The constitutionalization of the referendum and law making citizens’ initiatives makes them important institutions and also important tools for exercising direct democracy. The question that arises today is the effective usage of these tools, in the framework of enhancing the direct participation of the citizens in governance. Particularly, in countries like Albania, which represents one of the newest democracies established after the fall of the Communist regime in Europe, the exercising of these instruments encounters different challenges, coming up especially due to lack of traditions and practices in exercising direct democracy, legislation vacuum and the insufficiency of organizational experiences of the civil society. Nevertheless, some experiences in particular have been achieved in the last 15 years, after the current Constitution of the Republic of Albania was enacted. Out of the
direct democracy instruments that are sanctioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, this paper will focus only upon the law making citizens’ initiative and on the abrogative referendum initiative, as well. Legislation, jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and some other issues identified through the experiences established in Albania will be treated in this paper. These experiences are analyzed in a comparative point of
view with the experiences of other countries, particularly Italy.

The article portrays the ballot paper as a constitutional instrument of electoral democracy. The authors argue that the result of an election often depends on the form, the content, and the method of filling out the ballot. It is shown that a ballot is an election instrument of standard form, by means of which a voter votes for candidates and/or lists of candidates, and which later allows to establish the election results. It is concluded that the definition and classification of ballot types has not only theoretical but also practical value. In particular, this issue is of great practical significance in four cases: 1) simultaneous elections of differing types (sometimes including a simultaneous vote at a referendum); election of candidates for elective offices under different types of electoral systems or different types of territorial constituencies; 3) the vote count and establishing the outcome of the election; 4) prosecuting criminals for the illegal use of ballots.

The article concerns real and potential reactions of jurisprudential discourses to the phenomenon of the crisis of liberal democracy. The author argues that liberal democracy has been a hegemonic structure – meaning that not only has it been dominant in the factual sense in the broadly understood Western legal and political culture but it has also effectively suppressed any competing discourses. Today, the hegemony of demoliberalism is being questioned. The new state of affairs causes a range of complications that
jurisprudential discourses have to deal with. The author considers three possible scenarios of the reaction of these discourses to the said crisis. The first of them means a shift towards democratic authoritarianism. The second is about remaining in a collective hypocrisy, waiting for a change in the current intellectual climate. The third involves accepting the political nature of jurisprudence and making the concept of agonistic democracy a reality.

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current ‘juridification’ of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political
nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

Research into liberal democracy’s self-preserving quality is usually confined to the notion ‘militant democracy’ and focuses mainly on the specific instruments the political system employs to challenge its adversaries and bolster its structure. This paper takes a different approach to understanding liberal democracy’s self-preservation. It challenges the boundaries of the dominant concept by exploring consolidative tendencies in a more general and comprehensive fashion, focusing on gradual political – and legal evolutionary developments that contribute to the solidification of the political system. On that basis, a critical follow-up question is posed: what are the implications of these consolidative endeavours? By highlighting ‘political impotence’ and its destabilizing effects as one of more socio-political implications, the paper suggests that the self-preserving vigour of liberal democracy might turn out to be counterproductive, and that the crisis which liberal democracy is now experiencing does not occur in spite of but rather because of its self-preserving characteristics.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis.
The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

Debaty o Unii Europejskiej, jej modelu i funkcjonowaniu, charakteryzują się uproszczeniami, a w wielu przypadkach przesiąknięte są ideologią lub niewiedzą. W europejskiej – w tym polskiej – dyskusji pojawia się też często wąsko rozumiany interes narodowy, a strony żonglują emocjami i lękami, które przesłaniają niedostatki rzeczowej informacji. Kontrowersje między Unią Europejską a Polską, które pojawiły się na tle oceny stanu praworządności czy też problemu relokacji uchodźców dowodzą, że przedmiotem sporu staje się w pewnym stopniu model integracji oraz jej podstawowe pojęcia prawne. Należy się zastanowić, na czym polega specyficzny prawnie charakter UE? Dlaczego zgodziliśmy się powierzyć jej kompetencje do wykonywania władzy publicznej? Czy Unia ogranicza suwerenność Polski? Czy w Unii możliwa jest demokracja? Mimo krytyki Unia pozostaje sprawnym mechanizmem zarządzającym współzależnością państw członkowskich. Parafrazując Marka Twaina: Doniesienia o jej zgonie wydają się przesadzone.