The existence of the Court of the International Financial Centre “Astana” is a challenge to both legal theory and practice. This challenge concerns the status of the judges of this court, who apply the precedents of the English courts in their case law. This unique practice of letting the territory of a sovereign country enforce the principles coming from a completely different system of law is described by legal academics and commentators in various ways: as a reception, acculturation, transformation, implementation, migration of the law, continuity and replicability of the law. In this context, we analyse the very nature of the financial centre “Astana” and particularly one of its most prominent institutions, namely the Court of the International Finan-cial Centre “Astana” presenting it as a process of its integration into the framework of the Kazakh constitution of the autonomous legal system within the economic zone whose boundaries are determined by the constitution and the constitutional law governing the roles played by the international financial centre.

The analysis offered in this paper explores the legal definition of civil status and points out the different meanings of this concept in the basic branches of law as well as its relevance to the application in Poland of the norms of the Act of 28 November 2014 – Vital Records Law. The essence of vital records has also been considered. The discussion addresses the administrative-legal nature of civil status registration activities, highlighting their permissible legal forms. This is followed by a review of the most important features and scope of judicial review exercised by common and administrative courts, which serves as the background for an evalua-tion of the dispersed judicial review. The conclu sion offers de lege ferenda proposals relating to a uniform model of judicial review of civil status registration activities.

This article explores the possibility of replacing the traditional administrative supervision over the gig industry in favour of regulatory instruments rooted in economy. While regulation in this sense is not uncommon in the Enlish-speaking countries, even outside infrastructural sectors, in continental Europe, administrative supervision of business still prevails. The current approach of states, including administration, legislative authorities and courts, towards the gig economy can be attributed to the misconception expressed in the EU and national court decisions presuming that companies such as Uber, offering an electronic platform, form one entity with thousands of businesses performing services such as Uber drivers. This paper asserts that regulatory authorities with their powers of correcting the anomalies of the market, are better suited for platform-based services. States should use their powers to liberalise doing business, rather than restrict new, inventive forms of business to the detriment of the customers.

This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

The increased effectiveness of competition law enforcement has contributed to th appearance of an atypical type of cartel, which engages not only competitors, but also their common supplier (or retailer). The so called hub-and-spoke cartel consists in the exchange of strategic information between two or more horizontal competitors (spokes) via a common contractual partner active at a different level of the production/distribution chain (the hub), who often also contributes to stabilizing a cartel. Due to the existence of the vertical element of this indirect information exchange, the question arises whether it should be assessed in the same way as its direct equivalent, i.e. as a “by-object” restriction of competition, thus, not requiring an analysis of its actual effects. Although the EU institutions have not adjudicated a hub-and-spoke collusion case yet, the jurisprudence of the national courts may provide useful guidance on what the constituent elements of the hub-and-spoke collusion are and how to assess this practice under the EU competition law. The analysis of both national and EU case law allows to contend that the hub-and-spoke cartels should amount to de facto horizontal information exchange and be assessed in accordance with the “by-object” standard. However, the hub-and-spoke collusion may equally constitute a part of a normal negotiation process (e.g. bargaining) with trading partners, as well as give rise to several efficiency gains, which should be taken into account in examining the practice concerned under the EU competition law.

The Act of 17 December 2009 on pursuing claims in class actions regulating court proceedings in cases which involve claims of at least 10 people, is a kind of novelty in Polish law. Undoubtedly, it is a legal act improving and modernizing Polish civil proceedings. However, one should pay attention to new developments and the lack of their clarification, and therefore to the importance of already issued judgments of the Supreme Court. For this reason, existing jurisdiction on this subject has been presented and analyzed, which allows to precise the subjective scope, the term and extent of the unification of claims, as well as the concept and requirement of a representative of the collective. Without any doubts, the practice, which starts to shape, as indicated on the example of jurisdiction, will allow to clarify the scope of the subject and object of the Act. The ability to limit the claims for liability of the defendant has, without any doubts, a very important role in functioning of the class action, because the unification of pecuniary claims is in practice very difficult. Past court decisions show that unification should be understood as occurrence of a members’ request for the generically same forms of protection. Many practical problems are also raised by the concept of the representative of the collective, and the way, in which the collective should choose one.

In the judgement C-403/16 Soufiane El Hassani v. Polish Foreign Office European Court of Justice noticed that provisions of internal law cannot limit the right to judical-review established in art. 32 par. 3 of Visa Code. The regulation must be interpreted in context of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Meanwhile the sentence was answer to question of Polish Supreme Administrative Court and it arose under Administrative Courts Proceedings Act which prohibits performing judicial review over visa decisions. The aim of the paper is to explain that judicial review at those issues may be effectively performed by common courts, without damaging visa-applicants rights. The possibility comes from wide definition of civil case in code of civil procedure and attribution of common courts in some public administration cases.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

In the article, I contrast the contemporary legal dogma with the challenges underlying the political nature of law and judicial practice. Both the Continental jurisprudence and the judicial decisions issued by European courts are dominated by the dogmatic current – and treated as politically neutral acts. My intention is to carefully verify this quite common belief in this paper. Making use of H. Berman’s views, I assume that the present shape of jurisprudence and the judicial practice based thereon have been established as a result of political conflicts and that the legal dogma is capable of neutralising and solving modern-day political conflicts precisely because of the qualities of the said shape. It is therefore both a political and an apolitical activity. But this paradox is only apparent. In its strive to keep its paradigm alive, the dogma should be flexible in reacting to the challenges occurring in its political environment. It can – and should – modify the “buffer” of the theory upon which it is set in order to retain its core. In the article, I try to answer the question about the boundaries of the possible adaptation of jurisprudence and juridical practice with respect to claims raised by the domain of politics – claims currently articulated as the strongest by the so-called critical theories of adjudication. The final part of the paper is an attempt – based on the example of theses formulated in monograph
by R. Mańko, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania – to outline the said boundaries.