal democracy has been a hegemonic structure – meaning that not only has it been dominant in the factual sense in the broadly understood Western legal and political culture but it has also effectively suppressed any competing discourses. Today, the hegemony of demoliberalism is being questioned. The new state of affairs causes a range of complications that
jurisprudential discourses have to deal with. The author considers three possible scenarios of the reaction of these discourses to the said crisis. The first of them means a shift towards democratic authoritarianism. The second is about remaining in a collective hypocrisy, waiting for a change in the current intellectual climate. The third involves accepting the political nature of jurisprudence and making the concept of agonistic democracy a reality.

Authority – even though the title of this paper may suggest so – is not a phenomenon opposing culture. It is actually a product of culture or, as sometimes said, of the achievements of civilisation. Since authority is a product of culture, it may not be treated as a phenomenon isolated from it, without any ties with cultural patterns, which may – as a result – act as determinants of the institutional and functional qualities of authority. Culture and its products (including knowledge, law, religion, morality, etc.), like other social phenomena, can become factors stimulating the exercise of authority, or act as factors to stabilise or curb this exercise within the framework of the patterns (norms) it has created. Societies make constant choices in terms of adopting, modifying, and rejecting various cultural patterns.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis.
The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

The problem of „honour"-related (or „honour"-based) violence is a phenomenon that crosses the boundaries of countries, cultures and religions. Usually it is tended to be connected with various regions of the Middle East, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraqi Kurdistan. In Europe this issue has appeared in public debates at the beginning of XXI century and it was restricted to the migration context. Such categorization has resulted in the politicization of „honour" - related violence, which is manifested in the strong relation between state's undertaken actions and such factors as political line of a ruling party or public opinions. The aim of this article is to answer the question about legal regulation of this issue in the chosen countries of the Middle East and Europe: Lebanon, Jordan, Iraqi Kurdistan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. Such comparison will result in the identification of means and methods of combating this kind of violence that are used in practice. Moreover, it will enable the author to indicate whether the migration context has an impact on the differentiation of undertaken actions. The subject of the analysis will be the legal regulation and jurisdiction, as well as activity of various public and non-governmental institutions that are involved in the prevention of this problem. The result of the analysis leads to the reflection on the question if penal law is really the most effective instrument of solving this problem. Discussed matter fits into the wider context of an issue of use of law in order to achieve the aims of public policies.

The article aims to help realize that to understand the changes which take place in space policy and space law, it is necessary to abandon the old course of thought and think the other way. The author exposes thesis that force to take a look at the law in a different way. He states that: all sources of international law (specified in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ) and EU law are in force in the Polish legal order, with the exception of international agreements, which only apply if they are ratified by the Republic of Poland and published in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland. The legal policy (conducted by the competent authorities in each forum based on the specific procedures) is the ius reflex, which inspires the development of lex and vice versa. The law applies beyond the borders of states’ jurisdictions (res communis) in the maritime and outer space and becomes a constitutional element of the new civilization (market and culture), which gradually affects the law within the jurisdiction of states (sovereignty and sovereign rights). The power of law ceases to guarantee the resolution of international conflicts, which forces the application of the law of force. The sine qua non condition to survive the new civilization is to protect humanity and to share resources fairly in the process of transformation.

Mass migrations entail cultural changes in host nations. This includes the legal culture. Ours is the culture founded on the idea of equality and respect for individual rights, most profoundly expressed during the Great French Revolution. This culture is currently under pressure from migrants bringing in their own vision of society and law. Some of it promotes the inequality of men and women, reluctance to recognize secular law as law and disregard for democracy as a man-made order of things. The changes are hard to resist as the newcomers enjoy the protection of formalistically understood human rights. The need to respect the culture of the new arrivals, entrenched in our legal culture, works as a centrifugal force. To respect everybody’s needs a cohabitation of conflicting values is being tolerated. For example, it is morally wrong that known terrorists and Somalian pirates receive compensation for minor procedural violations by order of European courts from the same taxpayers who were exposed to their vile efforts. What suffers is equality and democracy and trust in the rule of law. We stand and the crossroads and some measures have to be taken to protect European legal culture from feudalization where each ethnic group is governed by its own law. One of the measures is to start paying attention to collective human rights of the indigenous nations that built that culture. It is time to apply the Radbruch’s doctrine on morally unaccepted effects of both existing laws and certain court decisions. An old adage “no democracy for the enemies of democracy” fits the needs of today.