This study systematically investigates the primary issues and obstacles impeding the establishment of a functional and credible judiciary in Kosovo, adopting an international perspective. The research methodology includes a combination of qualitative and empirical analytical approaches to concrete actions based on a review of relevant literature, reports, and legal documents. This paper concludes that Kosovo should be ready to reach compromises, strengthen the independence, pro­fessionalism, transparency and accountability of judges and prosecutors, and increase public confidence in justice, to achieve a successful reform in the judicial system. The paper offers several recommendations for improving the quality and efficiency of justice in Kosovo, such as promoting cooperation and coordination with international factors in this field.

Under the provisions of Act I of 2017 on the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, a brand new institution has been introduced in Hungary: as of 1 January 2018, in administrative court proceedings, the judge may, with the agreement of the parties, allow for a court mediation procedure in the cases in which the law does not preclude it. The primary method to approach the topic is the review of the relevant primary legal sources [actual law in the form of the constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary), acts, governmental decrees, orders of the President of the National Office, court cases, etc.] and secondary legal sources (Hungarian and international scientific literature explaining the primary sources, the legal practice and also the specific circumstances determining the broader social environment) through which we may define relevant scientific problems, create our own definitions and prepare a catalogue of practical problems, specifically for Hungarian issues regarding the topic. Moreover, this article tries to build on the results of the interviews with judges, representatives of different defendants (administrative authorities) and others. Qualitative interviewing, including the interviewing of judges and other participants of such proceedings, is a relatively new method in the field of legal studies, at least in Hungary.

The paper aims to discuss the reasonable observer test as a tool for assessing judges’ expression. The argument begins by analyzing the relevant provisions of international soft law, as inscribed in the instruments developed and adopted by the CoE and the UN. Subsequently, an operationalization of the test is proposed by identifying the factors to be taken into account in the application of the test. In the following step, the expectations placed on the reasonable observer test are addressed, whereby the juriscentric (“strong”) and post-analytical (“weak”) positions are outlined. The former relies on Artur Kozak’s law-philosophical conception, and the latter is underpinned by the topography of juristic power developed by Paweł Jabłoński and Przemysław Kaczmarek. The paper makes the case for the post-analytical approach, which places rather modest expectations on the reasonable observer test and considers it instrumental in structuring the discussion, rather than yielding
indisputably reliable conclusions.

This article considers the meaning of trust for judicial communication. The central tenet of this analysis is that trust is best conceptualized as a judicial virtue and that it can be most fully explained with aretaic language. This claim is elaborated through, first, making distinctions between trust and reliance, as well as between trust and trustworthiness. Second, exploring the determinants of trustworthiness leads the author to argue for a virtue account of judicial trustworthiness. Third, the article discusses whether and how trust as a particular attitude or propensity may be perceived as a judicial virtue. The argument concludes by considering the relation between trust in judges and trust in justice institutions, such as courts of law.

Article aims to invigorate the study of judicial smiles in Polish legal science. Judicial smiles are treated as an element of psycho-social processes in the courtroom, in particular the judge’s non-verbal communication. Such an opening will be made by identifying and discussing a few real cases of judges’ smiles in Poland, and more precisely in the courtrooms of Krakow’s lower courts (civil and criminal divisions). The empirical material was obtained through passive observation of the hearings, supported by a standardized observational questionnaire. According to the results, (i) there are more smiles of judges in courtrooms than one might think, (ii) a judge’s smiles during questioning the witnesses (as a rule) is generally less controversial than that smiles expressed in relation to parties or participants, (iii) five types of judicial smiles were distinguished, (iv) two of them seem to violate important procedural rules, while the role of others is positive, (v) it is possible to reflect on the development of the judges’ ability to use a smile in a situational manner, of course in a narrow scope and under many conditions.

The article deals with the normative patterns of communication of judges in a theoretical perspective. Their identification is thus taken as a universal problem, occurring in all legal cultures and regardless of current disputes concerning them. It is assumed that normative patterns of communication among judges are built on the understanding of the role of the judge and the place of the judiciary within checks and balances. Based on the assumption that the role of judges and the status of the judiciary have evolved, three successive historical models of judicial communication were proposed, i.e. the first model – impersonal, the second – self restrained, and the third – accurate communication. The thesis was also put forward that the last of the models may prove to be inadequate in the face of contemporary challenges, resulting primarily from cultural changes driven by the development of new communication technologies.

