In this article we attempt to summarize the fi ndings from a number of studies on the asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect, decoy effect). This is a phenomenon where popularity of one of the decision alternatives increases when accompanied by a similar but inferior (dominated) option. Scientifi c research and numerous observational studies show that the attraction effect occurs in various fi elds, incl. the economy, politics, law or medicine. In the literature there are many ambiguities and contradictory theories about, for example, its determinants in the light of the dual-systems theory. It is not ntirely clear whether the phenomenon of asymmetric domination is the result of a refl ective, deliberative way of information processing or of quick and intuitive thinking. There is also no unequivocal answer to the question whether this effect is a manifestation of human irrationality or whether it is an adaptive and effective decision-making strategy in conditions of uncertainty and information noise. The article contains a broad overview of research on the effect of asymmetric dominance among people and animals. The hanges in the susceptibility to this effect across the lifespan are analysed. Finally, the paper discusses using the asymmetric dominance effect to achieve socially desirable goals as described in the theory of libertarian paternalism.

This paper revisits one of the most debated tales from the Old Testament, Jacob’s deception of his father Isaac, and models it in the framework of a Bayesian game. Solving for the equilibrium that occurs in the Torah reveals what conditions must hold for biblical characters to be willing to make the decisions that they make. The paper also examines how the protagonists’ decisions would have changed if they had held different values. The analysis sheds light on which interpretations of the biblical story hold the most weight when its characters maintain consistent beliefs and act upon them in a sequentially rational manner.

Both in economics and psychology, positive discount rate is usually assumed as an axiom. However, there are circumstances which may lead to negative discount rate. This article presents such a phenomenon. Moreover, author presents particular cases of theories and models which imply preference of receiving lower income in later period of time, rather than higher income in earlier period of time (“less later than more earlier”). The described models are as follows: Life Cycle Hypothesis together with Self Control Theory, Construal Level Theory, Model of Patience Formation and Loewenstein’s Anticipation Model. Authors conclude that there is a need of empirical research verifying implications of these models concerning negative discount rate. Authors believe that the problem of negative discount ratedeserves more attention, taking into account that in developed countries interest rates are close to zero and it still does not discourage customers from putting money aside.

This paper serves as a brief introduction into the methods, results and problems of the new interdisciplinary field of neuroecomics (and its relatives).The focus is on the practical benefits that may result from it for the economicprofession. These primarily involve the possibility of setting new promisingresearch directions and providing novel tools raising hopes of enabling directobservation of human preference. The author also discusses methodological and ethical challenges that neuroeconomics is or will soon be facing.

The dynamic development of experimental economics, in particular of experimental work in game theory, has contributed to the questioning of the basic assumptions of classical game theory: the rationality and self-interest assumption. In response, those assumptions are being modified and more realistic models of human behavior in situations which can be described as games are being developed. The article provides a short overview of the models that abandon the self-interest assumption. An account is given mostly of the distributional models (i.a. inequity aversion models, model of quasi-maximin preferences). The results of the experiments designed to test the rival distributional models of social preferences are also presented in the article, as well as of the experiments that assess to the role played by intention-based reciprocity in motivating human behavior.

This paper presents the new, interdisciplinary field of science called neuroeconomics. The first part of the paper shows relations between neuroeconomics, classical economics and behavioral economics. Next, the most popular measurement methods used in neuroeconomic experiments are described. Finally, the paper reviews results from neuroconomic research in four areas: 1) choices under risk and uncertainty, 2) moral decision making, 3) intertemporal decision making, 4) economic behavior in the social context.

This paper is an introduction to a relatively new (and little known in Poland) field of economic research – the experimental economics. We briefly sketch its history and main research areas, and describe some of most important findings in laboratory experiments and their significance for the mainstream economics. We also present a sample of the experiments conducted in the experimental economics seminar at Warsaw University.

Auction theory belongs to one of the most important applications of game theory in economics. The possibility of presenting an auction as a game facilitates its strategic analysis and the comparison of different auction rules in relation to the player`s expected payoffs. The aim of this paper is to review basic knowledge concerning symmetric auctions for which we assume that all bidders possess the same amount of information concerning sold objects and all bidders` valuations are independent as well as identically distributed random variables. The first part of this paper is devoted to unit object auctions. We will present strategic analysis of the family of such auctions within the model proposed by Riley and Samuelson (1981). The second part of the thesis will be devoted to the description of different types of multiple object auctions: the simultaneous ascending auction and the Anglo-Dutch auction which have been created to sell telecommunication licenses, the combinatorial auction, during which buyers receive the possibility to place their offers on sets of items, and finally the double auction in which many buyers and sellers participate.