Artykuł stanowi glosę do orzeczenia Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z dnia 25 maja 2023 r. sygn. akt II FSK 2822/20. Przedmiotem glosy jest krytyczna ocena wydanego wyroku, w którym sąd uznał, iż w przypadku, gdy podatnik nie zapłacił podatku za granicą, a Polska nie ma podpisanej z danym krajem umowy o unika­niu podwójnego opodatkowania, podatnik nie może skorzystać z ulgi abolicyjnej. Autor glosy, argumentując swoje krytyczne stanowisko, wskazał błędną interpre­tację możliwości rozliczenia podatku według metody zaliczenia proporcjonalnego, co w konsekwencji skutkowało odmową skorzystania z ulgi abolicyjnej. Glosowany wyrok wpisuje się w dominującą linię orzeczniczą w odniesieniu do sytuacji, gdy brak umowy o unikaniu podwójnego opodatkowania, a jednocześnie podatek zagraniczny nie został zapłacony. Stąd zakwestionowanie jego sentencji może mieć istotne znaczenie dla praktyki stosowania prawa lub zainspirować do zmiany prawa (stanowienia prawa), zgodnie z przedstawionym wnioskiem de lege ferenda. W opracowaniu wykorzystano metodę dogmatyczno­prawną opierającą się na analizie przepisów prawa, orzecznictwa, stanowiska organów podatkowych oraz doktryny międzynarodowego prawa podatkowego.

The study based on archival, published historical documents and other available information sources highlights the activity of sickness funds that functioned in Ukraine on the territory of modern Prykarpattia during the period of Polish rule in 1919–1939 (the Second Polish Republic, in Polish: II Rzeczpospolita Polska) as a prototype of health insurance. The analysis of these documents allows to deter-mine the peculiarities of the activity of these institutions in relations with society and the state, methods of financing, rights and obligations of the members of these organizations, specific features of the decision-making management, insurance cases and ways of compensation. The retrospective approach used in this study makes it possible to recreate the picture of the past in the field of health care in general and health insurance in particular, even with the lack of historical and legal sources of a certain historical period. Seeing the present through a peculiar prism of the past helps to dive into the inner life of the society with all its manife-stations and ideas contributing to better understanding of modern social processes. In other words, the longer you look back, the further you see ahead.

The literary activity of Wenceslas Makowski (1880–1942) who was a prominent politician in the Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939) as well as a lawyer and a scholar, encompassed three main subjects: scientific, journalistic (mainly political and social), and artistic. His literary achievements in the scientific field of legal sciences are highly regarded. Of Makowski’s literary work in the scientific and journalistic field, his achievements in the field of criminal and constitutional law are noteworthy. Undoubtedly, this was associated with his extraordinary activity in the state bodies of the Second Republic of Poland. W. Makowski was also devoted to artistic activities and literary criticism.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.