It is the intention of the author of this article to present the theoretical and legal views of Sigmund Freud and Emil Durkheim and to place them in the context of classical texts on political-legal theory. Both thinkers, rather associated with sociology or psychology than with law, treated law as one of the most important reference points in their social concepts. In both cases, we are dealing with the treatment of the social order as transcendent to the empirical individual, and at the same time created by society. At the same time, the law is supposed to impede the emancipation of the individual and to allow the individual to have a real influence on the creation of power structures. At the same time, despite numerous analyses of the theoretical-legal views of these thinkers in the European scientific literature, this is the first such analysis in Polish. In addition to presenting Freud’s and Durkheim’s views, it opens up the possibility of not only situating them among political-legal theories, but also points to perspectives on the operationalisation of these theories – as well as their possible social implications. To this end, the following article juxtaposes their theories with the traditions of legal positivism as represented by Hans Kelsen and Herbert L.A. Hart – two authors who were inspired by Freud and Durkheim respectively.

The workplace, a certain kind of organisation (which consists of people and, therefore, is social in nature), is crucial for perceiving labour law from the perspective of public administration. Put simply, if one wants to view the fulfilment of tasks or public functions within the realm of labour law, one always needs to bear in mind that although one might be referring to ‘the employer’, the discussion, in fact, refers to the workplace, with the employer being a certain ‘organ’ or emanation of the workplace. This reflection fills me with particular joy as a researcher because it necessitates the appreciation of the human ommunity at the workplace despite the considerable reluctance of the Polish labour law doctrine to accept the workplace as a human community and an administrative-legal construct of social organisation. I believe that the workplace must be recognised as a key institution in the theory of labour law and this is beyond any doubt. The social consequences of failing to recognise the workplace can be dramatic. Moreover, in a situation where other human communities are scarce, the importance of the community of the workplace (especially if one remembers its relative stability) turns out to be fundamental.

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge’s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.

The article deals with the problem of modal inference: if some addressees are
obliged to do something, they are also obliged to realize states of affairs which
constitute a necessary condition for the main obligation. Likewise, they are obliged
to refrain from realizing states of affairs which constitute a sufficient condition for
the action contradicting the main obligation. This type of inference is called in Polish legal theory “instrumental inference”. It is argued in the article that sometimes instrumental norms in law must be fulfilled (“preparatory actions” must be undertaken) before the main obligation is fulfilled. Lawgiver helps addressees of norms by applying vacatio legis. It can lead to new paradoxical consequences – to the creation of “virtual norms” – norms which never come into force, but addressees are obliged to undertake preparatory actions. The article presents theoretical
description of this phenomenon. In conclusion one dogmatic claim is proposed:
there is a potential way (art. 4171 § 1 k.c.) of getting from public officials compensation for preparatory actions which caused burden for addressees, when the main obligation turned out to be “virtual”. In Poland this procedure should be based on the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal.

In the paper, we deal with the issue of education of lawyers in doctoral schools in
Poland. We describe the basic solutions adopted by the Constitution for Science regarding doctoral students. Based on socio-legal theory of the neutralisation of values in the law, we point out a few basic the categories of problems resulting from the regulations and the implementation of the act. They are: a vision of a doctoral candidate, a vision of a graduate, internationalization, interdisciplinarity, structure of doctoral schools and financing of doctoral education. The article is exploratory in nature, so its primary purpose is recognising and drawing attention to the problems and research questions that should be studied in further research.

The paper presents the literary vision of „the power of medicine” as sketched by Aldous Huxley in his book Brave New World. Huxley created a futuristic image of society which reaches a state of complete organization and control of human procreation. In Huxley’s world humans are born as a result of in vitro fertilization and cloning. Human bodies, due to genetic selection, are produced for desired features of appearance and character, and the means of achieving universal happiness are appropriate pharmaceuticals. Artificial procreation as well as reproductive genetics anticipated by Huxley have become reality in the 21st century, implying several moral and legal dilemmas. In bioethical discussions questions emerge about the consequences of using new genetic technologies and the legal boundries of medical experiments on human bodies.

The article discusses Polish social welfare within the context of the economic analysis of law. Specific issues addressed in the article are: cost, time, ways of setting matters, the number of issued decisions and the beneficiaries of social welfare in Poland. Following the presentation, the obvious question arises concerning the legitimacy of the use of certain solutions, particularly in the context of their financial performance. Reflections on the social care model used in Poland are presented in the article, as well as the crisis of law as part of the broader issue of the crisis of the modern Western democratic state.

Interpretation is one of key notions on the convergence axis of law and literature. Both lawyers and literary scholars during their practices focus on interpreting complex language texts, establishing the meaning of expressions, reconstructing the sender’s intention, penetrating the influence of the text on the recipient, i.e. questions which turn out to be fundamental in both legal as well as literary texts. Analysis of the legal and literary interpretations allows us to identify differences as well as certain analogies between these two spheres of activity. They may be analysed through referring to the specificity of the entities participating in the interpretative practice, which are the sender and the recipient. The essential difference between interpretation in law and interpretation in literature consists of the rule that a legal text should be interpreted in the way that produces an unequivocal result. On the other hand, in the case of literary interpretation, it is difficult to reach a precise or unequivocal effect of reading the sense. Moreover, in literary interpretation it is not required. In a legal text and in a literary text the author-sender’s intention plays an important role. However, in the case of literary interpretation it is possible to apply a more flexible approach to the reconstruction of the author’s intention than in legal interpretation, where it is necessary to take into consideration rules and objectives of law only. The separateness of legal interpretation is justified foremost by the fact that it is specific purpose-oriented, which is establishing the meaning of the substance of applicable law.

