The purpose of the article is the legal and comparative analysis of how the principle of the proportional restriction of the rights and freedoms of an individual is understood by the Constitutional Tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights. The author made a comparative profile of selected statements of the indicated judicial bodies, which refer to the essence, theoretical basis, structure and the practical application of the concept of proportionality, which allowed for distinguishing the basic similarities and differences between how proportionality is perceived by the CT and how it is viewed by the ECHR. The main thesis of the paper assumes that the most important and the most far-reaching differences concern the proportionality test structure as presented by both judicial bodies, as well as some practical aspects of the application of the test in the circumstances of specific actual states, however, the essence itself and its axiological basis remain similar in both cases.

The purpose of the article is to propose a concept of the collective right to food which may turn out to be essential in fighting hunger and malnutrition on a global scale. International agreements, including Pacts on Human Rights, overlook the rights of indigenous peoples by corresponding to the individualistic, state-centric, consumeristic and commercial vision of the right to food. An approach, which is based on the objectives of critical studies on law, to the official dogma of the right to food (developed within expert and intergovernmental bodies in the form of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) allows for claiming that the dogma is less legitimized than the collective right to food (defined in the Decla-ration of Atitlán) resulting from the indigenous peoples’ practice. This is why, remaining in the sphere of the official, Grotian international legal order, it should be acknowledged that the indigenous peoples’ right to food defined in the article is a part of third-generation rights (next to the second-generation individualistic right to food) while remaining strictly connected to the right to self-determination and the right to development. It is a result of the long-term practice of those peoples. The above-mentioned proposal of the third-generation right to food has not been applied to the legal doctrine so far. Its value is the opportunity to develop and study the concept of food sovereignty that allows one to more effectively combat hunger and malnutrition on a global scale as compared to the previous actions of international communities.

The rule of law does not govern all human interactions. There are times when the state bypasses legal constraints, as documented by the World Justice Project. Other times, jurisdictions may be mutually unfriendly and refuse to enforce foreign laws. Blockchains create trust between contracting parties at the individual level, enabling them to transact freely and increase consumer welfare. Blockchains can only supple-ment antitrust if the legal constraints do not impede their development. The law should thus support the decentralization of blockchains so that blockchain-based mechanisms may take over (even if imperfectly) where the law does not apply. With that in mind, we justify the attractiveness of that approach by showing that blockchain causes an increase in the number of transactions by creating trust (Part 1), and that it may overall increase the decentralization of economic transactions (Part 2). The law should take into account where it applies (Part 3). We conclude afterward (Part 4).

The interest in the profession of a mediator increased with the popularisation of mediation in Poland. The tendency was supported by the legislator’s liberal defini-tion of requirements for performing this professional function. In the article, we raise issues related to the principles of entering in the register of permanent mediators in Poland. We present the currently applicable legal regulations and we analyse them, focusing on the requirement to have knowledge of mediation and to be skilled in it. This requirement is interpreted in different ways by individual authorities that enter candidates’ names in the register of permanent mediators (presidents of district courts), and its interpretation is also evaluated differently in both Polish literature and case law.
The purpose of the article is to show the areas of legal regulations that require changes and unification, on the basis of analysing the results of statistical research conducted by the authors. It is significant particularly from the perspective of the ongoing discussion on the professionalisation of mediators in Poland, especially in the context of the planned changes and the introduction of the National Register of Mediators. The accomplishment of the task undertaken by the authors is primarily served by the formal and dogmatic method as well as the comparative method used in the statistical research. The purpose of that method was to show discrepancies in interpreting the regulations concerning mediation.

One of the basic aspects of modern education is the development of key compe-tences. This requirement is included in the legislative acts (domestic ones and those of the European Union) as well as in documents specifying core curricula in individual countries. By analysing this problem as exemplified by Poland, we show that communication competence in the language of the legislative acts, fun-damental for a modern, conscious people, is an absent element of key competences. In the article, we show why it is important to learn about the real features of the legislative acts in a rapidly changing, knowledge-oriented society. We present the results of the analysis of the core curriculum applicable in Poland for secondary schools in terms of legal education. We also present a proposal to include issues developing legal communication competence in the secondary school curriculum.