This paper focuses on the issue of whether the boundaries of the private lives of judges are shaped according to cultural conditions and gender. My main assumption is that gender inequality in a culture is reflected in how the boundaries of the private life of judges are interpreted. In this regard, women judges may face more restrictions than their male colleagues in what they wear, what they do and what they say in their lives generally. And ultimately, an interpretation of private life that reinforces gender roles also limits the freedom of expression. I concretise my discussion regarding gender stereotypes that influence what judges do or say in their private lives in different cultures.

The goal of this article is to discuss the problem of communicativeness of the instructions given by judges to non-professional participants of court trials. The background of the considerations are the results of empirical research on communication in the courtroom, which, among other things, show that judges are significantly active in giving instructions. Drawing on research conducted within the “plain language” movement, the author points out those elements of instructions that increase their communicativeness and those that decrease it. As a result, some hints were formulated as an answer on question – how to increase the communicativeness of instructions given at the court trial?

This paper discusses judicial duty of improving the law on epistemic grounds and claims in that regarding this obligation, it is possible to give a place to free speech from an epistemic point of view. As a requirement of having epistemic agency, judges like other human beings have epistemological responsibility. Different from the others’ responsibility, judges’ responsibility is connected to their duty of improving the law, which is required by their job as well as the idea of the rule of law and judicial professional principles. Judges should improve the law’s capacity to guide the conduct of its citizens, who are obligated to obey the law. Improving the law also improves the delivery of justice. The ways of legal interpretation and justification are important to improve it. While applying the law, judges can find the law unclear or they may encounter some norm conflicts. In these cases, they
should resolve them to keep the law ‘legally in good shape’, which should meet epistemological requirements. When fulfilling this obligation, judicial free speech on epistemic grounds should not be limited.

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia’s military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to post-war international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature.
Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since the 17th century the theoretical foundations of the law of war have been laid, which enshrined in international laws and customs of warfare (Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention, etc.) since the 19th century, thus forming the international humanitarian law. After World War II, violations of the latter by the belligerent party are viewed by the world community no less harshly than the mere war. The paper questions the purpose, reasons, conditions and intermediate consequences of the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Obviously, the military aggression and the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022 marked the beginning of the de facto war, under a specific formal definition by a Russian official as a “special military operation” instead of naming it an attempt to avoid legal responsibility for war crimes committed in Ukraine. The article analyses the aggressive nature of this war on the part of the Russian Federation, demonstrates numerous violations of international law conventions by the Russian armed forces during the military invasion and temporary occupied territories in Ukraine. It emphasizes that the law of war has always been replaced by signing a peace treaty and relevant international agreements, which entails the obligation to severe the political, economic, and legal responsibility of the state violating international humanitarian law. The paper reviews the key institutions and legal tools for bringing the Russian Federation authorities to justice for the war crimes committed in Ukraine. So far, the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have managed to apply legitimate international legal
mechanisms, primarily the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council, to prosecute Russia for violating the international humanitarian law and committing war crimes in Ukraine. At the same time, on the Ukrainian territories currently liberated from the Russian army’s occupation (Bucha, Gostomel, Irpin, etc.), it is already possible to implement a special mechanism of justice, which consists in the collaboration between national and international experts: specialists, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to collect objective and impartial evidence of gross violations of international law and war conventions in Ukraine. It is obvious that for Ukraine today both the victory and just punishment for the committed and continuing committed war crimes on its territory are important. The aftermath of World War II’s “Never Again” now requires, as never before, its effective guarantee and protection

This paper dwells on the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity. It claims that for the emergence and proper functioning of judicial empathy as a kind of judicial virtue, a number of conditions needed to be fulfilled, including the development of judicial integrity. The paper aims to unpack this argument and to demonstrate judicial empathy and integrity in action as exemplified particularly by judicial behaviour observed during empirical research in Cracow lower courts. The overall perspective for examining the relationship between judicial empathy and integrity rests on the developmental vision of a judge. Although the presented research fits into the broader interest in judicial empathy and judicial virtues, the paper contains concrete examples of verbal and non-verbal behaviours of a judge that demonstrate how judicial empathy co-functions with other skills and virtues. In general, the paper opposes the marginalisation of judicial skills and virtues.

