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Decyzje

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Year 2014-04-08 
Issue 6

Vulnerability of Selected Social Choice Methods to Strategic Voting

Piotr Pysiak
Microsoft

2014-04-08 (6) Decyzje

Article contents

Abstract

Analysis of vulnerability of selected social choice methods to strategic voting is presented in the article. Selected methods are: plurality voting, the Borda count and approval voting. Applied procedure allowed strategic voting of unlimited number of voters. With each method voters knew the outcome of the sincere voting, consistent with their real preferences. 24 variants differed on voting parameters; for each variant 1000 random profiles of preferences have been analyzed. Results are different from expected.

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APA style

Pysiak, Piotr (2006). Pysiak, P. . (2006). Vulnerability of Selected Social Choice Methods to Strategic Voting. Decyzje, (6), 45 58. Retrieved de https://journal.kozminski.edu.pl/index.php/decyzje/article/view/165 (Original work published 2014-04-08)

MLA style

Pysiak, Piotr. Pysiak, P. . “Vulnerability Of Selected Social Choice Methods To Strategic Voting”. 2014-04-08. Decyzje, no. 6, 2006, p. 45 58.

Chicago style

Pysiak, Piotr. Pysiak, Piotr . “Vulnerability Of Selected Social Choice Methods To Strategic Voting”. Decyzje, Decyzje, no. 6 (2006): 45 58. https://journal.kozminski.edu.pl/index.php/decyzje/article/view/165.

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