: According to Article 15(1) of the UDHR, ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’. Although the quoted provision looks deceptively straightforward, the determination of its content is not an easy task. Past research has been mainly focused on the problem of statelessness which was the historical reason for the introduction of the right in question. In this paper, I argue that holding the status of a formal national is not enough to have the right to a nationality secured. To show this, first, I analyse the difference between the concepts of ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ with special attention paid to the cultural component of national identity. Second, I investigate the understanding of a nationality as ‘the right to have rights’. On the basis of the research on the statelessness I ask what challenges are faced by people without the formal nationality of any state and I show that being a national of certain states is equivalent to being stateless with respect to certain fundamental rights of an individual. Thus, the right to a nationality is indeed ‘the right to have rights’, but only if it is a right to a right nationality. In consequence, I suggest that (1) any state which recognises the right guaranteed in Article 15 of the UDHR should embrace its full content by readiness to accept as nationals those whose original nationality does not guarantee the protection of their first-order rights or is based on values clearly contradictory to their own; (2) peoples from failed states should be able to acquire new citizenship in a country of maximal cultural affinity, with regard to the economic effectiveness of the latter; (3) the obtaining of new citizenship may legitimately be conditioned by demand on compliance with the system of values of the nationality granted.

The article analyses known facts concerning the corruption of deputies in Ukraine. The negative influence of various oligarchs on legislative activity is shown in it. It was established that the manifestations of corruption in legislative activity are significantly easier due to its imperfection and lack of proper regulations.
The principle of the inevitability of punishment as regards the deputies is formal. Several recommendations have been formulated based on the research in order to improve legislative measures.
Numerous corruption-related facts concerning the deputies indicate significant deformations of legislative activity for the purpose of illegal enrichment. It was shown in the paper that the improvement of the legislative process has not been implemented properly.
There is every reason to claim that the purpose of individual deputies’ legislative activity is to form unclear relations between business and the government on special conditions to which citizens do not have any access. Some of the deputies use those privileges not for the good of society, but for personal enrichment.
It is noted that the inevitability of the punishment of deputies for the crime of corruption is rather pretended. Activities which are meant to fight corruption in that category of higher national officials are being implemented quite slowly.
An adoption of a number of acts improving legislative actions the purpose of which is to fight corruption among deputies is proposed. The elimination of illegal relations between the government and business is a priority.

The COVID-19 pandemic, placing societies and governments in an exceptional situation in every respect, has had an impact on the legal order of individual countries. It pressed them, on the one hand, to take swift and decisive actions and, on the other hand – to a necessary thorough assessment and considering of the costs and consequences, both legal and economic, of the introduced measures, often related to the constraints of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. Although Sweden during the pandemic seemingly chose a path different from other European countries, keeping social life largely unaffected, in its essence this strategy did not differ much from those used in other countries. The aim of the article is to present the solutions adopted in Sweden and to analyse the Swedish strategy against the background of constitutional civil liberties.

The purpose of the article is to analyse the relationship between judicial integrity and the institution of votum separatum. The first part concerns the relationship between the concepts of a definite approach to a professional role performed and the institution of votum separatum. The second part of the paper attempts to answer the question whether care about maintaining integrity can actually be attributed to dissents submitted to the Constitutional Tribunal. The article attempts to justify a conclusion that judicial integrity does not constitute the main function of dissents that are actually submitted to the Tribunal. The main obstacle is interpreting cases in which such dissents were submitted, as axiological opposites. Thus, what can be attributable to dissents is definite values, for the protection of which these dissents are submitted, such as e.g. individual rights or care about the public interest. However, the relation of these values to judicial integrity is not obvious. This results from the fact that axiological characteristics attributed to the same judge’s dissents are subject to change. That change results not from the inconsistency of beliefs, but from the characteristics of the case examined.

The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.

The purpose of the paper is to analyse issues related to personal data processing
within the framework of co-operation between the employer and trade unions in
individual employment matters. The issues of personal data processing in collective relations are becoming more important especially due to lack of detailed legislative solutions, which results in the necessity to apply the general provisions of the GDPR as well as the latest changes to the Trade Unions Act. Pursuant to these changes, not only employees, but also persons performing gainful employment who are not employees can create and join trade unions as well as can be defended by the trade unions. The legislator frequently finds it difficult to adjust the protection of personal data to the specificity of collective relations, and the way in which the relationship between employers and trade unions is shaped in individual employment matters raises many questions in the context of personal data protection. The issue in question has not been explored in depth in the professional labour law literature. Thus, research on this subject is novel and justified from both the theoretical and the practical perspective. In the article, the formal-dogmatic method of research was used.

