The article analyses CJEU judgments passed as a result of preliminary rulings and their impact on the judicial decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court. Admini­strative courts are highly committed to and keen on referring preliminary rulings to the CJEU, which is a noteworthy fact. In assessing the implementation of the right legal instruments, the CJEU, by way of its judgments, often grants protection to taxable persons. These judgments have often resulted in legislative changes or changes in the interpretation of legal provisions. In some cases, the previous line of judicial decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court is legitimised and proven as correct.
What deserves particular attention is the CJEU’s existing judicial practice of dealing with tax law abuse cases, which is used by the SAC when examining cases involving tax carousels.

Following a complaint to an administrative court by two judges, the Prime Minister used the self-revision procedure and revoked his countersignature of the Presi-dent’s official act. This is a true precedent in the history of Polish constitutionalism. Yet, the permissibility of judicial review of presidential acts performed in individual cases should not give rise to any doubts. This is because such acts are subject to the general control regime set forth in the Act of 30 August 2002 – Law on Proceed-ings before Administrative Courts. What we can learn from other judicial systems indicates that the acts of central executive authorities are not, with some exceptions, exempt from such supervision. An analysis of the judicial decisions of, for instance, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, which recognises its jurisdiction over appointments of judges serves as a convincing example.

This paper presents the main ideas behind a new type of resolution, which, accord­ing to the proposed amendments to the Law on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, would be passed by the Supreme Administrative Court. The purpose of so­called pilot resolutions would be to prevent inconsistency in rulings concerning cases that are identical in legal and factual terms. In the concluding remarks, we underline the positive aspects of the proposed changes and argue that their incorpo­ration into the existing system would enhance legal certainty and increase the predictability of judicial decisions.

The judicial review of administrative courts covers the legality of acts and actions of public administration bodies. The oversight over the activities of bodies of other authorities is, therefore, excluded from this review. However, there are cases in which administrative courts, invoking the so-called pro-constitutional interpre-tation, attempt to extend their jurisdiction also to be able to review the acts, actions or inactions of legislative and judicial authorities. Despite the fact that according to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the executive power (equated by legal scholars, commentators, and practitioners with the exercise of public administra-tion) is exercised by the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers, the dominant judicial practice is that the acts of the President, which constitute the exercise of his prerogatives, are not subject to the jurisdiction of administrative courts. The author argues against this practice.
The discussion addresses also the demands and proposals made in the litera-ture dealing with the subject for entrusting administrative courts with the review of decisions issued in social insurance cases, as well as the establishment of a separate judiciary in tax or – more broadly – financial cases. The author strongly opposes these demands and proposals as well.

Legal certainty is one of the fundamental values of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, and striving to achieve it at the highest possible level is highly desirable. An essential factor influencing the degree of legal certainty is the predic­tability of judicial decisions. This is particularly significant for taxpayers, as it reduces the level of legal uncertainty. It is also relevant from a macroeconomic perspective, as a lack of legal certainty hampers a country’s potential for growth.
This paper analyses the state of Polish administrative courts’ practice of inter­preting tax law, which the authors consider unsatisfactory. It also offers a critical review of selected scholarly views on specific issues related to the core subject addressed.

This article is a contribution to the biography of Professor Andrzej Kabat – a prose­cutor, legal counsel, judge of the highest courts of the Republic of Poland, and a long­time academic teacher. The study discusses selected jurisprudential achieve­ments of Professor Andrzej Kabat from the period when he held the office of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative Court. Moreover, there are also references to his research on the institution of questions of law sub­mitted to the Constitutional Tribunal, which is regarded as pioneering in the science of law, despite the fundamental changes in the political system. What marks the discussed output of Professor Kabat is both the relevance of his ideas and the great significance for the practice of application of the law.

This article is a contribution to the biography of Professor Andrzej Kabat – a prose-cutor, legal counsel, judge of the highest courts of the Republic of Poland, and a long-time academic teacher. The study discusses selected jurisprudential achieve-ments of Professor Andrzej Kabat from the period when he held the office of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative Court. Moreover, there are also references to his research on the institution of questions of law sub-mitted to the Constitutional Tribunal, which is regarded as pioneering in the science of law, despite the fundamental changes in the political system. What marks the discussed output of Professor Kabat is both the relevance of his ideas and the great significance for the practice of application of the law.