In this work I present Leibniz’s views in the context of the dispute on the origins of language held in the 17th century and inspired if not yet by pure nationalism, then certainly by the argument about the priority of linguistic and cultural tradition. The Leibniz’s stand in the matter is not unequivocal. However, when comparing the philosopher’s marginal ideological statements, views expressed in his key texts concerning the theory of language, as well as the ones connected with the theory of cognition, we are lead to a conclusion that the philosopher has taken a different approach – not only as an ideologist defending Germany’s cultural heritage, but also as a thinker, theoretician and researcher of natural languages, proving the equality of their cognitive functions. The most interesting issue undertaken by the philosopher, is the problem of the status of language and its relation to thinking. In this context the futile argument about the priority of languages is replaced with a philosophical question, which remains significant to this day, about the human ability to create a language and its cognitive rank.

The article discusses the differences and similarities between discretionary, judicial power and administrative authority. It indicates a possible recognition of the administrative and discretionary power. The author also considers possible risks in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, associated with the abuse of discretionary by administrative authority.

The article contains seven justified arguments formulating a new programme of research in legal science. It is a programme of research on identity of the law. The author proposes i.a.: separation of the mental identity of the law as a distinct quality from the identity of law in its „physical” dimension. The new research trend requires a new independent methodology of knowledge, which may be a harbinger of a revision of many existing ways of conceiving the law.

The difficult history of Taiwan has preoccupied politicians and scholars for the better part of the last century and is unlikely to be unraveled in the near future. The main issue is the following: are there two separate Chinas or one and if so who has the right to represent China? Both the Taiwanese and Peking governments have consistently adhered the One China theory and both claim the right to represent the country. Many legal concepts were devised in support of either party, including that Taiwan had become res nullius after Japan’s unconditional surrender, or a condominium of the Allied Powers. Several major theories are analysed in depth, based on the interpretation of public international law such as the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, the Treaty of Taipei and the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty. Parallels are drawn between the attempts to decide the legal status of Taiwan and akin attempts performed by some European territories such as bringing Alsace-Loraine in the fold of France. The paper aims mainly at exploring various concepts of Taiwan’s status according to international law. This investigation takes into account the international and the domestic situation.

The Author presents a legal analysis of self-determination in international law. It is presented both through a historical and a modern perspective, recalling i.a. such cases as Kosovo, Quebec, Palestinian state in statu nascendi.

In the article the Author analyses an interaction between critics of law and the critics of theory of law. He studies a problem of the style of law theory and the influence of culture on that style. The Author proposes research the types of legal polemics. He claims, that the role of specific and abstract polemics in critics of law is significant and until now not sufficiently investigated.

The age of a human being is a common research topic in many branches. This topic is also addressed by the legal theory. Age categories also functioned in Roman law, determining the legal position of a person. In this article, the non-judicial sources which concerned the division of human life are analyzed. Consequently, it has been possible to determine that in ancient Rome, there were several theories concerning this matter. The division of life into three, four, five, six or seven stages was very popular. Each theory has different justifications and various arguments. Among those, we can distinguish medical, psychological, numerical and also military-administrative arguments.

The article is an attempt to problematize legal education in order to show its unconscious structures. Methodologically it is based on a Lacanian psychoanalysis, in particular on a three level concept of language. Considerations lead to the conclusion that the unconscious structure of legal education is opposed to conscious declaration. While declarations are talking about the transfer of knowledge, the real practices are based on enforcing discipline and subordination.

The article is based on an assumption that constitutionalism has a Janus face. A constitution is both a legal and a political act. So far, the public domain has been dominated by legal constitutionalism (constitutional dogmatics), which excludes the constitution from the public sphere, subjecting it to the authority of lawyers-experts. The contemporary political phenomena such as: new populism, illiberal democracy or new constitutionalism should shift the interest of researchers to the political aspect of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is, therefore, a multidimensional social practice. A political game featuring many actors. And the constitutionalism of lawyers is only one of its possible interpretations. Citizens also have their own constitutionalisms, and different perspectives on constitutionalism, reflecting opposing interests, may lead to conflicts. The constitutional law dogmatics applied to resolve such conflicts would argue for the existence of a transcendental framework for their resolution. A more political approach denies the existence of such a framework. In other words, the dogmatics in question requires democracy to adapt to constitutionalism, while the political approach requires constitutionalism to adapt to democracy. The text is an introduction to a part of a volume featuring articles by authors affiliated with the Centre for Legal Education and Social Theory of the University of Wrocław.

This article seeks to explore the issue of the required form of agreement on the transfer of rights and obligations of a party to a contractual relationship by a third party, which in the Polish legal system functions as an innominate contract and is more common in foreign legislations (Vertragsübernahme, transfer of contract, cession de contract). This issue has been analysed taking into account the various possible configurations of parties to such an agreement as well as the various legal natures of the rights and obligations transferred. So far, this matter has not been thoroughly discussed in the Polish legal literature. According to the author, in line with the unity theory, an agreement on the transfer of rights and obligations of a party to a contractual relationship should be classified as a single legal transaction and not as two separate (independent) transactions of claim assignment (Article 509 of the Civil Code) and debt transfer (division theory). Therefore, it requires a written form otherwise being invalid. This requirement applicable to an entire agreement results from Article 522 sentence 1 of the Civil Code; it also meets less strict formal requirements regarding claim assignment (Article 511 of the Civil Code). In this paper, the author also discusses the question of whether Article 77 § 1 of the Civil Code and pactum de forma regarding amendments to an agreement (Article 76 sentence 1 of the Civil Code) apply to the form of the agreement in question.