The article has two basic goals. The first one is to create a conceptual framework
for the discussion of judicial impartiality. In order to achieve this aim, in this text I reflect on three aspects of the principle of impartiality, which have generally been studied independently from one another in the literature. I make an attempt to show that the three distinguished aspects of impartiality can be analysed, using a uniform conceptual scale. The second goal of the paper is to justify a claim that one of these aspects (namely the aspect of impartiality towards worldview doctrines) differs from the other two in terms of structure. In the text, I attempt to consider that difference and then propose a formula for judicial worldview neutrality that takes into account the special nature of that aspect of judicial impartiality. The conclusion of these reflections is the introduction of two versions of the worldview neutrality principle, which should – in my view – be applied in activities under taken by judges.

The article attempts to confront the concepts relating to the force of res judicata and its subjective limits present in the doctrine and jurisdiction with the current wording of the provisions regulating this institution and the provisions concerning enforcement-warrant proceedings which ensure a possibility to pursue a claim indicated in a judgment having the force of res judicata through enforcement proceedings. In the following article, the author presents the existing assumptions of the doctrine regarding mutual relations between the validity of judgment and the authority of res judicata. The author also analyses the possibility of granting the enforcement order against as well as in favour of a third party intervener, but also a uniform participant not indicated in the operative part of the judgment from the standpoint of the doctrine and jurisdiction. Taking into account the above mentioned considerations, the author concludes that in the light of the existing regulations, the concept of the force of res judicata whose subjective scope is limited to the parties to the proceedings indicated in the operative part of the judgement seems to be the most adequate.

The forms of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures were developed in the 1960s in the United States. The ADR is based on conciliation of the parties rather than judgement. This is possible through ensuring of broad participation of the parties in the dispute resolution. The ADR has as its objective the replacement of the adjudication process by forms of arbitration, contract, mediation and conciliation. The goal is to reach
a compromise. The basic division of the ADR is into the basic and the mixed (hybrid) forms. The basic ones include mediation, negotiations and arbitration. The hybrid forms include, for example, conciliation, fact finding, mini-trial. The ADR tools are successfully used for solving disputes in civil law, labour law, and administrative law and even in criminal cases. American agencies also apply ADR procedure called reg-neg to work out the content of legal regulations between officials and representatives of the parties concerned. ADR forms are also used in appeal proceedings. Despite unquestionable advantages of the ADR methods, there are critics who blame them for lowering the standard of the judiciary. There is no doubt that the application of ADR results in de-formalisation and simplification of the court proceedings and often in delegating the position of a negotiator or mediator to people without a legal background. However, this should not overshadow the greatest asset of the ADR, namely, the achievement of permanent agreements satisfactory for both parties.

This article seeks to identify the characteristic features of judicial cosmopolitanism and its product – the emancipation of judges from the constraints of national law. Cosmopolitanism manifests itself in creating normative systems outside and above traditional international law. While the latter draws its binding power from the will of states, cosmopolitan rules are usually created by private actors. Their binding power results predominantly from practical necessity. Such is the status of lex sportiva, of the standards imposed by rating agencies, or of international accreditation bodies. Judicial cosmopolitanism is different, for it rests upon the existing structures and competencies. By resorting to alien legal sources judges free themselves from national constraints, thus enhancing their power and independence. In assessing the impact of cosmopolitanism, one has to differentiate between looking up to foreign laws and precedents as binding sources, and treating them as merely intellectual inspiration. The second, albeit it seems innocuous, entails serious perils to the quality of adjudication. It creates a danger of cherry-picking by selecting foreign inspirations, not necessarily best suited to the case at hand. There is a danger of judicial overstepping of powers by making laws instead of merely applying it. By allowing judges to venture the uncontrolled expansion of their powers we endanger the very essence of the rule of law. On a positive note, drawing on foreign legal sources enables judges to verify the rationality of their decisions, as they were already tested in other jurisdictions.

The article presents the powers of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland in terms of their potential impact on the implementation of the principle of the independence of judges and independence of courts. During the initial analysis of legal regulations of individual competences of the Council the author attempts to assess their potential impact or lack thereof on the implementation of art.186 of the Constitution. This may be a contribution to the evaluation of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland and its relations with other state authorities.

In the correspondence between the governor of Bithynia-Pontus and emperor Trajan in the years 111–113 one can find an exchange on whether to allow a buried body to be exhumed and transported to be buried in a different place. Pliny, who was familiar with Roman practices in this respect, turned to the emperor seeking advice on what policy he should adopt with regard to the inhabitants of the province. The emperor’s answer upheld the common practice that it was possible to move a body to a different burial site only when there was a strong reason for doing so (especially when the tombs were being violated or otherwise under threat). Trajan’s judgement influenced the decisions by subsequent rulers who took their stance in this matter.

