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Rok 6/2016 
Numer 26

Ewolucyjna stabilność dyskryminujących norm społecznych

Katarzyna Abramczuk
Uniwersytet Warszawski

6/2016 (26) Decyzje

DOI 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.77

Abstrakt

Praca przedstawia model ewolucyjny ilustrujący mechanizmy przyczyniające się do stabilności dyskryminujących norm społecznych, tj. zasad zachowania spełniających dwa warunki: (1) odmienne traktowanie aktorów o tych samych umiejętnościach i możliwościach, ale różniących się arbitralnymi cechami, (2) wsparcie na sankcjach społecznych. W proponowanym modelu zarówno dyskryminacja, jak i normy społeczne są konieczne, by rozwiązać problem koordynacji powstający, gdy sytuacja wymaga, aby poszczególni aktorzy podjęli różne zadania. Analizowane są własności zasad zachowania opartych na dyskryminacji, skutkujących różnymi poziomami nierówności. Pokazano, że
w ogólności zasady zapewniające równe wypłaty są łatwiejsze do ustabilizowania, ale niesprawiedliwe normy także mogą być stabilne.

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Cytowanie zasobu

APA style

Ewolucyjna stabilność dyskryminujących norm społecznych. (2016). Ewolucyjna stabilność dyskryminujących norm społecznych. Decyzje, (26), 27-57. https://doi.org/ 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.77 (Original work published 6/2016n.e.)

MLA style

„Ewolucyjna Stabilność Dyskryminujących Norm Społecznych”. 6/2016n.e. Decyzje, nr 26, 2016, ss. 27-57.

Chicago style

„Ewolucyjna Stabilność Dyskryminujących Norm Społecznych”. Decyzje, Decyzje, nr 26 (2016): 27-57. doi: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.77.