In the prison subculture, informal institutions have spontaneously evolved to mitigate levels of violence and potential confrontations between inmates. First, rookies (new prisoners) are subjected to initiation tests, which try to measure their rigidity (bravery) and cunning (intelligence) and assign to the appropriate subcultural group. Membership in a group of grypsmen signals the rigidity of prisoners and discourages fighting between the grypsmen or the resistance from members of lower groups. Experienced prisoners perfect eristics within the framework of prison argot, which allows them to turn real confl icts into verbal duels, use informal arbitration and learn to pretend aggression towards freshmen. All prisoners are trying to join the defensive coalitions. Inmates also perform spectacular self-injuries in accordance with secret procedures, faking desperation, but in fact minimizing damage to health and trying to get some benefi ts from the prosecutor or prison authorities. The collected empirical
material comes from the prisons in Warsaw (Rakowiecka) and Białołęka, where the author spent fi ve months in 1985 as a political prisoner.
Studies show that people perceive income inequality differently than most popular income inequality measures and axioms (postulated properties of inequality) indicate. This article synthesizes and reviews different results on income inequality perception. It presents basic income inequality axioms and analyses the level of support found in multiple studies. The paper shows that while answers to particular questions seldom perfectly agree with income inequality measures, the general pattern of respondents' answers is strongly correlated with these measures. It also argues that the observed differences can be partially explained by following Amartya Sen’s suggestion that income
inequality is a multidimensional concept (1973, p. 48).
I examined the robustness of the anchoring effect with respect to the method of valuation, type of anchor and the availability of information about the presented product. In four different laboratory experiments, I elicited consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for cosmetic product manipulating anchoring conditions (low vs. high anchor or no anchor vs. high anchor). I observed that only the market anchor (the real price of a similar product) had an impact on WTP. I also found that the strength of the anchoring effect is lower in incentivised
valuation tasks compared to hypothetical anchoring questions (I observed a significant anchoring effect only in experiment with declarative valuations). My findings suggest that the robustness of the anchoring effect is limited.
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przegląd wiedzy dotyczącej heurystyki zakotwiczenia. Mimo silnego ugruntowania empirycznego wytłumaczenia efektu zakotwiczenia nie można sprowadzić do działania jednego mechanizmu psychologicznego. W pierwszej części artykułu zostaną omówione klasyczne mechanizmy kotwiczenia – mechanizm niewystarczającego dopasowania i model selektywnej dostępności. Przeanalizowane będą również alternatywne podejścia teoretyczne do wytłumaczenia tego efektu. W drugiej – procedury eksperymentalne wykorzystywane do badania efektu kotwiczenia. Według literatury kluczowe aspekty determinujące skuteczność kotwiczenia to m.in. ilość zasobów uwagowych poświęconych wartości kotwiczącej i spójność kotwicy z celem szacowania. Jednakże zestawienie zasad kotwiczenia z rezultatami eksperymentów wykorzystujących różne procedury wyraźnie pokazuje, że zasady te nie mają charakteru uniwersalnego. Wskazane problemy natury teoretycznej stanowią propozycję kierunku dalszych badań nastawionych na ujęcie efektu zakotwiczenia w ramach jednego mechanizmu psychologicznego.
This study presents the results of an experiment on determinants of the strategy used by the participants and their profi tability. The study was based on N-person games in normal form 3x3. All games have clearly defined theoretical solution (the unique Nash equilibrium, which can be reached using the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategy).The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is the failure of the theoretical model predictions based on Nash equilibrium. The use of non-equilibrium strategy for people with relatively little theoretical knowledge was due to the inability to find such a strategy. However, participants with a relatively high theoretical knowledge use non-equilibrium strategies deliberately expecting higher profi t. That is why theoretical knowledge is useful, but its use should be adapted to the situation in the real world. This enables players to achieve extra profits.
The goal of the article was to compare negotiation behavior in duopoly andbilateral monopoly. The nature of tested bargaining problems was based on the scheme of cooperative repeated games. Performed experiments tested two hypotheses. First, in terms of cooperative game players will negotiate Pareto optimal solutions. Second, the split of profits will be indicated by egalitarian solution. Other cooperative results, that were taken into account were Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. The results of experiments supported taken hypotheses. Additionally, it gave the opportunity to make some comparisons between two tested market structures. Despite the differences of two bargaining situations, the results of experiments brought some observations showing similarities of bargaining behavior. First, in both cases negotiated solutions were significantly close to Pareto optimal set. Second, either in duopoly or in bilateral monopoly the results of negotiations were significantly close to egalitarian solutions. Next similarity was, that the gap between profits in opening proposals significantly differed from zero, and was significantly correlated in pairs of players in both experiments.
I conducted a three-person ultimatum experiment in which the stake is divided into two pots of different sizes. The responders receive either the same amount of money or the same share in their pots, and have full information about the distribution of the stake. I find that subjects care about comparisons between the responders and these comparisons significantly affect their emotions. The responders who are treated more poorly than their counterparts report high intensity of anger and envy, and by punishing the proposer with rejections cause a significant loss of effectiveness in the distribution of income. On the other hand, the responders who are treated better than their counterparts report high intensity of guilt, which suggests strong inequality aversion.
The dynamic development of experimental economics, in particular of experimental work in game theory, has contributed to the questioning of the basic assumptions of classical game theory: the rationality and self-interest assumption. In response, those assumptions are being modified and more realistic models of human behavior in situations which can be described as games are being developed. The article provides a short overview of the models that abandon the self-interest assumption. An account is given mostly of the distributional models (i.a. inequity aversion models, model of quasi-maximin preferences). The results of the experiments designed to test the rival distributional models of social preferences are also presented in the article, as well as of the experiments that assess to the role played by intention-based reciprocity in motivating human behavior.
For more than half a century experimental results accumulate that disprove prognostic value of perfect equilibrium, a concept derived from the principle of rationalistic egoism. The article is a short survey of popular experimental games in which actors make decisions of monetary consequences, thus shaping the income distribution in a group (dyad, in particular). A brief account is given of experimental research on ultimatum and dictator game, dictator's dilemma, trust game, centipede, gift exchange and public good game. Special focus is on dictator's dilemma which tests for readiness to benefit one's partner at one's own expense. This elementary personal dilemma turns out to constitute an essential part of more complicated and better known two- and multi-personal games.
Praca zawiera przegląd wyników eksperymentalnych dotyczących gry przetargu-ultymatywnego i gier pokrewnych. Obserwowane w eksperymentach postępowanie graczy w tej grze zasadniczo odbiega od przewidywań teorii gier, formułowanych dla zachowania racjonalnych graczy w racjonalnym otoczeniu. Ponieważ gra jest bardzo prosta, rozbieżność ta nie jest skutkiem kłopotów graczy z analizą strategiczną gry. Przedstawiamy w sposób krytyczny inne możliwe wyjaśnienia tej rozbieżności, w szczególności postępowanie dyktowane poczuciem sprawiedliwości i reakcje emocjonalne. Opisujemy także badania eksperymentalne nad wpływem parametrów gry (wielkości wypłat, opcji zewnętrznych itp.) oraz zewnętrznych czynników (np. narodowości) na decyzje podejmowane przez graczy.