The article has two basic goals. The first one is to create a conceptual framework
for the discussion of judicial impartiality. In order to achieve this aim, in this text I reflect on three aspects of the principle of impartiality, which have generally been studied independently from one another in the literature. I make an attempt to show that the three distinguished aspects of impartiality can be analysed, using a uniform conceptual scale. The second goal of the paper is to justify a claim that one of these aspects (namely the aspect of impartiality towards worldview doctrines) differs from the other two in terms of structure. In the text, I attempt to consider that difference and then propose a formula for judicial worldview neutrality that takes into account the special nature of that aspect of judicial impartiality. The conclusion of these reflections is the introduction of two versions of the worldview neutrality principle, which should – in my view – be applied in activities under taken by judges.

This article seeks to identify the characteristic features of judicial cosmopolitanism and its product – the emancipation of judges from the constraints of national law. Cosmopolitanism manifests itself in creating normative systems outside and above traditional international law. While the latter draws its binding power from the will of states, cosmopolitan rules are usually created by private actors. Their binding power results predominantly from practical necessity. Such is the status of lex sportiva, of the standards imposed by rating agencies, or of international accreditation bodies. Judicial cosmopolitanism is different, for it rests upon the existing structures and competencies. By resorting to alien legal sources judges free themselves from national constraints, thus enhancing their power and independence. In assessing the impact of cosmopolitanism, one has to differentiate between looking up to foreign laws and precedents as binding sources, and treating them as merely intellectual inspiration. The second, albeit it seems innocuous, entails serious perils to the quality of adjudication. It creates a danger of cherry-picking by selecting foreign inspirations, not necessarily best suited to the case at hand. There is a danger of judicial overstepping of powers by making laws instead of merely applying it. By allowing judges to venture the uncontrolled expansion of their powers we endanger the very essence of the rule of law. On a positive note, drawing on foreign legal sources enables judges to verify the rationality of their decisions, as they were already tested in other jurisdictions.

The article presents the powers of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland in terms of their potential impact on the implementation of the principle of the independence of judges and independence of courts. During the initial analysis of legal regulations of individual competences of the Council the author attempts to assess their potential impact or lack thereof on the implementation of art.186 of the Constitution. This may be a contribution to the evaluation of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland and its relations with other state authorities.

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the institutions responsible for the election, promotions and nominations of judges in France, Germany and Poland. At the very eginning – in the introduction – the genesis of institutions which are equivalents of the National Council of the Judiciary was presented, starting from the philosophical basis for the idea of the independence of courts and judges, through international regulations to the constitutions of individual states. The main part was divided into 3 sections: a brief description of the judiciary, the composition of the institution responsible for the election of judges and the manner of appointing its members, and the competence of the council and the manner of appointing judges. Each of these issues was divided by the selected countries, thanks to which it will be possible to get a clear picture of how these institutions work in individual countries. As a summary, conclusions about how the principle of judiciary independence is met in selected countries, and whether meeting this principle depends exclusively on legal framework.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

What is law and what is teaching – remains disputable. The departure point shouldbe the notio n of law, which cannot be said to exist without reference to normativity, binding power and predictability. The obstacle in teaching law is that there are several centrifugal forces resulting in disintegration of law. These are, for example: creating fake sources of law such as binding recommendations, amending laws by lower-ranking acts, which is the specialty of the EU; informally adopting the
common law doctrine of stare decisis by Continental Judges; using the interpretation of law as a fig leaf for actually amending it; demanding the disregarding of national laws by judges if they come to the conclusion that national laws are in violation of the EU law by the EU Court, even if there is no procedural framework to do so. In teaching law, a teacher should promote theories and practices conducive to the cohesion of the legal system. Teachers have to take sides in the encounter of conflicting ideas and practices in the spirit of fighting for a better law.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.