In recent years, it has been a relatively common practice for the Polish antitrust authority – the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the OCCP) – to issue conditional decisions in merger control proceedings. Actually, this is not a practice known only to the Polish antitrust authority, as such decisions are also issued by the European Commission. Consents granted following this procedure allow participants to a planned concentration (also referred to as merger) to proceed, but under certain conditions – behavioural or structural. Several important issues arise especially with regard to the latter type of conditions, particularly in terms of the permissible degree of interference in the sphere of private legal rights and obligations of one or both participants in the concentration, and the consequences of failure to comply with the condition under which the concentration has been approved. These issues are the subject of this paper, which ends with conclusions and implications regarding the judicial practice of the Polish antitrust authority in the area in question.

The crimes of armed robbery and robbery with a deadly weapon have always been the most pervasive, harmful crime against property in Hungary and are mostly associated with male perpetrators since. However, there are also female perpetra­tors committing the crimes of armed robbery or robbery committed with a deadly weapon. Despite the availability of the judicial decisions in the public judicial database, the characteristics of these female perpetrators – including their motiva­tions and the judicial procedures – have never been analysed. This paper will look into how female perpetrators mostly act together with male perpetrators and mostly motivated by financial difficulties. The females in question are almost exclusively adults outside of a domestic relationship and are not parents. They typically have a low­level education, and as a result have lower­paying blue­collar jobs.

Margin squeezing is an abuse of dominant position, which is not directly mentioned in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Euro­pean General Court that have recognised this practice as anti­competitive, initially treating it as anti­competitive refusal to supply. Given the many similarities between these practices, there are questions as to whether margin squeeze should be consi­dered an separate manifestation of an abuse of dominant position. The aim of the article is to analyse the position of the European Commission in this regard and juxtapose it with the views contained in relevant judicial decisions, judgements, and rulings, as well as to compare it with the regulations adopted in the United States.

This article provides only a small contribution to the inevitable scholarly discussion on whether excluding the primacy of the literal rule in favour of the priority of a pro-EU teleological interpretation in the judicial and administrative applications of Polish tax law is really reasonable. Firstly, this article sets out to discuss the stages of the transposition of the concept of a household from EU legislation into the provisions of the Excise Duty Act. Secondly, it presents the evolution in the lines of the interpretation of this term as used by tax authorities and national courts. Thirdly, it demonstrates the negative legal and fiscal consequences that are caused in practice by the definition of this term as framed by the Polish legislator.

The amendment of Article 209 of the Polish Criminal Code, which took place on 31 May 2017 with the entry into force of the Act of 23 March 2017 on Amendments to the Criminal Code Act and the Act on Assistance to Persons Entitled to Maintenance (Journal of Laws of 2017, item 952), resulted in significant changes not only in the wording of the said article itself, but also in the picture of the statistical effects of pre-trial and court proceedings for the crime in question. From the very beginning, the said amendment raised questions and reservations among a substantial number of supporters of the established line of judicial decisions issued in the domain of criminal law. They considered it unfit to keep to the principles of adequacy and proportionality, as well as posing a threat to a significant – and ultimately destructive – increase in the burden on law enforcement authorities and the judiciary in general. At the same time, taking into account the main objectives and ideas of the amendment, which was intended in particular to improve the enforcement of maintenance obligations, it needs to be said that it proved ineffective and was actually a manifestation of penal populism.

The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative concepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the application of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity’s own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evaluative norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR’s judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level.

Fixed establishment (FE) is one of the institutions of the EU value added tax system; its structure is essential to correctly determine the right tax jurisdiction of an EU Member State for the purpose of VAT settlement in situations of cross-border provision of services. However, the legal structure of a FE adopted by the EU legislator (and, consequently, adapted to national legislation of the Member States) causes uncertainty when it comes to its interpretation. In the absence of unambiguously defined conditions in EU law to consider a specific presence and activity of an enterprise to be a FE, interpretation rules contained in judicial decisions
issued by the Court of Justice of the EU play an important role. Among attempts
made by the CJEU to clarify the ‘blur areas’ resulting from the dynamics of modern
business processes, one of the most interesting ones is the possibility of considering
a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for a parent company. The purpose of this
paper is to analyse legal and economic factors, the fulfilment of which may constitute a condition for considering a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for
a parent company, with particular emphasis on the ruling of the Court of Justice
of 7 May 2020 in the Dong Yang case (C-547/18).