In analysing the historical development of the Roman criminal procedure it should be observed that it followed the immediacy principle from the earliest times until the Justinian period. Adherence to this rule is best confirmed by the manner in which particular evidence was taken in the Roman criminal procedure, as well as by its judicial evaluation. The significance attached by Romans to the principle in question is corroborated primarily by an example of evidence obtained from a witness’s testimony. Already in the Republic period, testimony given personally by a witness before the court was preferred to testimony in the form of a document. Adherence to the immediacy principle in the Roman criminal procedure was manifested by the fact of preparing reports, initially comprising only certain decisions, e.g. judgements, and later all procedural actions. In the Empire period, the Roman criminal procedure was also ominated by the immediacy principle. The fact that the principle was adhered to is explicitly confirmed by the rescripts issued by Emperor Hadrian, expressing the demand that direct evidence be taken before the court, the reform of the irenarchae’s office implemented by Antoninus Pius, as well as a ban on legal assistance in criminal cases, confirmed by Justinian. Certain exceptions to the immediacy principle were allowed, such as submitting at a trial written laudationes prepared out of court and reports on interrogation of witnesses compiled during the proceedings, as well as admissibility of circumstantial evidence.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the institutions responsible for the election, promotions and nominations of judges in France, Germany and Poland. At the very eginning – in the introduction – the genesis of institutions which are equivalents of the National Council of the Judiciary was presented, starting from the philosophical basis for the idea of the independence of courts and judges, through international regulations to the constitutions of individual states. The main part was divided into 3 sections: a brief description of the judiciary, the composition of the institution responsible for the election of judges and the manner of appointing its members, and the competence of the council and the manner of appointing judges. Each of these issues was divided by the selected countries, thanks to which it will be possible to get a clear picture of how these institutions work in individual countries. As a summary, conclusions about how the principle of judiciary independence is met in selected countries, and whether meeting this principle depends exclusively on legal framework.

In the judgement C-403/16 Soufiane El Hassani v. Polish Foreign Office European Court of Justice noticed that provisions of internal law cannot limit the right to judical-review established in art. 32 par. 3 of Visa Code. The regulation must be interpreted in context of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Meanwhile the sentence was answer to question of Polish Supreme Administrative Court and it arose under Administrative Courts Proceedings Act which prohibits performing judicial review over visa decisions. The aim of the paper is to explain that judicial review at those issues may be effectively performed by common courts, without damaging visa-applicants rights. The possibility comes from wide definition of civil case in code of civil procedure and attribution of common courts in some public administration cases.

Climate change is one of the key civilisational issues. This change is caused by greenhouse gas emission. Stopping this change requires multidirectional actions on a global scale, primarily limiting the combustion of fossil fuels. What reaches towards these needs is the proposals of the international community, which are determined in the protocol of 15 December 2015 (called the Paris Agreement). The legal framework for the strategy of implementing it in the European Union and the member states is formulated by the legislative package “Clean Energy For All Europeans”. The directions and terms of developing the economy pose particular challenges for Poland which plans to maintain
the significant role of coal in the energy industry for decades. Government documents show that the government of the Republic of Poland will not decide on the spectacular decarbonisation of the economy. It cannot be obligated to do it, either, due to the treaty conditions. However, the future of the coal energy industry seems prejudged. This results from the development directions of European economic-legal instruments which serve the direct (determining binding emission standards and environmental quality standards) and indirect (through influencing the prices of greenhouse gas emission allowances) rationing of the activity of entities from the energy sector in the environment.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

What is law and what is teaching – remains disputable. The departure point shouldbe the notio n of law, which cannot be said to exist without reference to normativity, binding power and predictability. The obstacle in teaching law is that there are several centrifugal forces resulting in disintegration of law. These are, for example: creating fake sources of law such as binding recommendations, amending laws by lower-ranking acts, which is the specialty of the EU; informally adopting the
common law doctrine of stare decisis by Continental Judges; using the interpretation of law as a fig leaf for actually amending it; demanding the disregarding of national laws by judges if they come to the conclusion that national laws are in violation of the EU law by the EU Court, even if there is no procedural framework to do so. In teaching law, a teacher should promote theories and practices conducive to the cohesion of the legal system. Teachers have to take sides in the encounter of conflicting ideas and practices in the spirit of fighting for a better law.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

Climate change is one of the key civilisational issues. This change is caused by greenhouse gas emission. Stopping this change requires multidirectional actions on a global scale, primarily limiting the combustion of fossil fuels. What reaches towards these needs is the proposals of the international community, which are determined in the protocol of 15 December 2015 (called the Paris Agreement). The legal framework for the strategy of implementing it in the European Union and the member states is formulated by the legislative package “Clean Energy For All Europeans”. The directions and terms of developing the economy pose particular challenges for Poland which plans to maintain
the significant role of coal in the energy industry for decades. Government documents show that the government of the Republic of Poland will not decide on the spectacular decarbonisation of the economy. It cannot be obligated to do it, either, due to the treaty conditions. However, the future of the coal energy industry seems prejudged. This results from the development directions of European economic-legal instruments which serve the direct (determining binding emission standards and environmental quality standards) and indirect (through influencing the prices of greenhouse gas emission allowances) rationing of the activity of entities from the energy sector in the environment.

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the institutions responsible for the election, promotions and nominations of judges in France, Germany and Poland. At the very eginning – in the introduction – the genesis of institutions which are equivalents of the National Council of the Judiciary was presented, starting from the philosophical basis for the idea of the independence of courts and judges, through international regulations to the constitutions of individual states. The main part was divided into 3 sections: a brief description of the judiciary, the composition of the institution responsible for the election of judges and the manner of appointing its members, and the competence of the council and the manner of appointing judges. Each of these issues was divided by the selected countries, thanks to which it will be possible to get a clear picture of how these institutions work in individual countries. As a summary, conclusions about how the principle of judiciary independence is met in selected countries, and whether meeting this principle depends exclusively on legal framework.

The article presents the status of an assessor in the court of law in accordance with applicable legal provisions. For the needs of the study, the most important competences of the assessor were chosen in relation to the principle of judicial independence and independence of the courts. Additionally, the most important stages of shaping the institution of the assessor from 1928 were also approximated.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.