The article aims to analyse the national parliaments’ capability of exerting influence on the European Commission in the framework of the yellow card procedure. The analysis is based on the actions undertaken by national parliaments of selected Member States from Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe within the period between the announcement of the European Commission proposal for a targeted revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers and its decision to maintain the proposal. The analysis covers three variables concerning the states selected for analysis, namely the economic interest of those states, the coherence of their parliaments’ respective positions and the actions undertaken by the national parliaments, including those of their members, on the international level.

This text aims to prove the thesis that we are currently witnessing a birth of new constitutional solutions. The populist movements across the world, and especially in Central and Eastern Europe, are effectively redesigning liberal-democratic constitutionalism. There is a clear correlation between populism, constitutionalism, and democracy, and so the process of redesign of the Central and Eastern European constitutionalism has an underlying democratic potential. Perhaps it is a sort of necessary adjustment of the system implanted in this part of the world after 1989.