There are many theoretical and legal issues related to the operation of private military companies (PMCs) and their presence (location of their registered offices) in democratic states under the rule of law that remain unsolved in legal doctrine and practice. There are no clear rules at an international level that define the status of these agencies and the way in which they carry out their duties. There is also the problem of distinguishing between contractors and mercenaries. PMCs, like private security companies (PSCs), are used by states in exchange for large government contracts in so-called „unwanted wars”, where it is cheaper to conduct operations without parliamentary oversight, media publicity, or social objections to sending military contingents abroad. Sometimes it is a question of providing discrete military aid to „friend countries”. PMCs are politically safer in such a situation. Not only states but also non-governmental organizations, private companies,
rebel groups and declining dictators hire these private armies. The problem requires urgent multifaceted reflection leading to changes in legal doctrine and legislative action, both at the international level and in individual countries.

One of the main provisions in shaping legal obligations between the parties is the freedom of contract. Although the parties are free to choose the provisions of their agreement, the content and the aim of the contract cannot contradict the essence and nature of the contract of employment, the act and the principles of the community life. Thereby, in order to engage an employee based on a long term contract of employment for a specified period, along with a short, two weeks notice termination period, justified and rational presumptions should be in place. In other words, taking into consideration current provisions of law, long term contract of employment is acceptable; however its validity is depended on the circumstances of each individual case.

The author of the article draws attention to certain semantic contradictions appearing in contexts where the word „fact” is used in the language of legal acts and the language of legal practitioners. These contradictions pertain, in particular, to the possibility of attributing some logically exclusiv predicates, especially such as „true” & „untrue” and „existing” & „non-existing” to „fact”. This word is also key to an understanding of the legal notion of „truth”. The semantic collocation of „fact”, atypical for the expressions in general language, and the aforementioned predicates, suggests a specific and different meaning of the word „fact” in the language of legal acts and legal practitioners. „Fact” has been traditionally defined in Polish legal doctrine as a „fragment of reality”, so the stress was put on an ontological semantic component of the word. The author argues that such a notion of „fact”, in particular in the light of the legislator’s statements, may lead to language phenomena which are named by linguists as semantically „absurd” or „nonsense”. The pointlessness of expressions such as „untrue fact” or „non-existent fact” in the context of the general language consists of an inability to understand the meanings of these expressions. The author considers the possibility of regarding them as socalled semantic paradox, and the word „fact” itself as a „quasi-individual” name [nazwa quasi indywiduowa] or a hypostasis. He draws attention to the point, generally ignored in the literature by legal practitioners, that the word „fact”, as corresponding to a certain situation, is always expressible in the form of a meaningful sentence. Moreover, the language of legal practitioners, especially the language of judicial decisions, always associates an approving assertion to the notion of „fact”.

The article presents the covenant marriage on the example of the state of Louisiana. This institution is a legally distinct kind of marriage, in which the marrying couple agree to obtain pre-marital counseling and accept more limited grounds for divorce. The author attempts to answer the question about the transfer of this institution as a whole or its individual elements on the ground of Polish law. This article provides some reflection about the liberalisation of divorce law in Poland and Europe.

Transfering duties customarly designated for public entities to private entities is a fact. It is connected with delegating on them a part of legal power in creating rights and duties of individuals. A vast majority of their domineeringly will is commonly stated on the grounds of by-laws. By-laws have different form, content and even different function. At the same time, depending only on the will of private entities several times interfere in the freedom and the rights of their addressee. That is why scientifical research concerning their essence and content, including a progressive and complicated process of “privatisation of public safety” seem to be more and more important. On the ground of this research, several by–laws laid down by private entities are being analysed.

This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

The article presents the powers of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland in terms of their potential impact on the implementation of the principle of the independence of judges and independence of courts. During the initial analysis of legal regulations of individual competences of the Council the author attempts to assess their potential impact or lack thereof on the implementation of art.186 of the Constitution. This may be a contribution to the evaluation of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland and its relations with other state authorities.