The paper focuses on the issue of public enforcement of consumer law in Poland. This analysis considers exclusively the stage of administrative proceedings and it does not concern judicial control over the decisions issued. The analysis aims at answering the question whether the phenomenon of legal impossibilism is to be observed in the domain administrative proceedings instituted by the President of the UOKiK with the purpose of implementing consumer policy. The hypotheses to be verified in the foregoing are as follows: (i) there are procedural mechanisms which enable an authority to effectuate protection of consumer rights, operating to the public benefit, and that (ii) it might be reasonable to expect that these mechanisms are exploited in practice by the President of the UOKiK. The first part considers the legal framework for enforcing consumer rights with the use of public law mechanisms in Poland. In the second part, the discussion revolves around the
practical application of the legal instruments by the President of the UOKiK. The
conclusions constitute a starting point to initiate further, in-depth empirical studies
related to the activities undertaken by the President of the UOKiK with the aim
to effectuate protection of consumer rights in Poland.

This article concerns the problem associated with the nature of the institution of a petition for reconsideration of the case in view of regulation No 16 of the Administrative Procedur Code in the version before the amendment dated 3 December 2010, which entered into force on 11 April 2011. Despite the amendment, to this day the provision is the source of many disputes, which is reflected in a very non-uniform judicial practice. On the basis of this regulation can be observed, how defective constructed legal provisions affect the administration of justice and the application of the law by creating situations in which the courts take over the functions of law making. On the selected example is shown, how one decision of the Supreme Court, being the basis of decisions of courts of appeal, causes that victims defective administrative decision are charged with the responsibility for legislative errors. Knowledge of the matter, which is the subject of this publication, is extremely important for all practitioners as well as theorists of the law because of the importance of the issues, which accompany the main theme. The work is based on an analysis of the concept of finality and validity of administration decision and depth on theoretical consideration and extensive discussion of the judicial practice of administrative courts, civil courts and Constitutional Tribunal.

The author of the article draws attention to certain semantic contradictions appearing in contexts where the word „fact” is used in the language of legal acts and the language of legal practitioners. These contradictions pertain, in particular, to the possibility of attributing some logically exclusiv predicates, especially such as „true” & „untrue” and „existing” & „non-existing” to „fact”. This word is also key to an understanding of the legal notion of „truth”. The semantic collocation of „fact”, atypical for the expressions in general language, and the aforementioned predicates, suggests a specific and different meaning of the word „fact” in the language of legal acts and legal practitioners. „Fact” has been traditionally defined in Polish legal doctrine as a „fragment of reality”, so the stress was put on an ontological semantic component of the word. The author argues that such a notion of „fact”, in particular in the light of the legislator’s statements, may lead to language phenomena which are named by linguists as semantically „absurd” or „nonsense”. The pointlessness of expressions such as „untrue fact” or „non-existent fact” in the context of the general language consists of an inability to understand the meanings of these expressions. The author considers the possibility of regarding them as socalled semantic paradox, and the word „fact” itself as a „quasi-individual” name [nazwa quasi indywiduowa] or a hypostasis. He draws attention to the point, generally ignored in the literature by legal practitioners, that the word „fact”, as corresponding to a certain situation, is always expressible in the form of a meaningful sentence. Moreover, the language of legal practitioners, especially the language of judicial decisions, always associates an approving assertion to the notion of „fact”.

This article seeks to identify the characteristic features of judicial cosmopolitanism and its product – the emancipation of judges from the constraints of national law. Cosmopolitanism manifests itself in creating normative systems outside and above traditional international law. While the latter draws its binding power from the will of states, cosmopolitan rules are usually created by private actors. Their binding power results predominantly from practical necessity. Such is the status of lex sportiva, of the standards imposed by rating agencies, or of international accreditation bodies. Judicial cosmopolitanism is different, for it rests upon the existing structures and competencies. By resorting to alien legal sources judges free themselves from national constraints, thus enhancing their power and independence. In assessing the impact of cosmopolitanism, one has to differentiate between looking up to foreign laws and precedents as binding sources, and treating them as merely intellectual inspiration. The second, albeit it seems innocuous, entails serious perils to the quality of adjudication. It creates a danger of cherry-picking by selecting foreign inspirations, not necessarily best suited to the case at hand. There is a danger of judicial overstepping of powers by making laws instead of merely applying it. By allowing judges to venture the uncontrolled expansion of their powers we endanger the very essence of the rule of law. On a positive note, drawing on foreign legal sources enables judges to verify the rationality of their decisions, as they were already tested in other jurisdictions.