Subjects of rights originating from inherent human rights are among the subjects of public subjective rights. A deliberation on the matter of natural persons and legal persons, perceived as subjects of these rights, makes it possible to determine a number of questionable issues, which are surely reflected in the materialisation of these public subjective rights in legal practice. The subject matter is very complex, if only on account of the necessity to make use of the results of the linguistic interpretation of the notion of citizen. This is vital even though a legal definition of citizen exists. The intricate nature of the problem in question is also a consequence of the need to make a distinction in the area of the possibility to grant public subjective rights originating from inherent human rights to citizens, non-citizens under the jurisdiction of the Polish state, and non-citizens outside the jurisdiction of the Polish state. Another highly problematic aspect is the possibility to apply an analogy in the field of assignment of subjective public rights originating from inherent human rights to legal persons. Since the very application of analogies in this domain is controversial, it seems reasonable to stress the lack of possibility to consider legal persons as subjects of public subjective rights originating from inherent human rights such as life or health.

The aim of the publication is to establish the function of the legal regulation of the principle of resolving legal doubts in favour of the citizen (in dubio pro libertate), introduced by the amendment of 2017 to the Code of Administrative Procedure. The purpose of the article is also to compare the state of the regulation in force at the time of its entry into force with the legal state created after the introduction of the amendment. It has been argued that the introduced principle worsened the legal situation of citizens in relation to their situation before its entry into force. The paper briefly presents the functions of law, including procedural law. This principle has been discussed and it has been established that it has a protective function. First and foremost, to ensure the security and stability of the law when the legislator has failed to fulfil its duty to legislate correctly and fairly. This function is of particular importance in cases where an administrative body unilaterally determines constitutional rights and freedoms. Resolving legal doubts in favour of the citizens is of particular importance in administrative law, which is very dynamic area (inflation and atomisation of this law), specialised (e.g. technical conditions of development) and complex due to the existence of various hierarchies of sources of law (constitution, statutes and secondary legislation, including local laws). The principle also protects other values, such as an important public interest. As a result of the comparison of the state of regulation before 2017, it was established that as long as the principle of in dubio pro libertate was a postulate of the doctrine, court judgments, interpreted from other principles of administrative proceedings, it did not suffer such significant limitations and could serve more fully to protect an entity. It the current state of law, administrative bodies can make use of it in a limited way only to several proceedings. Nor does it apply if there is – as is common in administrative proceedings – an important social interest or conflicting legal or factual interests of the parties concerned. The originality of the work results from taking into account the case law developed since the entry into force of the principle and the comparison and analysis of the situation of citizens before and after its introduction into the Code. The research carried out for the purpose of this work will be based on the comparative legal method as well as legal-dogmatic analysis, including the analysis of Polish normative material and the resulting views of the judicature and doctrine of law.

The Schengen legislation is an integral part of the EU law, which translates into a right to free movement within the “borderless area”. This right can be, however, restricted, especially in the light of threats to public safety and order – and, less frequently, to public health. The restriction imposed on account of the above has become an event without precedent in Schengen’s history of over 30 years. The legal measures implemented on borders are absolutely exceptional on a global scale. One of them is the temporary
estoration of control at the internal borders of the EU Member States. The other is the “restriction on non-essential travel to the EU”, meaning, in fact, closing of the EU external borders to citizens of third countries. One could propose a thesis that even the most significant achievements in the process of integration, including the Schengen Area, are temporarily inactivated in the face of an unpredictable supra-European threat. The mission of the EU and its Member States is to establish a new set of rules that will help the Schengen Area survive the early phase of the pandemic by suspending its main principles for some period of time. Will these new rules be extended? And if so – on what conditions? How will it affect the future of the Schengen Area? These issues have not yet been featured and discussed in scientific publications given the recency and relevance of the subject, neither have they been presented in a legal-dogmatic context

The article analyzes the idea of the so-called “golden visas” or the possibility of purchasing citizenship or permanent residency offered by some countries. There are numerous controversies about this solution, and the defenders and opponents have many rguments for and against it. Arguments presented in the article confirm that at this stage, it is not possible to abandon this solution. However, it is possible to see problems arising from the existence of this institution and to introduce appropriate safeguards so that possible negative effects are minimized.

The publication explores the phenomenology and content of ‘soft law’ in the international
and national law and reveals the designation of ‘soft law’ in protecting the electoral rights of the citizens. ‘Soft law’ is intended to mean optional international documents, most of
which are resolutions of the intergovernmental organisations containing statements, commitments, guidelines, common positions or statements on policy or intentions. ‘Soft law’ documents are usually adopted by the statutory bodies of the international organisations on issues that reflect new problems, tendencies or trends in the field of electoral law, for which there is no political will or the accordance of all the member states in the form of a classical international treaty. When it comes to the content, the ‘soft law’ documents are all kinds of statements, obligations, guidelines, codes of conduct, codes of ethics, guidelines and standards, common positions or statements of policy or intentions.

This text is a contribution to the discussion on the state of legal education in Poland. The author refers, in particular, to the article by A. Czarnota, M. Paździora and M. Stambulski regarding a hidden program in legal education, describes the existing situation and proposes changes that should be introduced in legal studies and teaching methods for future lawyers. On selected examples, she shows how one can oppose the domination of dataism in university teaching at law faculties in
Poland and at the same time educate competent lawyers and conscious citizens.

This paper deals with the activity of the public administration of the Czech Republic. It analyses the structure and mechanisms of the functioning of the institutions of public administration and self-government of the Czech Republic. It appeared not so long ago that responsible persons were held accountable for wrong decisions – of both technical and political nature. In some cases, these decisions were also used against responsible persons at all levels. This research is based on the analysis of the present Czech legal norms and their application in the decisions made by local administration.

The article is based on an assumption that constitutionalism has a Janus face. A constitution is both a legal and a political act. So far, the public domain has been dominated by legal constitutionalism (constitutional dogmatics), which excludes the constitution from the public sphere, subjecting it to the authority of lawyers-experts. The contemporary political phenomena such as: new populism, illiberal democracy or new constitutionalism should shift the interest of researchers to the political aspect of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is, therefore, a multidimensional social practice. A political game featuring many actors. And the constitutionalism of lawyers is only one of its possible interpretations. Citizens also have their own constitutionalisms, and different perspectives on constitutionalism, reflecting opposing interests, may lead to conflicts. The constitutional law dogmatics applied to resolve such conflicts would argue for the existence of a transcendental framework for their resolution. A more political approach denies the existence of such a framework. In other words, the dogmatics in question requires democracy to adapt to constitutionalism, while the political approach requires constitutionalism to adapt to democracy. The text is an introduction to a part of a volume featuring articles by authors affiliated with the Centre for Legal Education and Social
Theory of the University of Wrocław.

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current ‘juridification’ of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political
nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis.
The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act of 1766 (Tryckfrihetsförordningen), the world’s very first legislation supporting freedom of the press and freedom of information, is part of the country’s constitution and grants today the widest possible public access to official documents. It forms the basis of the traditional Swedish right known as The Principle of Public Access to Official Documents (offentlighetsprincipen) and plays a crucial role not only in providing the right to access public documents, but is also indispensable in order to uphold public accountability of government and state officials. Exercising the widest possible transparency contributes to the proper functioning of the liberal democratic system, while curtailing corruption and abuse. Developing transparency and shaping an open society promotes greater participation of citizens in the society, encourages confidence in the state – an essential element in building an effective state that is to serve its owners, the citizens – as well as benefits the functioning of the rule of law and increases the quality of democracy.